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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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REAL DANGER OF LIBYAN PRESENCE IN CHAD

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 3 Feb 81 p 1

[Editorial by A. Hamouni]

[Text] As tragic as it may be, the Chadian affair is not without parallels to Pandora's box. As soon as one thinks one problem is solved, another pops up to prove the extreme complexity of the many confrontations which, while apparently being played out inside Chad, actually spring from external interests and designs.

It is that country's misfortune that its geographic position situates it at the center of gravity of a vast region whose equilibrium is easily shaken by the turbulence affecting the African continent.

Without assuming responsibility ourselves for the lines drawn by the colonialists, we still cannot deny the key position that country occupies in terms of the overlapping and harmonization it maintains between historically complementary civilizations and economies.

Bordering on the north and northeast with the Libyan Jamahiriya and Sudan of the Arab-Muslim civilization, Chad also cuts widely into the very heart of our continent, opening on Central Africa and Cameroon in the south, vast and rich Nigeria to the southeast, and, on the east, finally, Niger and Mali, whose pronounced concerns regarding national independence must be appreciated.

Indeed, this central position confers on Chad an important role as a junction, one on which are riding great hopes from the standpoint of the complementarity which, in globally strategic terms, is posed in its many aspects by Africa as a continent. In such a context--political and geographical--it is evident that neither the interests of Chad nor those of the countries surrounding it can be viewed in isolation. In plain words, durable stability for these countries depends on stability in Chad, and vice versa. The Lagos accords of 1979 and the installation several months later of the Transitional National Union Government (GUNT) headed by Mr Goukouni Oueddei were in fact a first step toward that objective. We are only too familiar with the sequel. The violation of those accords was solely the doing of Hissein Habre, and whatever the western media may say, the conflict is not between two individuals, but between a faction--the FAN [Northern Armed Forces] of Hissein Habre--and the remains of the GUNT within which are represented several

political-military forces waiting for the general elections which should definitively establish the state institutions of Chad.

One might expect the spoil-sports and other troublemakers, for whom the unity of the country has no importance except to serve their personal ambitions and thirst for power, to be universally and unequivocally condemned. No, profiting from the windfall, African and extra-African forces are going to latch on once more to the Chadian problem in order to disturb the peace, which is already fragile, and with the evident goal of devesting the re-emergent independence of the country of any real meaning.

So bogeymen are invented, and some are crying. "Wolf!" In short, the finger is pointed at direct foreign interventionism.

In an excess of bad faith, Hissein Habre, who himself has benefited from Egypt's human and logistical support, declares that enemy forces are "led by foreign mercenaries." Revealing once again the heart of his intentions and trying to play on the conservative learnings of the United States, he calls on Ronald Reagan, the new president, to take the Chad problem "seriously," "with due regard for its repercussions over all of Africa and the global strategic balance."

At that very moment--and this is obviously not merely by chance--the Egyptian under secretary for foreign affairs, Mr Mohamed Samir Ahmed, is making a visit to a number of African capitals for what are called "consultations." In Dakar, the real object of his visit becomes clear when he asserts that "Egypt is ready to bring its support to any Chadian nationalist front that would act for the preservation and independence (sic) of Chad."

The obvious aim behind such statements is to internationalize the Chadian problem, to judge by the way Egypt's maneuvers harmonize with imperialist designs on the continent. This hypothesis is all the more plausible when new struggles for influence seem to be unfolding presently in that part of Africa known as franco-phone. Egypt, and there can be no doubt about it, is in the process of strengthening its role as a continental policeman, a role given to it by imperialism.

It goes without saying that Chad, quite weakened by several years of war and foreign military presence, appears to be the weakest link, the one through which that strategy of neocolonial redeployment could take form.

By way of consequence, this new effort at destabilization cannot be confined merely to Chad. In effect, if it were successful, the entire region centered around Chad would be threatened.

This is why it is vital, in the face of this newly defined danger, for all African countries concerned for their security and stability to support all efforts aimed at assuring Chad's authentic independence, at consolidating its national unity, and at definitively escaping foreign interference.

In a word, Chad's security is the security for all the surrounding countries. After all, to say Chad is unlucky is to refer only to circumstances of the moment. For, as we have seen, it is destined by its position to play a decisive stabilizing role.

U.S. ARMS SALES TO MOROCCO

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 8 Feb 81 p 1

[Editorial by Tayeb Belghiche]

[Text] The press has just disclosed alarming news: barely installed, the new American administration has delivered OV-10 reconnaissance planes to Morocco and is getting ready to supply it 108 tanks.

Beyond the speed with which the White House acted, one might well question the intention of this gesture that in no way augurs well for the stability of north-west Africa.

Already the United States has in the past supplied the Rabat regime with all sorts of armaments--in order, it said, to "facilitate a peaceful resolution." We know the result. Morocco has shown itself to be more aggressive and more arrogant, in particular by threatening to exercise "the right of pursuit" into Algeria. Then, too, King Hassan II himself announced that 1980 would be the year of peace in the Western Sahara, but he showed himself incapable of taking the smallest step in that direction. However, the OAU and the United Nations have laid out the only possible path by which Morocco could honorably disengage itself from a war it unleashed itself. But it refuses to heed the voices of wisdom which are speaking out here and there throughout the world.

The American arms deliveries can do nothing but comfort the Rabat regime in its intransigence and encourage it to fan the flames of the conflagration it has started. Algeria has every right to be disturbed. The United States in fact cannot be unaware that all the Moroccan political parties are claiming a part of Algeria's territory just as they have always claimed Mauritania.

Moreover, if Washington's arms are destined for Morocco's war against the POLISARIO Front, it [Washington] is not only failing to contribute to peace, but is setting itself at odds with the wishes of the international community, which as a whole has declared itself in favor of implementing UN Resolution 1514 with respect to the Saharan people and for opening negotiations between Rabat and the POLISARIO Front. American Congressmen and a delegation from the State Department which separately visited the region have concluded that implementing these measures is the only solution capable of restoring harmony in the Maghreb region.

And it is precisely the duty of the United States as a great power and permanent member of the Security Council to work for the preservation of peace in the world. To act otherwise is not realistic.

The only way to help Morocco is to persuade it to begin a real peace process motivated by the same political will that already enabled Mauritania to disengage itself from the war. By over-arming it, on the other hand, the White House assumes a heavy responsibility that could have grave consequences. It could find itself implicated in a dangerously escalating entanglement of circumstances.

In addition, American warships have been sent to Moroccan ports in order, it is said, "to show concretely the decision of the new American administration to support Morocco," and this has been done precisely at the moment when the ministers of foreign affairs of the nonaligned countries are holding their meetings in New Delhi. Is this not yet a further provocation of the movement, which itself has also ceaselessly called on Morocco to grant the Saharan people their legitimate rights?

9516
CSO: 4400

USSR REPORTEDLY SETS UP POWERFUL RED SEA INDIAN OCEAN NAVAL BASE

Windhoek ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 20 Feb 81 p 2 [of supplement: DER WOCHENSPIEGEL]

[Article by Peter M. Rane: "Red Triangle in Southern Arabia"]

[Text] The Soviets are busy setting up a triangular base around the "Gate of Tears" (Bab el Mandeb) where the Red Sea empties into the Indian Ocean. Their purpose is to be able to control that important shipping lane to the Suez Canal, to the oil-rich Gulf and to Asia. With Aden in the middle they dominate the strait separating the Horn of Africa (Somalia) and the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula.

Shippers were reporting already last fall that "something was brewing" on the Dahlak islands right before the Ethiopian harbor of Massawa. This important harbor in the province of Eritrea was defended by Soviet destroyers 2 years ago against Eritrean freedom-fighters. The Soviets held it. Later, those destroyers and other warships anchored securely off the coral islands of Zuqur and Great Hanis, part of the Dahlak Archipelago.

The Dahlak islands are populated by Moslems from southern Arabia. They are situated in the Red Sea. They constitute the Soviets' basis for control of Eritrea as well as the Ethiopian harbor of Massawa. Most of all they provide a counterweight to Ras Benas in southern Egypt where the Americans want to construct an airfield for their "rapid deployment force." It is still not clear whether a Soviet airfield will be located on the Dahlak islands.

Dahlak protects red Aden from the north. In the east Sokotra island, the "third leg" of the triangular base, performs a similar function. Last fall the Soviets resettled most of the population of this barren, rocky island in the Indian Ocean--fishers mostly--on the mainland of South Yemen. Since then they have proceeded full steam ahead with construction of a man-made harbor. At present, using their own work force and machinery, they are piling up an enormous breakwater. Supply ships with parts and materials, and "trawlers" for electronic espionage are a familiar sight at Sokotra.

By this year the base will be so far towards completion that it will be able to serve as "home port" for the new "Kiev" (32,000 tons) aircraft carrier. Up till now, Soviet navy heavy units were stationed only temporarily in the Indian Ocean. With Aden and Sokotra, Moscow has at any rate come up with a suitable replacement for Berbera (Somalia) that is now being used by the Americans.

Aden, with its docking and repair facilities, is irreplaceable as a harbor for the Red Fleet. Even it is being expanded. Ten to twelve berths for atomic submarines are supposed to be ready by this year. Four Kresta-class guided-missile cruisers, as many as 10 Kriyak-class destroyers, and 5 guided-missile frigates are permanently stationed at Aden. They all belong to the Soviets' "Indian Ocean fleet," with headquarters in Vladivostok. But it won't be long before they will be redeployed to Aden with their own admiral. Moscow will then for the first time as an imperialist superpower have a permanent naval force outside of its own territorial waters. Since Aden's civilian airport and the Soviets' military airfield at Khormaksar share takeoff and landing strips, and since the harbor is visible on approaching by air, the South Yemeni are compelled to construct a new international airport at Riyan, far to the northeast of Aden. Moscow wants this. Construction will be partly financed by a \$15 million credit from Kuwait. Kuwait's ruler will visit South Yemen in February.

All Soviet supply ships for Ethiopia, Angola and Mozambique pass through Khormaksar. Two squadrons of MiG-15, 2 squadrons of Ilyushin-38 long-distance reconnaissance craft, and 1 transport wing are stationed there for defense. Because of this massive presence the Soviets are careful to "steer" international visitors to South Yemen "away" from Aden. They show themselves as little as possible. But they are in complete control of the administration, the army and the party of South Yemen.

Just recently 57 officers trained in the Soviet Union were given key positions in the military forces and in the police. Soviet "advisers" are to be found active all the way down to the level of company commanders. Moreover the Soviet leadership warned President Ali Nasser Mohammed that Aden will be kept, despite rebellion or revolt. The president was installed as a "moderate" last year by the Soviets. He has been invited as a guest of honor to the 26th congress of the CPSU at the end of February in Moscow.

Just as in Afghanistan, Aden's strategic significance for Moscow will preclude any peaceful pullout as was the case in Egypt or Somalia.

CSC: 4403

TEL AVIV, PRETORIA SAID TO PURSUE SAME GOALS

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 2 Feb 81 p 1

[Editorial by Boussad Abdiche]

[Text] At the very moment when South Africa was attacking Mozambique, Tel Aviv was once again pouring its cargo of bombs onto the civilian population of South Lebanon.

For those who understand the nature, the aims, and above all the tight bonds that unite the two regimes, whose dominant traits are racial discrimination and expansionism, the simultaneity of the two acts of aggression is far from a coincidence. The first in fact took place while a meeting was being held in Luanda (Angola) of the international committee of inquiry on crimes of the racist South African regime, while the second occurred immediately after the conclusion of the Islamic summit which firmly condemned the expansionist and oppressive policy of the Zionist administration.

By once again blindly striking countries whose sole offense is to have accepted refugees, Pretoria and Tel Aviv mean to hurl a new challenge to the world community while at the same time trying to distract their voters from the grave internal political crises that are wracking their regimes.

At a time when almost everywhere in the world colonialism is only a bad memory and when the forces devoted to justice and peace are tending more and more to strengthen their position and to be an organized force in regional and international forums, it may appear paradoxical that the survivors of an obsolete system should be trying not only to maintain their position but even to extend their domination.

In fact, everyone knows that racists and Zionists--is there any difference?--have always drawn their "power" and their arrogance from the multifaceted support of imperialist powers who need local policemen to defend their strategic and economic interests in various regions of the world, notably the Middle East and Southern Africa.

Without this hidden protection, Pretoria and Tel Aviv would fall like a house of cards under the ever-increasing pressure of patriotic forces to whom progressive countries, including Algeria, have given unstinting support.

The battle under way is thus to be extended on all fronts: military, political, and diplomatic, in order to corner the aggressor in his last bastions and force his protectors, the western members of the United Nations, to show their colors once and for all and to choose between short-term interests and a definitive peace that is in accord with the aspirations of all humanity.

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ARAB YOUTH UNION MEETING COMES TO CLOSE

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 6-7 Feb 81 p 3

[Article by Abdelmadjid Cherbal]

[Text] The work of the meeting of the central council of the Union of Arab Youth [UJA], begun last Monday under the chairmanship of Mr Mohamed Cherif Messaadia, member of the central committee and official of the permanent secretariat, came to a close between Thursday night and Friday morning at the Palace of Nations after adopting a resolution on general policy. The Arab youth also sent a message to the president of the republic and secretary general of the party, Mr Chadli Benjedid, in which it notes with satisfaction the role played by Algeria in the world, and more especially in support of national liberations. The UJA also salutes in this message the "important and remarkable mediating role played by Algeria in the resolution of the affair of the American hostages."

This session, which lasted 4 days, brought together the representatives of 21 countries and was marked by many interjections which all converged on the necessity of strengthening and consolidating Arab ranks in the struggle against imperialism, Zionism, and reaction. Support for the Palestinian people and for all people who are struggling to recover their independence and sovereignty was reaffirmed and underlined numerous times by most of the delegates, even if the Moroccan delegation did see fit, just 2 hours before the end, to practice the empty chair policy precisely at the point after the reading of the policy resolution which saluted the victories won by the Saharan people under the banners of the POLISARIO Front for their right to self-determination and national independence. The head of the Moroccan delegation broke in, on this subject, to raise a "point of order" with respect to the agenda for the day, which, he said, should have remained centered only on the Palestinian question and ways and means to be pursued to strengthen the cohesion of the Arab world.

This argument met with no support, and the speakers who followed the Moroccan delegate indeed took up the substance of his statement, but maintained and strongly insisted that the struggle in Palestine, in the Maghreb, and elsewhere in the world could not be separated, since the strategy of imperialism is founded precisely on a policy of destabilization in different zones to try to smother all the forces of progress. In the case of Palestine, it is clear that imperialism and its agents

are creating divisions within the Arab world in order to weaken the vibrant forces of the Arab nation in their struggle against the common enemy. This vast plan of destabilization aims solely to retard that process of struggle which is leading us toward the final victory. From Palestine to the Western Sahara, there is only a single step to take to comprehend the schemes of imperialism in its repeated attempts to try to strangle the two revolutions and the progressive countries which are giving them aid and support. Nevertheless, the general policy resolution is very clear since it condemns the capitulationist accords of Camp David and calls on Arab youth to become mobilized to confront the maneuvers of imperialism, Zionism, and reaction in the Arab Machrek and Maghreb. In this regard it firmly supports the struggle of the Palestinian people under the leadership of its sole and legitimate representative, the PLO, and condemns the Rabat regime with its feudal loyalty to imperialism and colonialism. The Arab youth condemn, with equal vigor, the expansionist policy of the Hassan II regime and salutes the victories of the Saharan people. In another section, the UJA supports the Firmness and Resistance Front, calls for its strengthening, and condemns any attempts to put pressure on progressive regimes. Also, the delegates call upon Arab youth to strengthen nonalignment and the struggle for the elaboration of a new world economic order. With regard to the Iraqi-Iranian war, the UJA considers that this is a loss for the peoples of the region and the Arab and Islamic world, and calls for an immediate ceasefire on the basis of respect for territorial integrity and a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

This point gave rise to some speculation on the part of one delegation which could find no better moment to leave the hall, despite the entreaties of several delegations which put the accent on the necessity to continue the democratic debate that had begun and to repeat that line of activity which, to the general satisfaction, had prevailed in council proceedings. Algeria's role was praised in this very context. Our delegation was able to rise above contradictions and trivialities and to impose itself as a driving force, participating thereby in a concrete and effective way to the solution of thorny problems. Algeria was with good reason the unanimous choice to resolve disputes between delegations. This kind of resort [to Algeria's delegation] for a contribution free of any partisanship, to the benefit of just causes and the unity of the Arab world reflects the continually growing position of our country in the concert of nations. Algeria's dynamic role in the world, more especially in support of national liberation movements, within the nonaligned movement, in the struggle for the advent of an international economic order, for the sovereignty and independence of peoples, and for peace, did not escape the notice of the representatives of Arab youth who devoted a major section of the discussions to it and noted this in the resolution. The consolidation of the ties of solidarity with the peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the victories of the peoples of those regions was reaffirmed by all the delegates, who also condemned the presence of American bases in the Gulf and the pressures of imperialism and Arab reaction on the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

The closing session, which was observed by Mr Kamel Bouchama, member of the central committee and the permanent secretariat, and Mr Nourredine Djellouli, member of the central committee and secretary general of the UNJA [National Union of Algerian Youth], saw the UJA opt for the city of Damascus as the site for the next Arab youth congress, scheduled for this upcoming May. That choice was determined by the unanimous desire of the delegates to witness their support for the foremost confrontation country in

the struggle against imperialism and Zionism and unquestionably reflects the unity which has been reached regarding the necessity of strengthening and mobilizing all the potentialities of the Arab world, particularly the youth and the Arab masses in the struggle against the common enemy.

We will not end before congratulating the organizers of this meeting, who exerted all possible efforts to assure the delegates excellent working and living conditions.

Message to President Chadli Bendjedid

[begin text of UJA Message] "On behalf of militant Arab youth, the central council of the Union of Arab Youth, meeting in Algiers, conveys to you and through you to the FLN [National Liberation Front] Party and the heroic Algerian people its militant greetings.

"Arab youth is pleased with the accomplishments of the Algerian youth and people as manifested in the path of national independence and social progress. Arab youth insists on expressing once again its great appreciation for the important role Algeria is playing in support of liberation movements both Arabic and around the world, in the nonaligned movement and in the world struggle for the advent of an international economic order, for the sovereignty and independence of peoples, and for peace. "We salute the important and remarkable mediatory role played by Algeria in the resolution of the affair of the American hostages.

"The central council of the Union of Arab Youth expresses its profound emotion in face of the suffering felt by the Algerian people following the catastrophe of El Asnam. "We wish to express to you our profound gratitude for having hosted the meeting of our central council in Algiers and for the warm and fraternal welcome we received in the land of the Algerian Revolution."

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BRIEFS

MAURITANIAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS--Algiers (APS)--Following a working visit to Algeria, Mr Sid Ahmed Ould Taya, Mauritanian minister of mines and energy, left Algiers yesterday afternoon. Greeted on his departure from "Houari Boumediene" airport by Mr Said Ait-Messaoudene, member of the central committee and minister of light industries, Mr Mohamedou, the Mauritanian ambassador to Algiers, and Mr Berekai Abdelhamid, assistant in the ministry of foreign affairs. During his stay the Mauritanian minister had talks with his Algerian counterpart, Mr Belkacem Nabi, and was received by the prime minister and members of the government. Before Mr Ould Taya's departure, he signed documents bearing on the establishment of development projects in Mauritania in the framework of cooperation between Algeria and that fraternal country. These documents were signed by Mr Aoufi, general manager of the Algerian Development Bank, and by Mr Mohamedou, the Mauritanian ambassador to Algiers. [Text] [Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 4 Feb 81 p 1] 9516

FLN-POLISARIO TALKS--Algiers (APS)--Official talks between the FLN [National Liberation Front Party] and the POLISARIO Front were begun yesterday morning, under the chairmanship of Mr Sliman Hoffman, member of the central committee and president of the party's foreign relations committee, and Bachir Mustapha Esseyed, member of the executive committee and deputy secretary general of the POLISARIO Front. The talks covered strengthening relations between the two parties and the two peoples, and a review of the regional and world situation. On the Algerian side these talks also involved Lazhari Cheriet, head of the party relations department, Abdelkader Bounedraft, head of the department responsible for relations with organizations and liberation movements, Sadok Zouaten, Mourad Lamoudi, and Fouanis Ammar, members of the party foreign relations committee. On the Saharan side, participants were El Kounti Waldjouada, president of the Saharan national assembly, Abdelkader Taleb Omar, Khalil Seyd Mohammed, Mansour Omar, members of the political bureau of the POLISARIO Front, and Habibullah, the POLISARIO Front representative in Algeria. The Saharan delegation arrived in Algiers Monday afternoon, coming from liberated territories of the SDAR [Saharan Democratic Arab Republic]. [Text] [Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 4 Feb 81 p 1] 9516

HUNGER STRIKE--The political prisoners at the Laalou civilian prison in Rabat have been on an open-ended hunger strike since 23 January 1981 to put an end to the degradation of their living conditions in prison. "Despite our appeals and our protest strikes," the prisoners say, "aimed at obtaining the improvement of

prison conditions suitable for the Middle Ages, the officials persist in their attitude of neglect." Sixteen hundred prisoners are incarcerated in a prison designed to accommodate a maximum of 600 people. In a communique announcing the hunger strike, the committee for the defense of Saharans in Morocco and the Western Sahara recalled that militants Said Menehti and Zaidji Brahim died in that prison. Some prisoners are critically ill. Thus, Moutiq Lahcen is stricken with tuberculosis, and Benaghir Abdelhadj is suffering once more from a stomach ulcer, despite five operations. Afflictions are spreading among the prisoners: serious eye infections, rheumatisms, hemorrhoids, etc, and the doctor's visits are rare. They get only one meal per day which does not supply the minimum nutritional requirements. They are denied the right to get books and newspapers to which they were entitled at Meknes, just as in other prisons, as well as the right to direct visits. Such are the inhuman conditions in which eight Saharans and Moroccans are being held at Rabat's Laalou prison. By going on an open-ended hunger strike, these political prisoners intend to obtain living conditions more in accordance with their status. To that end, they are asking, in particular: 1) that an end be put to the constant pestering and humiliation endured by our families at the gates of the prison. That we be given more humane visiting rights, including direct visits and the right to see our children; 2) that our right to get books and reviews and available newspapers be respected, that we be given the right to use wireless radio; 3) that we get heat; 4) that our food be improved; 5) that our right to medical care and hospitalization in decent conditions be respected; and 6) that we have the right to a minimum of hygiene. [Text] [Algiers EL Moudjahid in French 4 Feb 81 p 6] 9516

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CSO: 4400

ALGERIAN-CZECH JOINT COMMUNIQUE

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 8 Feb 81 p 4

[Text] Algiers (APS)--A joint Algerian-Czechoslovak communique was made public late Thursday morning following the official visit made to Algeria by Mr Bohuslav Chonupek, minister of foreign affairs of the Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia, at the head of a delegation from his country. Here are the contents of that joint communique:

On the invitation of Mr Mohamed Seddik Benyahia, minister of foreign affairs of the Algerian Democratic Peoples' Republic, Mr Bohuslav Chonupek, minister of foreign affairs of the Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia made an official visit to Algeria from 3-5 February 1981.

In the course of his stay, Mr Bohuslav Chonupek was given an audience with the president of the republic, Mr Chadli Bendjedid, to whom he gave a message from the president of the Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia, Mr Gustav Husak.

He called on Mr Mohamed Benahmed Abdelghani, the prime minister, and met Mr Boualem Baki, the minister of justice.

Mr Boualem Baki and Mr Bohuslav Chonupek went ahead with the signing of a judicial convention.

The two delegations, led respectively by Mr Mohamed Seddik Benyahia and Mr Bohuslav Chonupek, held talks characterized by friendship and mutual understanding.

In the course of those talks, the two sides devoted particular attention to strengthening relations between Algeria and Czechoslovakia and improving bilateral cooperation.

They also proceeded to a broad and fruitful exchange of views on the international situation.

With regard to bilateral relations, it was noted with satisfaction that they are evolving favorably in the spirit of friendship and cooperation which exists between the two countries.

They reaffirm their determination to continue their efforts to intensify and broaden cooperation in all areas.

With respect to economic, scientific, and technical cooperation, the two sides are pleased with the results of the work of the fifth meeting of the joint commission and the prospects now opening for giving it new and continuing impetus.

Examining the international situation, the two sides express their profound concern over the aggravation of international tension, the resort to a policy of force, the renewal of the arms race and the faltering of the politics of detente.

They decide to make every effort to safeguard peace and international security. The two sides stress the role of the nonaligned movement as an important factor in international relations and its contribution to the search for solutions to the great international problems.

The two sides express their concern over the pursuit of imperialist, colonialist, Zionist and expansionist policies and reaffirm their full and complete solidarity with the national liberation movements in their legitimate struggle for their people's right to exercise self-determination and to independence.

With respect to southern Africa, the two sides express anew their unreserved support for the struggle of the region's people against colonial domination, the policy of apartheid, and racial discrimination, to get their legitimate rights to freedom and independence.

For the Effective Exercise by the Saharan People of their Inalienable Right to Self-determination.

They denounce all efforts to establish a neocolonial solution which would deprive the people of Namibia of the fruit of the struggle they have waged under the leadership of SWAPO, their sole and legitimate representative.

They condemn the repeated acts of aggression of the racist Pretoria regime against the African countries of the region, with which they express their complete solidarity.

The two sides note their profound concern over the situation which prevails in the Western Sahara with respect to the process of decolonization of this territory which it has not yet been possible to complete in accordance with Resolution 1514 (XV) of the General Assembly of the United Nations on granting independence to the colonial countries and people.

They reaffirm their support for the people of the Western Sahara struggling for the effective exercise of their inalienable right to self-determination and independence. They consider that ways and means leading to a just and durable solution to the Western Sahara issue have been clearly defined by both the OAU and its ad hoc committee, and by the General Assembly of the United Nations, particularly by its resolution 35-19 of 11 November 1980.

Examining the situation in the Middle East, the two parties express their grave concern over developments in the region. They reaffirm that no just and durable solution of the Middle East problem is possible in a framework of separate accords. They condemn all attempts to seek pretended solutions on this basis.

They reaffirm that a just, durable, and overall settlement must necessarily be founded on the satisfaction of the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people, including the building of an independent state and withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories, including Jerusalem.

The two sides reaffirm their conviction that general and complete disarmament is the only effective guarantee of peace and international security. They are mindful of the role and responsibility of the United Nations in disarmament matters. They are agreed to continue their joint efforts in the UN and in other forums to see the decisions of the 10th special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations carried out and the implementation of effective disarmament measures.

With respect to the question of international economic relations, the two sides were concerned by the lack of progress made in establishing the new international economic order, as was also noted by the 11th special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to international economic cooperation and to development. They deplore the fact that this session, which should have opened the way to the opening of global negotiations in the framework of the United Nations, as well as the 35th session of the General Assembly, which should have continued this work, did not succeed.

The two sides are in agreement to continue their joint efforts to open the way, in the framework of the United Nations, for launching global negotiations this year. This would constitute an important element in the context of restructuring international economic relations in accordance with the declaration and the plan of action for establishing the new international economic order.

The two sides resolve to continue to work toward strengthening the role of the UN in the preservation of peace, the improvement of cooperation, and mutual understanding between countries.

The two sides are convinced that the present visit to Algeria of Mr Bohuslav Chonupek constitutes an important contribution to the continuous strengthening of relations between Algeria and Czechoslovakia.

The Czechoslovak side expressed its gratitude for the friendly welcome it was accorded during its stay in Algeria.

Mr Bohuslav Chonupek invited Mr Mohamed Seddik Benyahia to make an official visit to Czechoslovakia. This invitation was accepted with pleasure. The date will be fixed later through diplomatic channels.

ALGERIA

ALGERIAN-HUNGARIAN JOINT COMMUNIQUE

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 8 Feb 81 p 4

[Text] Algiers (APS)--A delegation of the National Liberation Front Party [FLN] visited the Hungarian Peoples' Republic from 26-31 January.

The Algerian delegation, which was headed by Mr Boualem Dellouci, a member of the FLN central committee and president of the economic department of the central committee, was responding to an invitation from the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party. Following the visit a joint communique was made public.

Here is the full text of the communique:

At the invitation of the central committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, a delegation from the FLN Party led by Boualem Dellouci, member of the central committee of the FLN Party and president of the economic department of the central committee, made a friendly working visit to the Hungarian Peoples' Republic from 26-31 January 1981.

The Algerian delegation was composed of:

--Abdelaziz Kara, ambassador of the RADP [Algerian Democratic Peoples' Republic] to Hungary,

--Boudjema Haichour, parliamentarian, member of the external relations [branch] of the FLN Party,

--Salim Oulmane, member of the external relations committee of the FLN Party.

In the course of its visit the delegation of the FLN party was received by Andres Gyenes, secretary of the central committee of the PSOW [Hungarian Socialist Workers Party]. The PSOW delegation was led by Janos Bereoz, member of the PSOW central committee, head of the external relations department, and was composed of:

--Laszlo Ballai, head of the economic policy department of the central committee,

--Tibor Baranvai, member of the central control committee, head of the department of party and mass organizations,

--Gabor Nagy, deputy chief of the department of external relations,

--Frenc Horvath, deputy chief of the department of political economy of the central committee.

The delegation went to the Pest departmental committee of the PSOH and gathered economic and social information on accomplishments in the department of Pest.

Safeguard the Gains of International Detente

In the course of talks which unfolded in a cordial and amiable climate, the delegations exchanged information regarding the situations and tasks facing their respective parties.

They also examined possibilities of improving and strengthening relations between the PSOH and the FLN Party as well as means of broadening bilateral cooperation in various areas of concern to the two countries.

The two sides expressed their determination, to this end, to deepen the ties of friendship and mutually beneficial cooperation. In that spirit a protocol agreement was signed by the PSOH and the FLN Party for 1981 and 1982.

Proceeding to an examination of the international situation, the two delegations exchanged points of views on questions of joint interest and expressed many similar views on the questions discussed.

The two parties expressed their concern about the aggravation of tension which prevails in the world and manifested their solidarity in the struggle against the maneuvers of imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, and reaction which endanger people's peace and safety.

In that connection, the two delegations condemned the maneuvers aimed at stirring up new conflicts in developing countries and which also attempt to put obstacles in the path of national liberation movements in their struggle for national independence, and for economic, social, and political emancipation.

Analyzing the current international scene, particularly problems in detente, the PSOH and the FLN Party consider that now it is more than ever necessary to strengthen the progressive forces in order to intensify efforts leading to the liquidation of sources of tension, to curb the arms race in hopes of achieving total disarmament and safeguarding the gains of international detente.

The two parties consider that peace and security in the world are one and indivisible. Certainly the FLN and the PSOH recall that there is a close relationship between peace and security in Europe, on the one hand, and the problem of peace and security in the Mediterranean on the other.

Support for the PLO, Lebanon

With regard to the Middle East problem, the two delegations expressed their active solidarity in the struggle of the Arab people of Palestine, under the aegis of their sole legitimate representative, the PLO, to recover their rights to self-determination and the establishment of an independent state.

The two sides condemned the Camp David accords, the attempts to settle the occupied Arab territories, and the attempts to annex the Golan as well as the occupation of Jerusalem by Zionist forces.

The two delegations raised their voices energetically to denounce the repeated and continuous acts of Zionist aggression against Lebanon, with whose struggle for national unity they express their solidarity. The PSOH and the FLN expressed their concern over prolonging the armed conflict between Iran and Iraq which causes serious harm to their people while endangering regional security.

For the Saharan People

The two parties consider that this situation serves the interests of imperialist designs and urges the necessity of finding a peaceful and political solution to the conflict. The two delegations expressed their satisfaction before the victories won over colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism and racism by the national liberation movements in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

The FLN and the PSOH once again assured the people who are struggling for their national independence and their rights to self-determination and independence of their solidarity and support.

To this end, the two delegations confirmed their common position in support of the right of the people of the Western Sahara, under the leadership of the POLISARIO Front, to exercise self-determination in accordance with the pertinent resolutions of the United Nations, the OAU, and the nonaligned movement.

The PSOH and the FLN expressed their satisfaction with the results already obtained by the POLISARIO Front, while still calling on the two parties concerned to peacefully resolve their differences through negotiations.

For SWAPO and the ANC

The two delegations reiterate their support for the people of Namibia and South Africa under the respective leadership of SWAPO and the ANC in their just struggle against colonialism and apartheid, whose maneuvers aimed at retarding the liberation process they denounce.

The PSOH and the FLN note that the movement of nonaligned countries, a political expression of the legitimate demands of the Third World, plays an important role in the emancipation of people seeking national independence and freedom. They consider that the nonaligned movement constitutes by its actions an obstacle to the sordid interests of imperialism and a force for peace, security, and detente in the world.

Democratization of Economic Institutions

The PSOH and the FLN declared themselves in favor of a democratization of international economic and financial institutions, as a step toward a new world economic order based on more equity and justice. The two delegations reiterate the principle of the right of each people to dispose of its own natural resources, and support continuing struggle against the activities of the multinational companies that try to carve up the wealth of developing countries.

Following the talks, the two delegations expressed their satisfaction over the convergence of views on the many problems inherent in their bilateral relations and the international situation. They reaffirm their common position for safeguarding peace, security, and their struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, and racism.

The FLN and the PSOH consider that securing relations between the two parties is a positive factor leading toward closer ties and friendship between the Hungarian and Algerian peoples.

At the end of the friendly working visit, the Algerian delegation invited a delegation from the PSOH to visit Algeria. This invitation was accepted with pleasure. The Algerian delegation also thanked the Hungarian leaders for the warmth and militancy of the reception they were accorded during their visit to the Hungarian Peoples' Republic.

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CSO: 4400

ARTICLE ANALYZES IMPACT OF HOSTAGE AFFAIR ON REVOLUTION

Tehran RANJBAR in Persian 22 Jan 81 pp 1, 4

[Article: "Compromise with Soviet Union, Moderation with the United States; The Annual Report Card of Those in Charge of the Hostage Taking in the American Spy Nest and Its Effect on the Revolution and Our Country"]

[Text] With the freeing of the American hostages, finally an end has been put to this one-year venture. Now it is time to make an overall assessment of this experience in order to clarify for the people of Iran what the revolution and the future of the country have gained from this adventure, what benefits we have gained and what damages we have suffered. Of course, this evaluation necessitates an extensive political, social, and economic investigation. But discussions of this issue have continued for over one year, and it has been more than one year that the Iranian people have tangibly felt the results and consequences. Therefore, in a preliminary analysis, we can already understand to a great extent the objectives of such an investigation. Essentially, on this basis, that is, on the basis of the experiences over this one year period and its tangible results, our people have to a great extent learned the necessary lessons from the hostage taking in the American spy nest and its consequences for the revolution and our country.

The fact that this lesson of the people differs 180 degrees from that learned by those in power is, of course, due to the conflict between the people and the ruling dictatorial minority. Naturally, our people are discontented with the hostage taking and its results--regardless of some limited positive benefits on political and ideological levels--because it is they who have borne the burden of hardship. It is also natural that the ruling dictatorial group is completely content with the results, repressing any kind of criticism with the usual labels, because this group has used this adventure to its best advantage even though it has damaged the interests of the people and the revolution.

Beyond this issue, how can the hostage taking be evaluated?

Two Different Angles in Confronting the Issue of the Hostage Taking

The hostage taking and the capture of the American spy center must be viewed from the following two angles: first, from the viewpoint of the taking of the hostages itself and second, from the viewpoint of the continuation of this incident, the policies governing it, and the political advantages gained by a minority of monopolizing, dictatorial groups with Soviet leanings. These two elements must be considered separately in order to facilitate a correct evaluation. But the method of the monopolizing ruling group in their handling of the hostage issue has been generally to combine the two. In doing so, they attempt to take credit for the glories gained while hiding the disgraces. They have done and are still doing a similar thing on a larger scale within the framework of the revolution. But this method of trickery cannot prevent our distinguishing good from bad. Without a doubt, concerning the issue of the hostage taking, what was supported by the masses was the capture, the exposition of the American spy nest, and the crystallization of the people's anger against American imperialism and not the policies governing the hostage taking which, especially in its continuation, brought more negative and destructive consequences and caused increasing discontent among the masses. Obviously, the Iranian people, a people who have tangibly felt for more than a quarter of a century the onerous, bloody domination of American imperialism and its puppet regime and who have nurtured a deep anger against this world-devouring power, cannot help but express their satisfaction with an action such as the capture of the American spy nest--especially at a time when Carter, in spite of the anger, hatred, and frequent warnings of the government of the Islamic Republic, is hosting the executioner of the Iranian people having treatment in America. Therefore, regardless of the motivations of the captors of the spy nest, this action was supported by the masses in the beginning, not because the people trusted the captors and their political ideology, but because of the sacred anger of the masses against American imperialism.

But those in charge of the hostage taking soon showed the people that they intended to make use of the people's support and the anger and hatred directed against the United States to advance the objectives of their own faction. They not only brought the hostage taking to an end, a struggle which clearly ended in defeat and submission to the United States, but they also inflicted violent blows on anti-imperialistic struggle, on the unity of the masses and the revolutionary forces, and on the international credibility of the Iranian revolution. Below, we will investigate briefly the various elements in this negative report card on this destructive action.

1. Deviation from the Revolution's Course of "Neither Eastern Nor Western" and Keeping Silent on the Role of the Soviets

The most important and at the same time most obvious negative result of the policies concerning the hostage issue has been the deviation from the course of "neither Eastern nor Western" and replacing it with an "anti-American" and "neither Western nor Western" ideology. While at the beginning of the capture of the American spy nest we witnessed a strong atmosphere of "neither Eastern nor Western" within the society, an atmosphere which was clearly evident in the numerous anti-imperialistic slogans, declarations, and marches after the occupation of the spy nest, we were suddenly confronted with a new policy which almost exclusively attacked the United States. The Moslem Students Following the Path of the Imam and those faces which came to the fore became visible in the society and undertook the practical leadership of these students unanimously and insistently evading the Soviet issue under the pretext that we were fighting the United States. It is hardly possible to find amongst the 180 some proclamations of these students one or two references to the Soviet Union, the Eastern superpower. If, meanwhile, the occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet transgressing army had not occurred and they had not been forced to take a position in this regard (especially given the strict position of the Imam and others concerning Afghanistan), there probably would have been absolutely no reference to Russian aggression in the documents and speeches of the operators and those in charge of the hostage taking. Even in the seminar of the liberation movements held in the spy nest with the participation of some of the representatives of the Afghanistan Liberation Movement, they kept silent concerning the Soviet Union and its aggression in Afghanistan. This caused protests among the Afghans and some other movements.

Apparently they were justifying their actions with Imam Khomeyni's statements: "Our real enemy is America" and "In this revolution, the Great Satan is America." But even if this evaluation concerning the real enemy were correct, it can never logically propose silence in the struggle against the Soviet Union and the avoidance of any kind of position against this aggressive superpower, especially when Imam Khomeyni and others had frequently taken positions against the Soviet Union and its aggressions, in particular concerning Afghanistan, in the midst of the hostage taking crisis. But those responsible for and those operating the hostage taking, who because of their sensitive positions in the struggle against America, should have clarified their position against this other superpower before anyone else in order to prevent a deviation from the path of "neither Eastern nor Western" and to confront the rumors concerning the influence of the Tudeh Party elements and others among them. But they so insistently refused this duty that one can take the aforementioned rumors seriously and indeed doubt their anti-imperialistic stance.

In any case, the ideology governing the hostage taking, except in scattered instances, was no different in practice from that of the Tudeh Party, that is, an ideology consisting merely of anti-Americanism and a "neither Western nor Western" philosophy. For our Islamic revolution, which had become victorious with the slogan "neither Eastern nor Western" and which carried out its anti-imperialistic struggle on the basis of this slogan, such an ideology was regarded as a retreat, a backward movement. And the continuation of this ideology has adversely affected our foreign policy. We can see negative and dangerous effects in the actions of those in power, with their obvious Russian leanings, and we can see that the silence on the struggle against the Soviet Union in the name of the so-called "struggle" against the United States has led to leanings toward the Soviet Union.

2. Impotence in the Struggle Against American Imperialism and Confining It to Slogans and Commotions

Even if the policy governing the hostage taking was to keep silent regarding the Soviet threat under the banner of the "struggle" against America, this does not mean that this policy has been successful in the struggle against American imperialism. Essentially, since struggle against America cannot be separated from struggle against the Soviet Union and since the anti-imperialist struggle in our time has the singular meaning of "neither Eastern nor Western, neither Russia nor America," dividing this singular meaning into two different parts, choosing one and omitting the other, empties even the chosen struggle of its true content. In practice, what was presented as "struggle against America" did not go beyond slogans, clamor, and commotion. Worse than this, it left behind only a superficial anti-American struggle in our country.

Those out front in the hostage taking never realized--or they realized but the issue was something else for them--that struggle against American imperialism means the mobilization of the entire nation with the distinct objectives of ending dependency and confronting the conspiracies and military aggression of the United States. While the masses of the people were highly mobilized, they wasted this boiling energy and this matchless power on daily demonstrations and marches instead of organizing and nurturing it. They tried to create in the people a superficial feeling of anti-imperialistic struggle. While the masses were ready to organize and arm against the American military threats, they shirked from their duty and confined the imam's idea of a 20-million people's army to creating scattered armed groups controlled by the monopolistic rulers and they used the atmosphere of military threat to control the pasdaran army and finally they forced those scattered armed groups of people to be dissolved into that army through a Parliamentary vote.

They replaced the issue of ending dependency with the mistaken idea of "cutting off relations." They imposed on the masses the thought that by merely cutting off relations with America the problem of dependency would also be resolved. They have even propagated, and still do, the notion that merely by closing and destroying the dependent industries one can end dependency. In this way, they have negated the long, hard battle of reconstruction, the creation of economic foundations, the independence of our country, and the end to economic dependency.

This false and dangerous thinking resulted in the formation of the program-less government of Raja'i, a government which considers knowledge, specialization, and programs as "Western" and from the very beginning has denied the necessity of a governmental program.

3. Deviation from the Struggle Against America and Turning the Rifles on Our Own Forces

Even from a political viewpoint, those at the forefront of the hostage taking could not--or they did not want to--follow a consistent anti-American policy, aside from the fact that their exposition of the United States and the American spies was very weak and inconsistent. (The Americans had destroyed a large portion of the documents and those in charge of the hostage taking have avoided publishing the portions related to themselves.) The major part of this exposition was directed not against the United States, but against domestic forces, the majority of whom were supporters of the revolution and even high ranking authorities in the government of the Islamic Republic. Even though the Islamists insisted that they turn the guns off each other and aim then at the real enemy, the United States, those responsible for the hostage taking began an extensive battle against domestic forces. They went to such an extent to attack personalities such as Engineer Bazargan, the first chief of the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, representing him and the freedom movement as having connections with and being in the service of the United States, that they did not realize--or perhaps they did--that with this action, they were striking down the credibility of the Islamic Republic which they claimed to defend.

They went so far as to unlawfully and dictatorially arrest and imprison a minister of the government of the time and, as a result, in the middle of the crisis of struggle against the United States, they weakened the government of the time. Very soon, they became in practice a new power which made decisions over the heads of all governmental organizations and institutions, over the government and the Revolutionary Council, and over the president. In implementing these decisions, they became one of the instigators of the destructive policies of the numerous centers of power and autocracy and one of the originators of the atmosphere of disturbance, rioting, and disunity in our society.

Their "expositions" gradually shifted from the United States and concentrated on domestic elements. In addition to their weakness and even their triteness, soon the ordeal became a chance to get even with other groups, a so-called "anti-liberal" battle. This started with the active participation of the Kiyasuri group and friends whose first serious action was to create a deep fissure between the national and Islamic forces, stoking the fire of disunity and civil war, the results of which we clearly witness today.

Hence, the hostage taking became a tool and an excuse in the hands of a number of people who by claiming that they represent "the Islam's line" unjustly suppressed with labels of "liberal" and "compromiser" all opposing forces, making themselves the top power in control. The one-sided government of Pajani was the logical consequence of these events.

4. The Worsening of Iran's International Isolation and Closing All the Roads Except the Road to the "North"

The hostage taking also gave to the false revolutionary forces who have existed since the beginning of the revolution the opportunity to attack the issue of foreign policy and isolate Iran internationally to the furthest possible extent. A false revolutionary concept in foreign policy came to mean an overall attack on all Western countries, putting them all on the same level with the United States (in spite of the thesis that "America is the real enemy"). As a result, these forces fell into the hands of the United States instead of making use of their conflict with the United States. With the continuation of the hostage affair, this deviation reached its ultimate peak.

Naturally, Western capitalist countries and Japan could not condone the hostage taking, as no other country in the world approved of this action, neither morally nor in terms of international law. (The Soviet Union, too, played a game: on the one hand stoking the fire and on the other, within international circles, taking exactly the same position as the United States and others.) But even if all the countries were united with the United States in condemning the hostage taking, many countries, including Western countries and Japan, did not agree or did not agree completely with the United States on the issue of the economic embargo of Iran. However, the incorrect, leftist, and adventurist policies of those controlling the hostage affair forced them, or part of them, to agree, or to agree somewhat, with the United States on the issue of the economic embargo of Iran.

Parallel to such a policy concerning Western countries and Japan, a similar policy was followed with Third World countries. And since they were all opposed to the hostage taking, they were given labels of "reactionary" and "American tool" by the pseudo-revolutionaries governing foreign policy and those in charge of the hostage affair.

Iran was isolated from everybody, except for two or three countries, including Libya and Syria, which were, in fact, doors to the Soviet Union.

This closed-door to the West and open-door to the Soviet policy soon ended in an open-gate policy to the Soviet Union. The passage of the emergency transit bill with the Soviet Union by the Parliament, with the excuse that we are in an economic embargo and therefore must pass this bill as soon as possible, is the best example of these forced events.

Obviously, since struggle against America had been translated into a policy of slogan shouting and not of mobilizing all the creative and constructive forces of the society and since they did not rely on the people but on another power, this power could be nothing but the rival power of the United States, the Soviet Union.

Here it must be added that the simple reason for the boldness of the Ba'thist regime of Iraq in attacking Iran, in addition to the weakening and crumbling of our defense system by the monopolizing pseudo-revolutionaries, was Iran's international isolation. Hence, the obvious aggression of Saddam against our country was not condemned by any country. Even countries such as Libya, Syria, and "Saf" (South Africa?) on whom the ruling monopolizers counted so much, refused their support for a long time. ("Saf" has not yet declared its support and the apparent support of Libya and Syria is questionable.)

5. The Failure of Those in Charge of the Hostage Affair to Obtain Their Specific Demands from America

In the final days of the hostage affair, the ruling group and their puppet mass media began a campaign of empty and ridiculous noise concerning the so-called "submission of America" to the demands of Iran in order to create in the people the false impression that Iran had come out victorious in obtaining its demands from the United States. But this noise-making has not deceived anyone, not even the gentlemen themselves. It is obvious that the demands that the United States accented are in reality nothing but the abolishment of the decisions made as a result of the hostage taking. In fact, it is the United States which has been able to get its own way, lifting the economic embargo and ending the blockage of Iranian assets--though not all of them--in return for the hostages. Only one of the initial three demands after the hostage taking, the "agreement" of the United States to "non-interference in the internal affairs of Iran" (an agreement by a superpower like the United States which is no more than empty talk), was met. The other two demands, the return of the Shah and the return of his wealth to Iran, were not by any means implemented and the ruling group skillfully ignored and white-washed them in its agreement with the United States.

There are two reasons for this defeat and retreat: first, contrary to the interests of the people of Iran and the great majority of independence-seeking forces in our society, a minority who with the help of the hostage taking took over the means and tools of the government did not really and truly desire to fight against the United States, but tried to use this incident in order to attain power. The opposition of this faction to the negotiations of Bakargan and Yazdi with Brzezinski was, in fact, a power play to see who would negotiate with the United States. Today, this faction has succeeded in presenting itself to the United States as the main "group" able to negotiate. (Of course, this issue was carried out under the guise of indirect negotiations, thus deceiving the public.)

Besides, if we even suppose that this faction or at least some of its elements were truthful in their desire for anti-American struggle, the method and tactics for struggle chosen from the beginning could result in nothing but defeat. It can be explained in this way: When in a struggle a demand or certain demands are made, one can have one of two objectives; either the demanders truly want to attain what they ask for or they are merely using these demands as a means of exposing more extensive objectives in their struggle. In the first case, based on a study of one's forces as compared to those of the enemy, there is a possibility of their specific demands materializing with the continuation of the struggle. (Recent workers' strikes in Poland are the best example of this type of evaluation, comparing forces and little by little achieving specific demands.) But in the second case, an evaluation of the forces and the realities indicate that attaining such demands is impossible. In which case, the demands should either not be made or they should be used for the purpose of more extensive exposition and clarification of the situation. Examples of this latter case can be found in the democratic movement of Iran during the shah's regime and the struggles of the International Confederation of Iranian Students for the freedom of political prisoners and those condemned to death during the regime of the shah. There was a time when the struggling Iranian students abroad united in the Confederation and through their harmonious struggle and the mobilization of world public opinion against the regime of the shah forced that bloodthirsty regime to retreat, reduce sentences, and even free those condemned to death from the harshest punishment.

But soon, with the escalation of the struggle in Iran against such violent oppression by the police, this was no longer possible. The Iranian freedom fighters were condemned to death one after another in the unjust courts of the Pahlavi regime and were martyred. Here, the Iranian students and their organization, the Confederation, while demanding the release of prisoners and the condemned, were not afraid and not only set as their objectives the freedom of these prisoners and the condemned but also the exposure of the regime of the shah, making known the sacred revolutionary goal of freedom. They ended

their defensive battle once they had already obtained the utmost results in exposing the regime.

The initial demands after the hostage taking, especially the demand for the return of the shah, were also of the latter kind. It was obvious that the United States would not return the shah because he and his family and their plunderers had been and are part of the American capitalistic system. In practice, the demand for the return of the shah would have been like asking the United States to give us Rockefeller or Kissinger. But to the same degree that this demand was impractical it was just. Imam Khomeyni's continual brief statement, "Give us back the criminal," is the epitome of this just cause. But, here, instead of emphasizing this just cause, instead of trying to expose and make known our just cause and advertise the Iranian revolution and increase the number of our friends and allies, they, either mistakenly or purposely, emphasized the "return" of the shah. They did not consider what effect the concentration of all our energies to bring about this impractical demand would have on our people if the demand failed to be achieved. Instead of making the people understand that American imperialism would not allow the shah and his wealth to be returned and that our main goal is nothing more than to expose, that in one phrase it is "exportation of the revolution" in a reasonable manner, they created such futile ideas about the United States that the CIA killed the shah to free Washington of the burden. Then, suddenly the hostage issue became irrelevant.

If a vast, anti-imperialistic farsightedness had dominated our propaganda and campaign of struggle in the hostage incident, this affair could have ended long before a year after the hostages were taken with maximal spiritual and material benefits and minimal damages to Iran, preserving our dignity. But the absence of such a policy brought the business to a scandalous political end: in the peak of the aggressive war with Iraq, under the military, economic, and political pressure of the United States, and in an atmosphere polluted with the obvious fear of those in power responding to Reagan's hardline policies, the hostages were freed, and under American terms.

These issues cannot be hidden from the intelligent people of Iran. Today it is clear to the people that the above logical, rational deductions were not employed. Only one calculation was followed through: the hostage issue was used to create an atmosphere suitable for the ascension to power of one faction and to open the way for the greater influence than ever before of the Soviet Union, all in the guise of an "anti-American struggle."

Summary

The capture of the American spy nest and the taking of its employees as hostages could have escalated the movement of a large segment of society against this imperialist because of the anger and deep hatred

of the masses for this world-devouring superpower criminal, the United States. But, as a result of a deviant policy and ideology and as a result of factional, monopolistic leanings, it brought for our revolution adverse and destructive consequences, the most important of which are the weakening of the policy of "neither Eastern nor Western," the strengthening of a tendency toward reconciliation with the superpower Soviet Union, and rise to power of the dictatorial faction which leans towards the Soviet Union.

In this way, the hostage taking and the policies governing it created a very favorable climate for the growth of the Russian functionaries in Iran, especially the band of Kiyasuri and friends. In exchange for all this, not only was a noteworthy result not obtained regarding the fight against the United States, but this struggle, which is primarily aimed at domination on a material basis, that is, economic and other dependencies, was overshadowed by slogans and clamor.

Now, this incident has in fact ended. But its grave political, economic, and social consequences as regards our anti-imperialistic struggle and the unity of the people and national and Islamic forces still remain. Now is the time when the Russian functionaries, the minority monopolistic groups and the governing dictators with Soviet leanings who have been responsible for all of these damages and have operated a campaign of slander, rumors, and labels, should make an accounting to the people. The people and all the independence-seeking forces supporting the revolution have a right to this accounting so that in the end, after all the clamor and tumult, damages, and playing with the dignity of persons and national forces, the truth is revealed and the deceivers of the people, the ambitious, and the professional charlatans are bared of their pseudo-revolutionary masks and the usurped power gained in this crisis is restored to the people.

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IRAN

PAPER CONSIDERS SOVIETS, REAGAN WINNERS IN HOSTAGE AFFAIR

Tehran RANJBAR in Persian 27 Jan 81 pp 1-2

[Article: "Who Are the Winners in the Hostage Affair?"]

[Text] In the hostage affair, three winners can be distinguished: the Soviet Union, the main winner; Reagan's faction in the United States, which used the hostage issue to its best advantage; and the operators of the hostage taking, who claim to be victors but who are, in fact, the false winners in this affair.

The hostages are gone and the money has not been returned. American claims remain. A number of people achieved power, and . . . But the people still demand an accounting. Individuals and political groups interested in this nation and this country demand to know what happened during this year and more in which claims were made, promises were made, and the pure sentiments of the nation and the welfare of the country were toyed with. This issue must be discussed from political, economic, and financial standpoints in regards to power, honor, credibility, etc. An important issue to be discussed is: Who is or are the winners in this affair? A complete, correct answer to this question will clarify the nature and the results of the hostage taking and hostage keeping. The nation also wants to and should know who the winners are.

The individuals and groups who operated and were behind the hostage taking and who were involved in the final negotiations with the United States, through slogans, interviews, newspaper headlines, shouts, and under the guise of an Islamic Republic, with lies, clamor, and blackmail, tried to pretend as though from a political and religious (!) standpoint and from the standpoint of the credibility of the Islamic Republic of Iran (meaning themselves), they have achieved victory, that they have made the United States miserable and brought it to its knees. It is enough to recall the newspaper headlines in JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI, ETTELA'AT, and KEYHAN and the speeches and radio and television programs in this regard. Although the most ignorant

and perhaps the most ideological of them tried to proclaim Iran the economic and financial winner and show that the United States is bankrupt (perhaps because of the great sums of money it has made!), on the whole, they also officially accepted that of the \$13.9 billion of Iranian assets, presently only \$2.7-2.8 billion have been transferred to the Central Bank of England to an Algerian account and the rest of Iran's money plus its wealth, etc. is uncertain. At most, some portion will perhaps be returned to Iran, over and above the financial, economic, and commercial costs and damages, and that will, of course, depend on Reagan.

On the other hand, individuals and political groups along with the people are busy investigating and accounting, each answering one of the aspects of the question of who the winners are and clarifying the various aspects of this issue for the nation.

Keeping in mind the existing rationale and the reality of this issue, we can distinguish three winners, two of whom are real winners and the third a false one. But what are the rationale and the reality and who are the winners?

The Soviet Union the Main Winner

1. From the beginning of the hostage taking, a faction of the governing body took control of power and indulged in the following policies and actions:

It slandered national and Islamic forces who support independence and oppose Soviet domination labeling them "Weststruck" and "liberal," categorizing them as supporters of the United States. Meanwhile, they paved the way for those connected with the Soviet Union, such as the Tudeh Party and company. They became of one voice and one mind such that today they openly say that the Tudeh Party agrees with them and they share tactical unity.

They taunted with the slogan "neither Eastern nor Western" and with the concept of independence from both superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, at every step; and instead only propagated "struggle against America" such that anyone who said "neither the United States nor the Soviet Union" was labeled "American" and a deviant from "the Iran's line," etc. In this way, they became of absolutely one voice with the functionaries of the Kremlin.

They welcomed the economic embargo and the cutting off of relations with all Western countries, recognizing this as serving to cut off dependency and claiming that we do not need imports, industries, etc.

They then signed a large transit agreement with the Soviet Union, begging for its approval, saying that because of the embargo we are in need, while our markets with all their shortages are filling up

with Eastern and Western goods and while other agreements were waiting to be approved. They labeled all Western and/or Third World countries with leanings toward the West, or even those who are non-aligned, American. They said that we do not need to have relations with any of them. They took a position against all international circles. They cursed everyone and welcomed isolation. They said: This is the meaning of independence and anyone who opposes it is "American."

Then they started to look for friends, beginning with countries with Soviet leanings, such as Syria and Libya. They made friends with countries dependent on the Soviet Union, such as Cuba and South Yemen, calling them "progressive." Now they wink at the Soviet Union. They act in agreement with Russian policies in international affairs. They quiver when confronted with the threats and warnings of the Soviet Union and open the doors to this polar bear.

Therefore, the first winner of the 14-month hostage affair is the superpower, the Soviet Union, which can profit politically and even economically by placing itself and its functionaries in a position to win over some of the governing people on an international as well as domestic level to its own course of competition with the United States and by taking the first step to drag Iran under its domination.

Some of the individuals and political groups studying the hostage issue and its consequences, although they note other correct aspects of this issue, either are not paying attention or are paying little attention to the issue of the Soviet Union being the major winner. We call to the attention of these individuals and groups this subject and its detrimental consequences and ask and expect them to enlighten the people in this regard. There is much evidence that the people themselves have become somewhat aware of this issue.

Reagan the Second Winner

Since the faction which took control of the situation by taking and keeping the hostages did not intend a serious struggle against American imperialism, only thinking of its own interests, it did not pay attention to the basic question of anti-imperialistic struggle. As a result, no real blow was struck against the United States. Yet, a portion of the propaganda which was carried out against Carter's faction and the Democratic Party did help Reagan's faction and the Republican Party take advantage of the internal quarrels of imperialist America. This issue played a very positive role in Reagan's victory in the presidential elections. Even up until the last moments before the hostages were freed, Reagan's faction and the banks toyed with the hostage takers and the hostages were finally released half an hour after Reagan took the oath of office and officially entered the White House. This in itself was a victory for Reagan's faction and the Republican Party.

Hence, the second winner in the 14-month hostage affair was Reagan's faction, among other American imperialist factions.

Some people conclude that Reagan's faction in fact had a hand in the hostage issue and directed the manner in which the hostages were to be released and the propaganda that accompanied the release up to the last moment. But we do not need to assume so. In any case, what is important is that no struggle against American imperialism was carried out and that Reagan's faction profitted greatly from this crisis.

False Winners

The operators of the hostage taking events, that is, those groups who are presently controlling the major organizations and tools of power and government, proclaim that they are the major winners or at least one of the winners in this affair. They say that the hostage taking resulted in the loss of power of one faction and the takeover of control by their faction.

On the surface, it appears to be true that they join the ranks of the other winners since the hostage taking was a lever used to abolish the transitional government of the national forces and some of the factions of the Islamic movement. This issue has been used until recently as a means to pressure and propagandize against all national and Islamic forces opposing the governing dictators. The present governing faction was able to force its domination upon many centers of power and to mobilize its functionaries to oppose the people's resistance. This faction intends to eliminate the remaining opponents and quell the people's resistance.

But are these people really the winners in this event? The answer is negative and the presumption of the dictatorial rulers that they are the winners speaks of their shortsightedness and worship of power. Within this one year period they have taken over the centers and tools of power. But at the same time, they have been exposed for what they are. They have become isolated from the people. They have turned the masses against them. They have caused the political independence-seeking forces to become closer and more united than ever before and have caused them to be increasingly loved by the masses. Now, with this great wave of resistance by the masses which is becoming stronger daily, when the independence-seeking forces are determined to stand by the masses and defend the nation's independence and freedom and the revolution, how could the ruling dictators hope to hold on to the power they have usurped? They most assuredly cannot. The masses of the people and forces faithful to them will not allow a handful of dictators to reap the fruits of the revolution and dominate over the destiny of the people and the country. Soon it will become obvious that these claimers of victory are the false winners in this event.

PAPER ACCUSES TUDEH LEADERSHIP FOR SUPPORTING POLISH BUREAUCRATS

Tehran KARGAR in Persian 12 Jan 81 pp 5, 6, 14

[Excerpts] Approximately 5 months ago the struggle of Polish workers for workers' democracy against the bureaucratic regime of Poland assumed immense dimensions and attracted world wide attention. This struggle between Polish workers and bureaucrats still forms the focus of international politics.

With the commencement of this struggle, Iranian Tudeh Party leadership defended the interests of the privileged class, the ruling Soviet and Polish workers' governments, instead of supporting the interests and the demands of the Polish workers. This party has not remained idle and has repeated its everlasting drill, those determined by the Krem'in bureaucrats, namely libelling false accusations against Polish workers. In the beginning of the struggle, MARDOM, organ of the central committee of Tudeh party of Iran, described the Polish situation as follows: "People of Poland are watching with concern the activities of anti-socialist elements." In order to discredit demands of the workers, it libelled the nation-wide strike in Poland as the work of a number of irresponsible groups, anarchists and anti-socialists.

Tudeh Party leadership's objective in expressing such nonsense had been to assist Warsaw and Soviet bureaucrats by distorting truth and demands of Polish struggling workers and ensuring their eventual defeat.

Despite such poisonous propaganda waged by Stalinists throughout the world, Polish workers succeeded in obtaining significant victories, one of them being official recognition of independent workers' unions known as "Solidarity" by Polish government authorities. This is the first time that in a bureaucratized workers government, the workers have overtly and legally created independent militant organizations despite opposition of bureaucrats.

Leadership Mistakes

In the wake of growth and progress of powerful Polish workers movement, rulers of Moscow and Warsaw who presently are incapable of suppressing this movement have been forced to retreat and have changed the manner of direct threats and mud slinging tactics against Polish workers.

The Iran Tudeh Party leadership has, as usual, observed changing attitude of bureaucrats vis-a-vis the struggle of the Polish workers and has reflected it in recent

editions of MARDOM. In its 30 AZAR 59 [21 Dec 1980] edition MARDOM has reprinted an item entitled "Regarding the Polish Situation." Here, Mr Kianuri, the first secretary of Central Committee of Tudeh Party of Iran discusses the Polish situation in a question and answer party session.

In an answer to a question about "causes of emergence of difficulties in Poland" Mr Kianuri stated "In earlier sessions I have explained in detail and these explanations are still valid. It became practically apparent that those mistakes of the Polish government and party in analyzing economic difficulties, in evaluating problems of industrial growth, production and their relations to improvement of economic life of the masses formed the basic causes.

Mr Kianuri also attributed these "mistakes of leadership" to not recognizing the crisis in world capitalist economy and its effects on Poland's exports.

The Polish economic crisis emanated from the bureaucratic system of economic planning and non participation of workers in decision makings. Unreasonable and illogical decisions adopted by bureaucrats in Poland for the purpose of preserving their privileged financial interests, without regards for interests and needs of workers and an economy based on socialist programs, form the basic roots of this economic crisis.

During the past few years, this form of bureaucratic economic planning has created numerous difficulties in this context for Poland. By resorting to insane acquisition of loans from imperialist banks and pursuing export markets of capitalist countries, Polish bureaucrats have tried to avoid the unpleasant consequences of these bureaucratic economic decisions.

However, crisis in the capitalist world, has resulted in mis-calculation by bureaucrats of continual expansion of export markets and as a consequence Polish economic crisis was aggravated. Polish rulers have tried to impose the costly burden of this economic mismanagement on the lives of the workers. Resistance of workers vis-a-vis this bureaucratic act resulted in the emergence of incidents of the past few months in Poland. While stressing "mistakes" of Polish government and party leaders, the Tudeh Party leadership intends to hide this devastating and anti-revolutionary role of ruling bureaucracy over the Polish society.

But let us perceive what kind of a phenomena is this party, whose mistakes are referred to by Mr Kianuri and has established its dominance over all government power in Poland.

Bureaucratic Isolation

The Polish United Workers Party, same as the Tudeh Party, is a Stalinist organization and contrary to its name, does not possess any base or roots among the Polish workers.

Basically this party comprises of a group of influential bureaucrats whose interests differ widely with needs and demands of the majority of Polish masses.

For example, Polish independent workers' unions which has recently emerged out of the struggle of the workers against bureaucrats embraces 10 million people namely two thirds of the Polish work force. This very fact forms the best cause for failure of United Polish Workers Party and syndicates under its influence vis-a-vis Polish workers organization.

Prevailing lack of credibility has culminated in the elimination of the influence of the United Polish Workers Party among workers and on the ground floor of factories where economic programs correlate with actual work force and needs of society. It is evident that in such circumstances decisions of the government and the party on economic programs which had been adopted without considering the views and proposals of workers would lead to failure and thereby would aggravate the Polish economic situation.

This is not merely "mistakes" of the Polish party and government leaders but is an indication of existence of a bureaucratic party and government organization which does not have a place among the majority of the workers but makes decisions for them contrary to their interests.

The dynamism of the struggle in Poland is generated with the view of correcting these "mistakes" namely changing prevailing relations between the workers and government bureaucratic organization. Weakness of Polish bureaucracy vis-a-vis the workers' struggle is also indicative of a lack of influence and baselessness of bureaucracy among workers and peasants which form the majority of the society. It is quite evident that Mr Kianuri does not show any inclinations in expressing this fact.

Changing Bureaucracy or Replace a Bureaucrats

In fact the struggle of the Polish workers against bureaucracy demonstrates that workers are not prepared anymore to pay the penalties for decisions made by bureaucratic government officials. Jacek Kuron makes the following statement about the new situation in Poland and proposed economic plans by bureaucrats:

"This year such a situation cannot reoccur. People are strong. They have an organization and presently it can be seen that the proposed program would be rejected in workers sessions. Thus can government authorities draw a plan which would be effective and pertain to aspirations of society?

It must be stated that this issue forms the basis of the system in which we live in and certain endeavors have been undertaken in order to find a positive answer to this issue.

Thus Polish workers have decided to solve this dilemma namely the problem of ruling bureaucratic system of Poland. They desire to interfere and participate in all countries' decision making in other words they desire socialist democracy. This system is the only one which would guarantee economic progress with a socialist program and at the same time would remove the obstacle of bureaucracy hindering progress.

On the other hand, Polish bureaucracy which is being subjected to heavy blows by the Polish workers movement organization reacted by replacing a number of top government officials including party secretary general Edward Giersek and Premier Edward Babiuch, however, it is this very organization which creates prevailing basic difficulties in Poland. Mr Kianuri has also portrayed these changes of officials as a solution of the problem and states: "During the past year, the previous leadership was not able to detect these difficulties in time and solve them and as a consequence this crisis developed. In face of such a crisis, the party has the right to change those leaders who had been unable to solve the difficulties."

"Solving problems" in Poland is not feasible in the manner proposed by the Tudeh Party leadership as a replacement of leaders and without changing the bureaucratic government system it would not solve any problems.

The struggle of the Polish workers is aimed at taking away the right of decision making and solving difficulties from the bureaucrats and vesting it on the majority in the society namely the working masses. Such workers' democracy is the only actual solution in overcoming prevailing difficulties in Poland.

Lech Walesa, one of the leaders of Polish Independent Workers Unions refers to the struggle of workers in a changing bureaucratic system, namely political revolution in Poland and states "various revolts in 1956, 1970 and 1980 which have occurred with the view of redressing the system. It appears that this is not feasible and thus why should we not try to find another organization? This in itself responds to all Stalinist endeavors of Moscow and Warsaw in replacing officials and preserving governmental bureaucratic system."

Church and Bureaucracy

Under present conditions, the Kremlin has cautioned the Tudeh Party leadership to refrain from direct mud slinging at Polish workers but this tactic is being waged cunningly and indirectly. In addition to "mistakes of leadership" Mr Kianuri has pointed out to another factor effective in the emergence of the Polish crisis namely "provocations by utilizing religious sentiments of Polish religious masses" and states in this context "as I have stated in previous sessions, imperialism has made efforts during many years to utilize the Catholic Church in provoking people against socialism."

It is amusing to see that Mr Kianuri who pretends to be a Marxist and supports historical materialist thesis endeavors to prove the viewpoint that "church and religious sentiments" threaten existing and practical socialist economic results in Poland. In other words, church ideas threatens actual material achievements of Polish workers. The fact is that Mr Kianuri is neither a Marxist, nor does he understand anything about historical materialist theory. The church also is not a basic problem in Poland. This explanation clarifies mud slingsings of Mr Kianuri and the Tudeh Party under the cover of "provocation of religious sentiments" against Polish workers. Before anything else, it is necessary to state that Marxists, not pseudo Marxists such as Stalinist Mr Kianuri, defend freedom of religion. One of the demands of the Polish workers about accessibility of the Catholic Church to radio-television brings into focus the issue of freedom of speech and opinion. Defense of such a demand is based on the principles and traditions of international workers movement.

Submission of this demand by Polish workers is a correct act in the defense of freedom of opinion and solicitation of support from the broad masses of the country's people for the struggle of the workers.

Since, 70 percent of the Poles are Catholic, many people consider attacks against the church as a manifestation of encroachment upon their national and human rights by Soviet and Polish bureaucrats. Support of the church for Polish workers' struggles is a reflection of solidarity of Polish masses vis-a-vis government bureaucracy. In addition to this and despite Mr Kianuri's allegation about the utilization of the church by imperialism against socialism, the Polish Catholic church does not comment on the establishment of capitalist order but accepts socialist economic order in Poland.

Although under prevailing conditions, the church supports government, it is considered a semi-opposition force by the Poles. The propagation of demands by the church for lifting censorship was in line with the demands of the vast majority of the people in eliminating censorship of religious beliefs and censorship in general. It is interesting to note that Cardinal Wyszynski, a high ranking official of the Catholic church appeared on television after 12 years of being excluded and asked the workers to stop the strike and return to work. The opposition of high ranking church officials with the demands of the workers during the strike and the continuation of strike demonstrated that in the same way that the Polish workers' movement is independent from government bureaucracy, it is also not connected to "church" officials and "religious sentiments."

Recently a Catholic church spokesman accused Jacek Kuron of publishing "vociferous and irresponsible statements." This act assists bureaucracy in dividing workers and undermining the Polish united workers' movement. This subject pointed to progress of Polish workers' struggle which prompted high Catholic Church officials to take up a common position with bureaucrats.

But contrary to the statement of the Tudeh Party leadership, the chief "impetus" for the Polish crisis is government bureaucracy. Instead of solving country's economic difficulties by mobilizing workers and involving them in decision making, this bureaucracy has held on strongly to its short sighted interests and has been reviewing the method of countering these difficulties from the angle of preserving and expanding these interests.

This bureaucratic method of decision making together with efforts of the bureaucracy in imposing the consequent loss on the shoulders of the workers is the main factor behind the crisis and the principle obstacle hindering progress of socialism in Poland. Finally, the main imperialist base for provocation in Poland is formed by Stalinist bureaucracy. This fact is distasteful to Mr Kianuri as well as to Moscow and Warsaw bureaucrats.

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PAPER ATTACKS FEDA'IN-E KHALQ FOR DISTORTING POLISH WORKERS STRUGGLE

Tehran KARGAR in Persian 12 Jan 81, p 6

[Text] At long last, KAR, the organ of the Feda'in-e Khalq guerrillas of Iran (majority) broke its silence about recent happenings in Poland and published a series of articles under the heading "What lessons must be learned from polish happenings." Last article of these series which was published in Kar, No 89 dated 26 Azar [17 Dec] reflected the basic views of the Feda'in-e Khalq (majority) leadership about the struggle of the polish workers.

The surprise lies in the fact that instead of evaluating and supporting the experiences of struggles and recent achievements of Polish workers, this article reproached the modus operandi of striking workers and did not consider it appropriate for workers aware of class interests. It did not think this to be sufficient and went on as follows "By their procedures, striking workers did not strengthen the front of world wide revolutionary forces but created a background whereby imperialism and world reaction found pretexts to propagate against these forces and their unity."

The fact is that workers "aware of their class interest" in Poland have become tired of the bureaucratic system of government of Stalinists in their country. The Polish workers are opposed to this affluent class which prefers its luxurious villas, splendid palaces, stylish apartments, luxury cars and special stores to the interests of the working masses, peasants and the need for economic progress. Consequently, in order to express their opposition to the life and parasitic position of the bureaucrats, Polish workers were forced to utilize a plan of action namely country wide strikes which would unite rank and file.

Now it must be asked whether utilization of such a plan of struggle by Polish workers is "appropriate." Naturally the response voiced by Soviet and Polish big bellied bureaucrats would be negative. More than anything, these people desire to preserve the status-quo, namely preservation and extension of their short sighted interests at the expense of discrimination and injustice against majority of Polish workers.

From the point of view of these bureaucrats bowing of workers to this oppression is a praiseworthy and acceptable procedure. The discomfiture of Kremlin and Warsaw bureaucrats at the struggle of Polish workers emanates from this dis-obedience.

Despite the claims by the Feda'in-e Khalq (majority) leadership, Imperialists are not pleased with the struggle of Polish workers as struggle of Polish workers against bureaucrats which form the real base of interference of imperialists in Poland would also establish a suitable pattern for workers in Western Europe and America to base their struggle against capitalist order and further progress toward socialist revolution. Even Brezezinski, a well known politician of American imperialism has identified himself with Polish bureaucrats and has cautioned Polish workers to remain cool and acquiesce to compromise, self-control and tranquility vis-a-vis the bureaucracy. By considering these realities, struggle of the Polish workers strengthens the camp of the oppressed throughout the world and undermines the position of bureaucrats and imperialists. By reproaching the plan of action of striking workers, the Feda'in-e Khalq (majority) leadership which professes to support socialism, in, in fact, imitating policy of libel and lies as practiced by bureaucrats and imperialists against Polish workers. This is the same policy which was being practiced by Stalinist Tudeh Party of Iran for many years and was a source of pride to them.

In order to prove that struggle of Polish workers is 'unworthy,' the KAK publication has resorted to a bigger lie and writes "some of the demands of the workers is particularly reactionary, which point to low level of class awareness of workers."

But let us consider which of the demands of Polish workers are "reactionary." Are such demands as official recognition of free and independent workers' syndicates, respect for freedom of speech, election of managers on basis of capability and competence and not because of membership in the party, creation of possibilities for participation of all classes of society in decision making policies of the country and finally closing down all stores reserved for bureaucrats, "reactionary"?

These demands propounded by Polish workers indicate the correct manner of progress of socialism in Poland by means of democratic worker actions and point to the high level of class awareness of Polish workers. Lack of comprehension of this superior level of awareness of Polish workers by Feda'in-e Khalq (majority) leadership points more than anything, to confusion and mixed up centrist policies of this organization. Such policies during revolutionary and decisive moments wind up in adoption of common positions with imperialists and bureaucrats in workers' governments. The leadership of the Feda'in-e Khalq (majority) which had not learned from its past incorrect and malicious policies, is still not convinced and does not have faith in the power of the masses and their capacity to create revolutionary developments. Despite the confessions of the leadership of Feda'in-e Khalq (majority) regarding its adventurous policies in Kurdistan and Turkmen Sahra and its malicious stands vis-a-vis militant students following the line of imam and the Iran-Iraq war, this leadership has not been able to adjust itself to revolutionary realities and equip itself with revolutionary policy.

In the international political scene the Feda'in-e Khalq (majority) leadership libels the struggle of 10 million Polish workers which are engaged in revolutionary activities against bureaucratic minority as "reactionary" and thus offers its centrist policies to bureaucrats in order to be utilized as appropriate pretexts against the workers.

True revolutionaries believe in class and industrial workers movement as central power and basic means of bringing about changes and revolutionary developments. The

position of the Peda'in-e Khalq (majority) leadership vis-a-vis revolutionary movement of Moslem peoples of Iran and Polish industrial workers precisely attest to the opposite.

Youth and militant supporters of Peda'in-e (majority) are faced with the duty of engaging themselves in mobilization of Iranian Moslem peoples against American imperialism, Iraqi aggression and also in effectuating solidarity with revolutionary struggles of Polish workers and thereby rectifying these mistakes.

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MAJLES NATIONALIZES WEALTH OF 60 PAHLAVI DYNASTY MEMBERS

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 13 Jan 81 p 2

[Text] The Islamic Consultative Assembly this morning took up an urgent bill under which the wealth of members of the Pahlavi dynasty is nationalized. Following is a complete list of the members of the family of the deposed shah:

1. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi
2. Fatemeh Ashraf
3. Shams (Khadijeh) Pahlavi
4. Tajolmoluk Pahlavi
5. Ashraf (Zahra) Pahlavi
6. Amir Reza Atabay
7. Malakeh Aqdas (Simindokht Pahlavi)
8. Sirus Atabay
9. Mahnaz (Zahra) Zahedi
10. Keyvan Pahlavinia
11. Kambiz Khatami
12. Farahnaz (Ma'sumeh) Pahlavi
13. Reza Pahlavi
14. Ali Reza Pahlavi
15. Gholam Reza Pahlavi
16. Abdol Reza Pahlavi

17. Ahmad Reza Pahlavi
18. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi
19. Fatemeh Pahlavi
20. Hamid Reza Pahlavi
21. Mehrnaz Pahlavi
22. Bahman Pahlavi
23. Ali Pahlavi (changed to Islamic name)
24. Shahnaz Pahlavi
25. Behzad Reza Pahlavi
26. Nazok Pahlavi
27. Shahrokh Pahlavi
28. Shahla Pahlavi
29. Shahriar Shafiqnia
30. Azadeh Shafiqnia
31. Nilufar Pahlavi (changed from Ashtiani-e Nik)
32. Shahram Pahlavinia
33. Daryush Pahlavinia
34. Sirus Pahlavinia
35. Sonia Marima (Mariam) Pahlavi
36. Keykhosro Jahanbani
37. Ja'far Reza Pahlavi
38. Kamran 'Abbasi Vahid
39. Azardokht (Khadijeh) Pahlavi
40. Mariam (Zahra) Pahlavi
41. Bahram Pahlavi
42. Kamyar Pahlavi

43. Sarv-e Naz Pahlavi
44. Shahin Pahlavi
45. Shahrnaz Pahlavi
46. Parinaz Pahlavi
47. Reza Pahlavi
48. Alireza Pahlavi
49. Lily (Fatemeh) Pahlavi
50. Ramin Khatami
51. Yunes (Mohammad) Pahlavi (changed to Islamic name)
52. David Pahlavi (changed to Islamic name)
53. Hood Pahlavi (changed to Islamic name)
54. Ananhita Pahlbod
55. Dara Shafiq
56. Fowzieh Jahanbani
57. Farah Diba
58. Shahbaz Pahlbod
59. Shahriar Shafiq

The latest bulletin: The open session of the Majles, that was to take up the government's urgent bill, was postponed until tomorrow because of lack of quorum, due to absence of representative members of the Council of Guardians, who are on a trip.

KEYHAN reports that the bill for the nationalization of the wealth of members of the Pahlavi dynasty will be eventually approved, especially now that the Assembly Speaker has declared that the prospect for the approval is good and the atmosphere in the Assembly suitable for it.

9651

CSO: 4906

SECOND ANNIVERSARY OF 'FLIGHT OF CURSED SHAH'

Tehran MARDOM in Persian 15 Jan 81 pp 1, 2

[Text] With the nationalization of the properties of the Satan and his relatives, on the second anniversary of flight of "cursed Shah," the heroic people of Iran are continuing their fight at all levels against the principle enemy of Iranian and world peoples, namely American imperialism.

After the Shah it is America's turn! Two years ago, on the day when the "cursed Shah" finally fled and took refuge with his patrons, the country's sky reverberated with this slogan.

At noon of 26 Dey 1357 [16 Jan 1979] newspapers in the capital were published with large headlines of "The Shah Went." Another phase of the revolution became victorious. The "cursed Shah" who could no longer preserve his throne on the sea of blood of the masses by resorting to mass killings by his military government and other diverse schemes finally fled from Iran, same as all traitors and executioners in history, accompanied by his "homeland" namely jewels and wealth plundered from the people of Iran.

With the flight of the "cursed Shah," the streets of Tehran which had been scenes of mass killings, were converted into sites of festivities and celebrations. Our heroic people danced and rejoiced. Every body was smiling and the people were throwing flowers and candies at each other. In town squares statues of the "Satan" were torn down along with clamor of "the tyrant has been overthrown." Above cries of joy and clamor of victory of people who had finally, after 2500 years, thrown families of kings into the dust bin of history, were preparing for the next phase of the struggle by uttering their sole motto: "After the Shah it is the turn of America."

Now after 2 years since the flight of the "cursed Shah," the heroic people of Iran are in the middle of this conflict. During the past 2 years the "cursed Shah" has been buried in the dust bin of history but his patron, the world imperialists led by the United States are continuing to pursue the same policies which had earlier been followed by the Shah.

During the past 2 years American imperialism had planned and carried out diverse conspiracies against the heroic people of Iran. During the past 2 years, as a consequence of these conspiracies, thousands of our heroic people have been martyred or injured. During these 2 years, American imperialism has tried the

pursuit of two tactics, that of the transformation and suppression of the revolution, to bring our country's heroic people to their knees and to tie our country, once again to plunder and crime of imperialism. In this period of 2 years, the heroic people of Iran fought by shouting "death to America" and as the leader of revolution had stated "everybody has directed shouts against America."

This great historical struggle is continuing. Our heroic people are continuing to cry out the motto which they had voiced with all their might on the day of the flight of the Shah. By experience, people of Iran know that genuine independence, true freedom, progress and happiness, decisive and final victory of the revolution are subject to the realization of this motto, namely uprooting the principle enemy which is imperialism headed by America.

Since the flight of the "cursed Shah" our heroic people are directly facing American incited aggressors, namely Saddam's military forces. Now 2 years after the motto "after the Shah it is the turn of America," our heroic people are facing threats of direct U.S. military aggression.

Now on the second anniversary of the flight of the "Satan," the heroic people of Iran are solidly united and prepared to continue their struggle to the end and disappoint the bloodthirsty, plundering and aggressive imperialism from reestablishing domination over our revolutionary homeland.

During the following days, the Majles will approve a bill nationalizing properties of the "cursed Shah" and his relatives. Thus, the struggle for the final and decisive purification of the "Satan" and his followers at all levels will continue. During the past 2 years, consistent with its honorable tradition, the Tudeh Party of Iran occupied the front ranks of the heroic Iranian peoples' fight against imperialism and world reaction led by America and her mercenaries and sacrificed a group of its best sons for the revolution. At this historical moment, the Tudeh Party is certain that the heroic and united people of Iran led by Imam Khomevni will defeat imperialism and world reaction led by American imperialism in the same manner as her crowned servant had been overthrown.

9797

CSO: 4906

GROUP DENOUNCED BY TUDEH ORGAN AS 'AMERICAN-CHINESE' PARTY

Tehran MARDOM in Persian 17 Jan 81 p 7

[Text] American Maoists affiliated to RANJBAR, which under cover of Islam had distributed gratis a "paper scrap" named "PAYAM-E JOM'EH" without a license, have now resorted to publishing another paper scrap without permission named AHZAB and this one is also distributed gratis.

American Maoists affiliated to RANJBAR have thoroughly betrayed their counter-revolutionary cover and countenance and have overtly attacked the Islamic Republic of Iran and militant clergy following the line of imam, in their second edition of counterrevolutionary "paper scrap" published last week. This publication does not have a license and is published illegally. The new counterrevolutionary "paper scrap" named AHZAB was introduced earlier in the former "paper scrap" called PAYAM-E JOM'EH and has been published in 16 pages.

This new "paper scrap" which is similar to the former example, does not deal in any way with the principle enemy of Iranian and world peoples, namely American imperialism and is being published for the sole purpose of creating dissidence among the people. The contents of this "paper scrap" is wholly directed against forces supporting the Imam's line and is full of curses and fabrications against the Tudeh Party of Iran, the Feda'in-e Khalq (majority) Organization and other forces loyal to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

As we had written in edition 401 of NAMEH-E MARDOM 1 Dey 1359 [20 Dec 1980] producers of this illegal "paper scrap" are precisely those elements directing American-Maoist group of RANJBAR. These elements had earlier established a phoney organization under the name of 'Islam' but when its counterrevolutionary nature was exposed, the RANJBAR group dissolved it and after a time began to publish PAYAM-E JOM'EH. The director of this counterrevolutionary "paper scrap" is a notorious club-wielder who has the "honor" of being a member of the American-Chinese party of Ranjbara and has been and is the ring leader of attacks directed against groups and book sellers under cover of "Islam."

The AHZAB "paper scrap" has been published in thousands of copies last week and has been distributed gratis to people worshipping and others in Tehran.

We, once again demand from the National Guidance Ministry and other authorities in this country to prevent publication of this counterrevolutionary "paper scrap" and not permit a "paper scrap" which is against the law and the interests of the revolution and the Islamic Republic of Iran from continuing to pursue its counter-revolutionary mission.

ALLEGED U.S. SPY PUT ON TRIAL

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 11 Jan 81 p 3

[text] The trial of an American spy, by the name of Hamid Jarayedi, began yesterday in the second branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Court in the capital.

At the first session of the trial, beginning yesterday morning, at the second branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Court in the capital, Hamid Jarayedi was accused of spying for the CIA. At the opening of the trial, the text of the indictment, issued by the court, was read by the prosecutor. The text of the indictment is as follows:

"The accused, Hamid Jarayedi, the son of Gholam Ali, assistant chief of the Policy Department of the Ministry of Finance, holder of a doctorate degree in international economics and of Tehran, with no criminal record, arrested on 1/4/59 [24 Jun 80], is charged with having had contact with foreign elements and of passing on to them secret state information (spying). The fact is that following the occupation of the American Embassy in Tehran by militant students, a number of documents were found showing that the accused had been in touch with the CIA agents, after which he was immediately arrested. In view of the said documents and the open confession of the accused, the court is hereby presented with the case for consideration."

After the text of the indictment was read to the court, the accused spoke in his own defense, saying: "When I was in college, they began establishing contact with me. At the beginning, and even at our last session in America, I did not know who they were and to what agency they belonged. At all sessions, the subject of discussions was economics. During the last session, 2 weeks before my return to Iran. I was contacted by an individual, who presented a contract to me saying that I had no alternative but to sign it, and that if I did refuse to do it, I would not be able to leave the place safely. I had no choice but to sign and they agreed to pay me 500 dollars a month."

The judge: "When did you sign the contract?"

The accused: "In the fall of 1355 [1977]. The party of the contract was CIA and I was supposed to furnish them information in Tehran."

The lawyer: "What other arrangements did you make?"

The accused: "One was the meeting arrangement in Tehran. That person asked me about the date of my return to Iran. I must add that it was arranged that approximately a month and a half after my return to Iran I would walk in front of the parkway gasoline station in order to be given a ride by him. I must also add that on the evening when these were being discussed I was very tense and was shaking. The reason was that until then, which was our last session in the U.S., no such matters had come up."

The judge: "How long after the revolution did you meet them again?"

The accused: "I must say that it was 7 or 8 days after 22 Bahman of 57 [11 Feb 79] that we met. After that I received my pay in Ordibehesht of 59 [21 Apr - 21 May 80] and our last meeting was in Geneva."

The judge: "Why did you keep your promise after your return to Iran?"

The accused: "They could do everything they wished during the rule of the shah."

The judge: "What was your code name?"

The accused: "Tony, the name my American classmates had given me. But in the bills I signed I used the name of Ali Mansuri. They agreed to use that as my code name."

The lawyer: "What important records did you have access to and what were the subjects that you discussed with them?"

The accused: "After I was hired by the Planning Organization I worked as an economic expert, and during the 1 year that I worked there I had no access to any confidential documents. I was not in a position to have had any access to such material."

The judge: "Why did you cooperate with them after the revolution?"

The accused: "At our first meeting following the revolution, I told them that I was not going to work for them anymore. They told me that my two brothers in the U.S. would be killed. I then began to pretend to cooperate with them and in our Geneva meeting I did not tell them anything except some made up stories."

The lawyer: "The session is announced recessed and that the next meeting will be held tomorrow morning."

9561

CSO: 4906

PRESIDENT, ARMY LAUDED FOR RECENT WAR OPERATIONS

Tehran ENQELAB-E ESLAMI in Persian 6 Jan 81 pp 1, 2

[Text] When the President was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces by the Imam, we had a disintegrated army, scattered all over the country. The President and commander-in-chief patiently began organizing the army, boosting its moral, and more important, giving it a new hope for a free and independent existence. He worked hard to demonstrate that true independence was attainable only by Islam and through Islam, and it was through Islam that an army, capable of protecting and defending the country's territorial integrity, could find its real place. There were conspiracies aimed at dissolving the army, and instead of strengthening its morale, efforts were made to break it, and accusations were hurled against it from right and left every day and every night. High army commanders, officers, non-commissioned officers and servicemen would write to him or tell him directly about how they were being treated and the difficult conditions under which they were forced to work. In spite of that, the President, devoted as he is, visited various garrisons, talking to commanders trying to give them encouragement and to boost their morale, urging them to be patient, while at the same time trying to organize and rebuild the army. The army was not yet fully prepared when it suddenly became involved in Kordestan, and in spite of all the difficulties it faced, it was able to courageously defend the nation.

Based on information and intelligence reports, the President had repeatedly warned against the threat of conspiracies faced by the Islamic revolution. He had urged that it was necessary to help rebuild an army with an Islamic spirit. They used to say that President Bani-Sadr was trying to make the Imam give more power to the military. Surprising enough, they were talking about a man who had spent many years of his life in studying the workings of power based on the Koran. In his book "Personality Faith" he analyzes the various aspects of power, its creation, inter-relations and the struggle for power. He once told this writer that he hoped that his most important work, "Personality Faith", could cause a revolution some day. The more he warned against conspiracies, the more they were misinterpreted. But he continued his efforts, hopefully and decidedly, until 3 months ago when the Ba'thist regime of Iraq, suddenly and according to well-planned program, launched its land, air and naval attack on Iran, hoping that it could finish the work in a matter of a few days. The day Iranian airports were bombed, many people panicked, not knowing what was to be expected until that very same evening when the Imam and the President sent their encouraging and heart-warming message to the people, victoriously quieting them down.

A few days later, the Commander-in-Chief left his house and established himself at the joint staff. He told me then: "When I am at the joint staff, I am able to neutralize the plots and at the same time keep abreast of the events at the front". Not long after, and despite the danger involved, he visited the front, moving from one front to the other. He told me that he was endangering his life so that the Islamic revolution could live, but in spite of the dangers the country was faced with, and at a time the country was confronted with an imposed war, certain opportunists and power-hungry individuals are busy elsewhere, seeking power and position.

We must sacrifice everything, even ourselves, to preserve the revolution and Islam in the country. A lot of people who were not aware of what the Guardians were doing for the country, and did not know much about the army and the condition in which it was, were busy in various cities of the country, trying to weaken the morale of the people. I was a witness myself when an army commander was nervously complaining and said: "I am in a command position, but I am afraid to advance or retreat even a few meters, for if we advance or retreat for tactical military reasons, voices of protest will rise and in cases of withdrawal, will question our motives".

At that time, a commander had asked the commander of the land forces for advice, and he had been told to go and discuss his problems with the Imam of the people. Finally, after having been criticized for not attacking, he launched an unprepared attack and was forced to retreat. When he was questioned by the Commander-in-Chief as to why he had withdrawn, he explained that he had been forced to attack because of pressure. He was told by the President that we should not attack unless we are fully prepared and that he [the president] will answer all criticism.

It has been more than 40 days since an all-out offensive is being planned and prepared:

--He [the President] has discussed with officers and commanders various problems and conditions of the country and what should be expected if victory is not achieved.

--He agreed to accept responsibility for all criticism against the army and the fighting men.

--He revived hopes in the hearts of all those who are engaged in military affairs.

--By his participation, work which took years and months to achieve during the former regime was completed in a short time.

--Initiatives and talents were directed in the right direction.

--He lived with them (the military) on the front and checked their problems.

--He procured necessary weapons for an all-out attack.

--He did not listen and paid no attention to rumors and criticism, and continued boosting the morale of the army, the Guardians and all other elements connected with the war. He was the object of all sorts of accusations and proclamations, issued in various parts of the country, aimed at weakening public morale. He ignored all these and did what he was supposed to do.

--At a time when anonymous bulletins and declarations were being distributed in Tehran and other cities, he was busy at the front coordinating operations of the various elements of the armed forces.

--He coordinated the operations of various branches of the armed forces, as no victory is possible without coordination. Sometime ago, I asked him in Khuzestan why he was not going back to Tehran. He said: "There are important things to be done here, and that I must make preparation for an all-out offensive". The first offensive got under way yesterday, bringing the promise to the people of Iran of total victory against the Ba'thist regime of Iraq. As the Imam of the nation said in his reply to the President's telegram: "I expect that with perseverance, coordination and devotion of all our fighting soldiers, the country will soon be cleared of the infidels. I pray to Almighty God for the health and victory of the nation. Hoping to hear the news of the final victory soon."

9561

CSO: 4906

BEHESHTI EXPLAINS MILITARY IDEALS TO KHORASAN DIVISION

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 7 Jan 81 p 2

[Text] Mashhad - PARS NEWS AGENCY - Visiting supreme court chief, Ayatollah Seyyed Mohammad Beheshti, in the second day of his visit yesterday morning, spoke to the army, air force, gendarmerie and police personnel at Mashhad's 77th division garrison. While rejecting the school of thought which replaces God with history and regards man as a toy and that history was the determining factor of morality, literature and arts, he said:

"They consider man as a soft wax in the powerful hands of history with fatalism and exigency ruling over him. In our opinion, the natural result of such an outlook is that man is the continuation of the same dumb, unintelligent and captive of natural laws and instincts. According to this school of thought, man is just an ape that walks straight and has been able to develop slightly beyond an ape. But there is another school of thought and approach, believing that man as coercion-free, capable of dominating the land and space and imposing his will where he has not yet done so. Our Islam is based on the second school of thought and approach, believing that man was created alert, selective, constructive and responsible. It commands that man should never stop at the ebb, and must continue to go forward, knowing that there was no limit or end to man's progress and development. Man is a child of the infinity and is in Love with the Lord and should keep infinity alive within himself. In short, you, the man, should not make history and give form to nature and extend your sovereignty over it more every day. This is only the excuse of bankrupt humanity who believe that if God gave one day can take it back again another day. But the Lord says: that if God bestows blessings on a nation and a generation and then takes it back, man must be responsible for this and he must be guilty."

In another part of his speech, the Supreme Court chief said: "You, the soldiers, non-commissioned officers, officers and Guard, should realize that the building of a healthy and strong body should be coupled with the strengthening of virtues and humanity, which is the essence of Islam. I must openly admit that a fundamental spiritual and intellectual change is taking place in all the garrisons and that these centers should become places for the remaking of personalities. I particularly put the emphasis on improving the gendarmerie, the army and the police, just as Islam has. Islam considers soldiers and

commanders as brothers and equal. The commanders issue orders in sincerity and truthfulness and soldiers carry them out in the same manner with speed. Our garrisons should become character development centres. This move alone can, with the help of Almighty God, become factors in making the history of the Islamic nations and of Iran. I hope that experience gained during our current conflict would prove that your self-building could become a destiny making factor, and the success achieved during the past months in our war (with Iraq) are the practical signs of this self-building process." Beheshti noted that a victorious army could develop a feeling of vanity (pride) and expectation of reward, privileges and war booty. If that was the final goal, he said, then there was no need for revolution. The reward of fighting for God, he added, was His satisfaction, and army men should be looking for that worthy reward, satisfaction, and army men should be looking for that worthy reward, satisfaction of Almighty God, and eternal salvation by the will of God.

9561

CSO: 4906

LORESTAN COMMANDER ANNOUNCES PASDARAN ACADEMY

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 31 Dec 80 p 11

[Text] Tehran - PARS NEWS AGENCY - In an interview with PARS NEWS AGENCY correspondent in Ahvaz, who questioned him about his views regarding the Guard Corps (Pasdaran) and the problems facing it in the war zone, commander of the Guard Corps in Lorestan Province said: "From the start of the conflict, in order to be able to confront the Iraqis, the Corps was reinforced in the area, and the actions taken in the direction of strengthening, organizing and equipping the Corps in the area and coordinating its operations with those of other units of the armed forces have been meeting our expectation."

Regarding the conduct of the Guards during the conflict, he said: "By their presence at the advance lines of the war fronts, and by being on the side of other Islamic forces, the Guards have played a decisive role. This offered them the best opportunity to familiarize themselves with various tactics in war and increase their fighting efficiency. We also have envisaged a long-term training program for them and are preparing to set up an academy for that purpose, but it requires time and opportunity."

He further said: "At present time, our program aims at improving the efficiency of our Guard in actual combat. But it must be added that by going through a 15-day intensive training course, our brother Guard become familiar with the needed new war techniques. In spite of lack of equipment, the morale of our brothers in trenches is very high and they are constantly asking us for orders to advance forward."

In connection with the methods of doing away with disputes and lack of coordination, Lorestan commander said: "Officials must leave egotism aside and choose to walk toward the divine direction and remember those who are guarding and protecting our revolution."

We went on to say: "As a Guard and a spokesman for the Guard Corps, I repeat our allegiance to the Imam and the nation. As long as we live we shall never allow opportunists, whether internal or foreign, to strike any blow against the revolution, and the enemy should realize that our victory is certain and our struggle divine. We are not fighting for gains but for ensuring human rights."

In expressing his appreciation for the wholehearted support of the nation, Forutan asked people to pray for the victory of right against wrong and act in unity.

WAR BOOTY MUSEUM EXPANDED

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 15 Dec 80 p 9

[Text] KEYHAN City Service: The exhibition of the war booty and of the activities of the armed forces after the revolution, which had been arranged by the office of the political ideology of the joint staff of the land, air and naval forces at the National Defense College, on Qasr Avenue, has been extended up to 15 Day [5 Jan 81].

The KEYHAN correspondent, who visited the exhibition yesterday morning, reports:

"In addition to slides, photographs and examples of the activities of the armed forces in connection with making spare parts and equipment for the armed forces, publications by the Organization for Reconstruction Campaign and Research and Ideological Propaganda Center of the armed forces, along with samples of the war booty taken by the army, are on exhibition."

It must be noted that a report about the exhibition had been published by KEYHAN on 6/9/59 [28 Oct 80].

Concerning the extension of the exhibition, which is open to the public every day from 8:30 am to 12:30 pm and from 2:00 pm to 4:00 pm, 2nd Lieutenant Ash-tiani said: "Because of increased public interest in the exhibition, it was extended and the number of items put on display at various pavillions were also increased."

KEYHAN reporter, who had visited the exhibition, writes: "While visiting the naval pavillion, the attendant talking about the exhibition, said: "The main object was self-assistance, and we are very much encouraged by the way the public has reacted."

He further added: "We intend to ask officials to hold the exhibition, on a bigger scale, at the International Fair grounds, which has not been used most of the year. The purpose is to make it possible for more war booty to be displayed so that the public could get a better feeling about what was going on and know that the news about the events were true. These days, many rumors are circulating and people ask themselves where are the tanks and airplanes that officials claim they have destroyed. We therefore ask officials to give us required facilities for bringing parts of the war booth from the war zones in western and southern regions of the country to Tehran, and by setting up a large exhibition punch the rumor mongers in the mouth. The public spirit and moral will be greatly boosted if this is done."

MINISTER OUTLINES ISLAMIC NORMS FOR UNIVERSITIES

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 11 Jan 81 p 12

[Interview with Dr Arefi, minister of science and higher education]

Text In the course of an exclusive interview with our correspondent the minister of science and higher education spoke about change in the educational system, the resumption of activities in the universities, the activities of the university holy war on the front and in the field of producing and introducing films, stipulations on the issuance of hard currency for college students, and other current university matters.

In response to the question on whether decisions had yet been taken on changing the education system, Dr Arefi said, "The staff of the cultural revolution and its branches have reached some conclusions. What we have determined is that the system of selection is not to be as it was in the past. Previously, entrance examinations were arranged and admission to the university was easier for people who lived in the big cities and spoke a more standard language. Now, our greater effort is to have the selection take place on a geographic basis, with a percentage chosen from the location and the rest from overall. Sometimes, for example, to admit a medical student, 60 percent of the individuals will be chosen from rural areas which are in the region and the rest will be from the big cities and the other regions, or, in the case of agriculture, there may perhaps be no need for us to take 90 percent of university students as farmers from the Tehran area -- to the contrary, it is necessary that 90 percent be chosen from rural areas in which agriculture is widespread and 10 percent from the country as a whole." The minister of science and higher education added, "In the selection, as well as in our future system of education, we will not neglect the theoretical side of the sciences -- we will just expand the nationwide scope. However, all in all, it is necessary that I add that no final decision has yet been made regarding admissions." In response to a question on when the universities will start their activities and which branches will be entitled to priority in this regard, Dr Arefi said, "The university will open at a time when it meets the Islamic rules for opening. The university will under no circumstances open in its previous form, when it had neither efficiency nor results, and would that it reopen -- it would be better for it to be known who the students who want to enter the university are, and they must conform to the rules. The professor and the university environment must also be known, and planning should also be made in an area where we will have a university which is oriented toward Islam and the service of the

people." Regarding the production and introduction of films, the minister of science and higher education said, "The undersecretary of science and higher education has taken and is taking measures regarding the production and introduction of films domestically, and, if necessary, abroad. However, decision-making in the case of films, or any other art, does not take place in a manner which gives immediate results; its results appear over the long term. However, in the field of producing films inside the country, this activity must be carried out by a person or group which believes in the system of the Islamic Republic and is on the side of the people, since someone who is devout can produce a film in this area, as art is the product of the way of thinking of the person who is the producer. However, one can say that all in all effective measures have been adopted in this field." In answering the question on the extent to which the university holy war has so far been effective in advancing the objectives of changing the education system, Dr Arefi said, "The university holy war and its committees have been conspicuously active in our educational system. Following the shutdown of the universities, the university holy war brought professors, students and employees out from behind desks and put them among the people and caused the problems understood from up close. Therefore, the university holy war can have an effective role in advancing education goals." The minister of science and higher education stated, with respect to university holy war activities following the renewed activity of the universities, "After the opening of the universities, the university holy war will also continue its activities; it will principally be a link between the field and studies and the scholarly fields which the students go into after studies. For example, in the field of medicine, practical activities (work in the hospitals) have constantly been in conjunction with theoretical studies, and the effort will be for other fields also to run such a practical program, in a broader manner; the holy war of the university can have a role in this regard."

Concerning the departure of the students' hard currency (which was raised by the undersecretary of science and higher education), he said, "The activities which have been carried out so far have all been reviewed, but have been raised several times by me and him (the undersecretary). Hard currency used to be sent out of this country, but one must see for whom and where this hard currency — which in reality has been and is support from this nation — has been sent out. This investigation has shown that the hard currency sent abroad from the country has sometimes amounted to double or more the requirements of an individual. Secondly, a number of people benefited from this hard currency but in exchange stood in the opposing ranks or took advantage in other ways. Thirdly, hard currency must be sent out for people who will return to their country after their studies and serve on behalf of the people. Our investigations have established that some of these individuals have sold jewels, have become cab drivers, or have recently been active in the ranks of the counterrevolution, and have nothing to do but amuse themselves. Hard currency was constantly being sent out for them as students; these persons (people who made use of hard currency in an illegal manner, not only as students) enrolled in a university outside the country and for example took three course units and then, after failing these three units re-registered and so on, and there also were people who stayed outside the country for 15 or 16 years, taking out this country's hard currency as students without receiving any diplomas or taking any courses. So student hard currency will be given to people who get diplomas within a specific time and then become engaged in serving the revolution."

The minister of higher education, regarding the activity of the university holy war at the battlefronts, stated, "The university holy war activity took form with the shutdown of the universities, and in most matters, including the battlefronts, it has been in service of the people. Sometimes if there is a need to form units at the front the university holy war has been at their service, and members of the university holy war have also been of service to wounded people on the fronts. For example, the wings which are being destroyed in the hospitals now are repaired and erected by these persons. However, one can say that in direct terms it has been less and their indirect activity has been substantial."

In conclusion, Dr Arefi, the minister of science and higher education, described the structure of the future educational system as follows: "The educational system in the universities must be 100 percent Islamic in the future. Its yield ultimately must revert to the people, who provide the budget for it. For example, if a laboratory is open, its research and activities must be for the people. We cannot have a university as in the past where some subject, for example cells, was studied domestically at the people's expense but was published in the form of an article in a foreign magazine. Now, if we have some research, it will be on a basis where orientations are clear. For example, if an article is written it will have to be seen what orientation it has; if someone is active as a researcher in a university, it will have to be seen to what extent his work is of benefit to our revolution. Therefore, planning in the universities will be founded on this basis. It is true that we need doctors who perform plastic surgery, but one must see now that we have no 'surgeons' whether we have greater need for a plastic surgeon who for example straightens a person's nose or performs surgery on a part of the body of a person who was injured as the result of mortar fire, so that that person is not lost."

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CSO: 4906

MAYOR DISCUSSES PLAN TO HALT MIGRATION TO TEHRAN

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI (in Persian 11 Jan 81 p 12)

[Article: "To Avoid Migration of Rural Inhabitants to City, Tehran Mayor Announces Broad Resources Placed at Rural Dwellers' Disposal"]

[Text] Yesterday morning Mr Seyyed Reza Zawvare'i, the new Municipality of Tehran supervisor at a press, radio and television conference declared his views regarding the duties of the municipality, the reason for change and evolution in the Traffic and Driving Department, the United Company, current problems in the United Company, and other matters.

At the outset, Mr. Zawvare'i stated:

"As also was stated in the Ministry of Interior announcement, my presence in the municipality will basically last until the appointment of a new mayor; however, in any event, while I am here, measures will be taken. I declared my views regarding municipality matters in that first meeting to the municipality managers in summary form. I must point out to my dear brethren that day by day the city of Tehran expanded and grew in a disorganized fashion, through the program which colonialism and its executors and domestic agents had set out for close to 50 years, and the fruits of the blood of the people throughout the country, and the fruits of plunder and pillage throughout the country, were apparently spent on the welfare of the people of Tehran -- a matter which caused rural people to migrate every day from the countryside and seek refuge in the cities. Therefore, in order for us to find salvation from the state of dependence which colonialism created for us, it is necessary that all the efforts and endeavors of the Islamic government and the Islamic state be devoted to reconstructing the rural areas, and those elements which caused migration should be eliminated. In the agricultural field, we can be self-sufficient in order not to have any need for foreign countries.

The Tehran Subway and Rural Areas in Ruins!

"Through this thinking and this belief, it is clear that we in the city of Tehran will not carry out any other program which might cause the continued migration of rural inhabitants and people from other provincial areas to Tehran, such as paving the alleys and streets which must be paved, especially in the south of the city, and provision of relative humane welfare and present relative services. For example, credits of close to 20 billion were set aside for the Tehran subway,

at a time when some of our rural areas do not have paved roads and there is no sign of piped water and electricity in some rural areas; not only do Islamic rules not permit such exorbitant funds to be disbursed just for the sake of the people of Tehran from the public treasury -- justice and gallantry to not permit it either. If Tehran is to have a subway, the inhabitants of Tehran and persons whose income level is 100 times that of rural inhabitants must provide that themselves and not get it from the public budget -- in a city where in the era of the government of that father and son billions of tomans were expended in the name of the municipality up to now and when rain or snow comes the areas in the south of the city are flooded. I do not think that fairness would allow us to construct an expressway for people at a time when we have not been thinking about these basic matters, that is, surface water. It is necessary that these basic matters be carried out. This is a program which another brother to whom the job will be assigned after your servant will absolutely pursue. It is intolerable that the people who were the arms of the revolution should be tortured and tormented by floods during a rain and then be made uncomfortable after rain by the stench of the marshes remaining in the open sewers. Thus the subject which is the municipality's duty and to which importance must be assigned in the first place is municipal sanitation; unfortunately the state of sanitation has not been better after our revolution than it was before the revolution. This is a general picture of what one must expect from the municipality in the future, and what the municipality will do. Of course, in terms of administrative staffs, it is necessary that the requisite transformation take place.

A Report to the People

"I have spoken with some regional mayors and we are to propose at a session that the mayors provide mosques in their areas and announce to the people in these areas through the mass media in advance that they will have to appear in these mosques on specific days of the month in order to present a report on their work to the people, request help from the people, listen to the people's issues and problems, and respond to the people there themselves, along with the officials of the various units of the area of the municipality. The people will raise their issues directly, listen to their answers and, if they see anyone who is busy up to now, he can apply himself to this situation, coordinate the expectations of the people with the revolutionary movements, and correct errors and be at the service of the people in matters where there are mistakes. Of course, municipality officials will enjoy their cooperation and will be the object of protection; if in their actions they show that they cannot service the people, it is natural that they will not be able to anticipate continuing work in the municipality."

Staffs Established in the Mosques

Regarding the formation of staffs in the area, Mr Zawware'i said, "In the first session I held with the mayors of the areas, views were sought in this regard. I said that in the event you form your staffs within the context of the mosques, you will certainly be successful and this activity will endure. However, outside the mosques, the people will not give protection to any issue that may arise and it will not be a success either. Therefore, the staffs must be formed within the mosques, and these staffs will belong to the people themselves and must absolutely circulate among the people."

With respect to the reason for the change of the traffic chief and the managing director of the United Company, Mr Zawware'i said,

"When I went to the driving examination room for the sake of getting to know the new driving chief, I had a conversation there with the driving instruction officers and noncommissioned officers and I said 'Since you were not directly in difficulty with the people before the revolution, the people accepted you after the revolution; but you, unfortunately, did not consider it essential to respond to this popular acceptance, and the transformation and movement which ought to have come about in your organization for the sake of the performance of your duty and service to the people has not been seen in the traffic department.'

A Popular Government

"Basically the philosophy behind creating an organization and meeting its expenses from the treasury is to eliminate the people's problems. The government employee is in reality the servant of the nation. The fruits of his work must be the source of satisfaction of the people, and above that it must be the object of the satisfaction of God. However, what I perceived myself and saw around myself was that the people were in no way satisfied with the work of the Traffic and Driving Department, and this change has been made purely to create movement in the work of Traffic and Driving. Regarding the new traffic plan program which has been implemented, the mayor of Tehran said 'A basic program is stipulated to be laid out for this activity so that the people will not periodically be faced with new programs and new plans.'

Mr Zawware'i was asked about the reason for the change in managing directors of the United Company and replied "Basically, the day they assigned this duty to me, Area Four of the United Company went on strike. I went there and addressed their laborers, employees and officials as a group. Of course part of the problem was connected to management, and they were dissatisfied; part of it, again, was related to welfare matters which resulted from a form of sabotage. I sent an investigation to the United Company areas, people from the United Company visited me after being assigned to their positions, and this was all the result of dissatisfaction of all the United Company employees with the state of the management in it. I see that the necessary bus movement is not to be observed, in spite of the slight traffic in some areas. Many reports arrived to the effect that the gentlemen hired a large number of people after the revolution. When I requested a list of the people who had been hired, in order to see how many people there were, they did not know how many they had hired -- they just said around 3,000 to 4,000 people, just 1,200 of whom had been approved. These were matters which in their totality could not continue.

Movement in the United Company

"Of course the gentlemen who belonged to the board of directors wrote a letter in the form of resignation. I studied it and sent out people to investigate, so that they could conduct an investigation and see if it was possible for us to continue to benefit from their cooperation. Unfortunately, however, we reached the conclusion that it was not possible to continue their cooperation; because of the extensive dissatisfaction which existed among the laborers and employees of the

United Company and the exorbitant expenses the United Company has brought on the people, these are matters which must be investigated, and, God willing, be arranged in such a way where we will be self-sufficient and have no need to make use of the people's treasury just for the people of Tehran and for the operation of buses." Referring to the revenues of the municipality, the supervisor of the municipality stated "At the start of the revolution the Tehran municipality was active and performed activities but unfortunately it has not performed many activities in the past year, and the best scale and criterion for weighing the services of an organization are the people themselves. Therefore, if the people are not satisfied, one must admit that there is a deficiency and weakness."

With regard to the construction of a subway system, Seyyed Reza Zavvare'i stated "The construction of the subway is not connected only to the municipality; for this reason, a session was held in the Ministry of the Interior to investigate the performance of work on the subway, and in accordance with that it was determined that to the point where the work is half-completed it should be completed and carried out and that the work which is not in the public interest should be suspended."

The supervisor of the Tehran municipality then referred to the United Company's annual revenue and said:

"In view of the fact that the streets are empty and private cars are not being used, the company's revenues have been forecast at 600 million tomans, in a situation where credits of 1.4 billion tomans have been allocated to the United Company from the general budget."

The municipality of Tehran supervisor then stressed that the United Company must become self sufficient in one way or another. He also added that the new managing director of the United Company is temporary and that he will continue his job until a board of directors is elected.

11887

CSO: 4906

COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK EXTENDED TO MANY VILLAGES

Tehran BURS in Persian 31 Dec 80 p 3

[Text] One hundred and fifty districts and villages across the country will have communications coverage next year.

Dr Mahmud Qandi, minister of post, telegraph and telephone, announced this news during a special interview with a PARS correspondent. In regard to the expansion of communications facilities in the districts and villages, he said: After the revolution, in 1358 [21 March 1979 - 20 March 1980] approximately 30 villages and districts, and in 1359 [21 March 1980 - 20 March 1981] approximately 70 villages gained communications coverage. These figures show a 20 percent expansion and a speed five times greater in comparison with the 50 years of the pre-revolutionary period, during which only about 350 rural points were given communications.

Dr Qandi added: We are resolved to continue our actions to the fullest extent possible to expand communications in the villages. This can have an important effect on the improvement of the economic, social and cultural conditions of these points. With our present program we foresee a communications network for about 600 more districts and villages during the coming year. Right now we are examining a program that would establish communications for villages having a population of about 2,000 during the years 1361 and 1362 [21 March 1982 - 20 March 1984]. Of course if the economic and industrial circumstances of the country improve, the speed we have foreseen will increase.

Then the minister of post, telegraph and telephone spoke about the dissatisfaction of some citizens with the service of operators for 123 - 126 and 118. He said: The employees who work in these sections are hardworking and dedicated to the revolution. Of course it is possible that there are also persons who have not been able to adapt themselves with the revolutionary and Islamic order in a manner befitting an operator committed to the people's service. These are persons who have damaged the reputation of the entire bureau by their improper clashes with people and sometimes by abuse of the telephone lines for their own private objectives. This is really misuse of public funds. He added: I am positive that the majority of employees are faithful, revolutionary, and Islamically committed. If there are also undesirable elements who will not reform themselves, they will undoubtedly be purged or even legally prosecuted for misuse of public funds. One of the distinctions of the Islamic government is its campaign against all forms of corruption. We in the government are particularly obliged to combat administrative corruption.

Dr Qandi continued: On the other hand I advise all our dear citizens to give our colleagues their greatest consideration when contacting the operator. Many times, if the operator's line is busy or is late in answering, the reason is the high volume of telephone traffic, and occasionally deficiencies and flaws in some equipment. This dissatisfaction must not be taken out on the operators because any kind of heedlessness can serve to discourage our colleagues.

Dr Qandi concluded: The definite majority of our honorable colleagues are striving with the greatest possible dedication to provide the best possible service to their fellow citizens, and they rightfully expect the people to be appreciative.

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CSO: 4906

TRADE BEING DEVELOPED WITH VARIOUS COUNTRIES

Cuban Ambassador Visits

Tehran BURS in Persian 7 Jan 81 p 8

[Text] Yesterday Alberto Velasco, ambassador of the socialist Republic of Cuba in Tehran and Mr Gomez, Cuban press counselor, met and spoke with 'Ali Reza Nobari, general director of Bank-e Markazi-ye Iran [The Central Bank of Iran], in the bank's headquarters.

In this visit economic and banking relations between the two countries and expansion of these relations were discussed. At the end of the meeting, the Cuban ambassador, in a short conversation with the PARS economic correspondent concerning the reason for the meeting, said: This meeting took place primarily in order to become acquainted and establish close contact with Bank-e Markazi-ye Iran's general director. He added: Our main goal in this meeting was to examine establishing suitable relations and increasing cooperation between the two countries.

Finnish Bankers Visit

Tehran BURS in Persian 13 Jan 81 pp 1, 8

[Text] Bank-e Markazi-ye Iran public relations announced that Mr Ten Kanun, Finnish ambassador to the Islamic Republic of Iran, a representative of the Finnish Central Bank and also one commercial official from Finland met and talked with Mr 'Ali Reza Nobari, general director of the Bank-e Markazi-ye Iran. In this meeting some issues related to the two countries' commerce and the transfer of currency by Finnish exporters and contractors were discussed. It was resolved that in further secondary sessions necessary actions be taken to solve the aforesaid problems in regard to the relevant regulations.

The public relations spokesman added: In these talks mention was also made of recent trade trends between the two countries and possibilities of trade expansion. During the last year Iranian exports to Finland have increased about 100 percent, and Finnish exports to Iran nearly 150 percent. Great possibilities exist for further expansion of commerce between the two countries.

Austrian Trade

Tehran BURS in Persian 15 Jan 81 p 7

[Text] Statistics published in Vienna indicate that Austria, which did not participate in the U.S.-led economic boycott against Iran was able to increase its exports to Iran about three times over in the past year. Austrian trade officials said that the level of chemical materials, iron, steel, paper, wood and food which compose the main Austrian exports to Iran has reached more than \$179 million during the current year. The level reached last year was \$67.6 million. Last April Iran founded a good-will office in its own embassy building in Vienna in order to coordinate the purchase of food and spare parts from factories in Europe which agreed to ignore the economic boycott. These officials added: But Austria has not been transformed into a large base for exports to Iran because demand for industrial projects which constituted the highest figure before the revolution is now practically eliminated. Austria has lowered its exports from Iran to less than half of their value during 1979 due to Iran's petroleum export reduction. These imports, which are mostly carpets and dried fruits, are worth 50 million rials.

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IMPORT FIGURES REPORTED FOR SEVEN-MONTH PERIOD

Tehran BURS in Persian 6 Jan 81 p 3

[Text] The Customs Office of Statistics and International Affairs of Iran gave the PARS NEWS AGENCY import statistics for the first 7 months of the current year from the country's 9 principal ports of entry. On the basis of these statistics, at the 9 ports of entry, Abadan, the Port of Bushehr, the Port of Anzali, the Port of Khorramshahr, Port Imam Khomeyni, Bandar 'Abbas, the Port of Nowshahr, Astara, and Jolfa, 5,425,000 tons of merchandise worth 312,487,000,000 rials were imported into the country. Compared to the same period in the year 1358 [21 March 1979 - 20 March 1980] these figures represent a 4.93 percent increase in weight and a 1.97 percent increase in value. On the basis of these statistics, the merchandise imported at the 9 ports mentioned is equal to 97 percent by weight and 66 percent by price of all the country's imports, while these figures for the same period in the previous year represented 92 percent and 64 percent of the entire country's import totals by weight and price respectively.

The Customs Office of Statistics and International Affairs of Iran also announced export figures on various goods exported at seven of the country's principal ports of entry. On the basis of these statistics from customs houses at Abadan, the Port of Bushehr, the Port of Anzali, the Port of Khorramshahr, Port Imam Khomeyni, Bandar 'Abbas, and Jolfa, around 148,305 tons of merchandise worth 2,686,545,000 rials were exported outside the country. These figures represent 72.6 percent by weight and 9.86 percent by value of all the country's exports.

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CSO: 4906

OUTPUT OF MAZDA VEHICLES TO INCREASE

Tehran BURS in Persian 29 Dec 80 p 3

[Text] The vehicle shortage throughout the country is not a new problem. However, the way that most people are talking about it these days, one can hazard a guess that 80 percent of the need is for personal use of a vehicle, not for carrying loads or moving the needs of the public. However, there are persons among them who are thinking about that group of consumers whose livelihood truly depends on the automobile. However, all the trading of middlemen on the free market exaggerates the real extent of the vehicle problem. In fact, knowledgeable persons express the opinion that there are more than 25,000 vehicles in Tehran which cannot be seen in circulation. These very same factors are going to cause difficulties. Another group also expresses the opinion that vehicle importation should be freed until the market is saturated. This would cause even more acute problems. It will not be that easy to find a solution to this problem. Above and beyond all this, the issue of domestic production arises. For various reasons production is not at the level it should or might be. However, some units, with support from the workers and proper management, have been able to maintain and continue their production at a relatively good level in comparison with other domestic vehicle producers.

The Mazda factory's production continues as before, even after the stoppage of spare parts and production parts from Japan. Production is not at the level it should be, although its production is better than that of other domestic factories. This unit's production decrease was due to the nonexistence of parts or delay in their arrival. The managers of this unit also undertook actions in this regard, and lowered production themselves so that production could continue and workers could remain employed. In this way they were able to continue production with the parts they had on hand. However, in recent weeks, due to the non-arrival of production parts, they somewhat lowered production so that 10 to 12 units were produced daily. An emergency plan was immediately put into effect in which factory workers had an important role as well, and parts were transported from customs to the productive units. One informed official at the Mazda factory expressed hope that the production level would quickly rise to 20 units a day. At the present time the production of this unit is better than that of other factories. He also said: Talks have been held with Japan, and if the transportation problem is solved, many of our problems will disappear, and we will have no problem in the parts area. Then we will be able to continue production at a higher capacity. When we possess parts we can have a greater share in the elimination of shortages.

BUSHEHR ATOMIC PLANT TO BECOME INDUSTRIAL SCHOOL

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 31 Jan 81 p 5

[Text] Since plans to operate and utilize Bushehr atomic plants have come to a standstill the facilities at these centers will soon be used as training and production complexes for the country's various industries.

Dr 'Abbaspur, the minister of energy, while making this announcement in an interview with a PARS correspondent at the conclusion of an inspection of the installations at the Bushehr atomic plant, said: Projects to operate the atomic plant will not continue in present circumstances because of various problems such as dependence and technological considerations. Production of electricity needed by the country will be done in conventional ways.

He said: At the present time the plant's housing units have been turned over to war refugees and the navy. The navy will also use the port and the technological facilities. Existing work areas in the plant will be converted to a large training complex. We hope that this complex can assist area industries, maritime industries, the country's food production, and the Ministry of Energy.

Concerning the use of atomic energy, the Minister of Energy said: The plan for the Bushehr atomic plant is not on a long-term hold.

Concerning procurement of the province's electric power and water, Dr 'Abbaspur said: Fortunately there is no shortage of electric power in this province. As far as water is concerned, since Bushehr is one of the country's southern provinces, notice has been taken of its water shortages with a view to expanding the Ministry of Energy. At the present time a project is underway to route water from the Kheyraabad River. On the basis of this plan, which will show useful results in 2 1/2 years, water from this river will be conveyed by pipeline to Bushehr and to cities and villages along the way. In order to speed implementation of this plan efforts are being made to use the Ministry of Petroleum's existing surplus pipelines.

Concerning the construction of a dam in the Province of Bushehr, the minister of energy said: Studies are underway with the aim of constructing two dams on the Mand and Sheshpir Rivers. Efforts will be made actively to begin the work of constructing these dams, as quickly as possible. This will be an extraordinary help to the area.

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CSO: 4906

WEST AZARBAYJAN GETS MANY DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 31 Jan 81 p 8

[Text] Urmia--KEYHAN Correspondent--Eng Nureldin Parspur, Chief of the West Azarbayjan Rural Cooperative Organization, announced that in the current year 38 warehouses, factories, stores, and headquarters buildings for the cooperatives of this province have been created. Since the start of the current year 897,800,000 rials in loans have been provided by this organization to members of cooperatives in 438 villages in Urmia, Maku, Khoy Miandoab, Salmas, and Naqdeh. These loans will be used to expand agriculture and fishing in the area.

He also said, in the current year, to protect apple growers, this organization has undertaken to buy the apple crops of area growers, and 503,521 tons of apples have been purchased at guaranteed prices. He added, the production of a commercial poultry farm located 8 kilometers from Urmia continues at 30,000 birds. Other activities of the above organization include construction of 23, 250-500-ton warehouses for storage of goods in villages, construction of 5 organized facilities for rendering agricultural services and repairing machinery, construction of a cheese factory at a cost of 4,780,000 rials in the Khoy municipality, construction of a 1000-head sheep ranch on a 3,500 square meter plot, being built with 150 million rials in credit, construction of 38 headquarters buildings at village cooperative centers, creation of 16 stores in existing buildings, 11 of which cost 1,280,000 rials each and 2 of which cost 2,500,000 rials each, and construction of 7 consumer outlets in the villages at a combined cost of 14 million rials.

He also said, in the province of West Azarbayjan 151 village cooperatives with 165,621 members and 563,634,350 rials in assets and 190,314,445 rials in goods in stock encompass 28,440 villages with combined assets of 970,565,500 rials, and that 10 cooperative unions with 270,565,500 rials in assets procure what is needed by 408 consumer outlets and 430 village petroleum products dealers.

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CSO: 4906

THIRD STATE SEEN BETWEEN ISRAEL, JORDAN

Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 2 Jan 81 Weekend Supplement pp 9, 26

[Article by Aryeh Luba Eliav: "Israel's Options in the Eighties"]

[Text] The first basic assumption from which I have proceeded is that the Jewish-Arab dispute in the Mideast, the implications of which far exceed the confines of the region and which has become one of the international foci of combustibility and peril, has its source in the frontal clash which has erupted and continues to erupt between two nationalist movements which demand for themselves--for historic, cultural, religious and nationalist reasons--the selfsame territory.

The one national movement--Zionism--the movement of renaissance and liberation of the Jewish nation which demands the Land of Israel; and the other is the Palestinian Arab national movement which demands Falestin for itself. The Land of Israel and Falestin are two synonyms for the self-same stretch of land which extends, in general, between a sea on the west and a desert on the east and between the slopes of the Hermon in the north, to the Red Sea in the south. And it is that territory which is named Palestine and over which the British Mandate following the W.W. I had jurisdiction.

From this source the conflict has spread with the passing of years over the Arab and Muslim world and over the Jewish world; and because of the geopolitical status of the region has become, as well, an inter-bloc and great-power arena of conflict.

Four Generation Animosity

The second assumption is that the only way to localize--and in the course of time to eliminate--the conflict, is by partition of this land, this territory, between two nationalist movements and between the two nations, which have battled, and are battling with each other in a bloody war of four generations and more.

The third assumption is that the Jewish national movement, Zionism, has attained through its own power and after mighty efforts, its political goal which is self determination (not its social nor its economic goal!). This occurred during the War of Liberation in 1948 through the formation and the establishment of the State of Israel. Within its borders, the Zionist movement is able to achieve all of its goals under conditions of peace.

The fourth assumption is, that Israel must comprehend that the conflict will not end unless Israel and Zionism also recognize the right of the Palestinian Arab national movement for self determination and this within the areas which were conquered by the State of Israel in its defensive Six-Day War--that is to say, in the areas of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

The fifth assumption, is that such recognition will bring about peace negotiations with the representation of the Palestinian Arab nationalist movement, on condition that the other side--that is to say, the Palestinian Arabs and their representatives will recognize Israel and sit down with it around a conference table in order to conclude with it a full peace.

The sixth assumption is, that it will be the prerogative of the Palestinian Arabs to determine the form of connection between them and between the state of Jordan, which is part of the Palestinian-Israeli problem. Similarly, it will be their prerogative to determine the form of solution to the Palestinian refugees in the Areas, areas which were in their hands and the connection between them and the Palestinian diaspora--exactly as Israel will continue to guard its Zionist and unseverable ties with the Jewish diaspora and the Jewish nation.

The seventh assumption is that evacuation of the areas will be accomplished in stages which will extend over a number of years and which will be tied in with the negotiations and their progress. Until the evacuation is complete there will be an IDF presence in the Areas. Even after the Palestinian Arab nationalist movement acquires sovereignty over the Areas to be evacuated there will continue in the evacuated areas a status of demilitarization and supervision or a joint Israel-Palestinian or Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian supervision.

The length of this supervision and demilitarization will be determined by the peace treaty through negotiation. The goal of these arrangements would be to assure that no factor hostile to Israel within the region or outside of it be able to imperil its security.

Only after this process which will be considerably lengthy, will the conflict to reach its end; only then will even the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt acquire concreteness and true substance; only then will Israel be able to attempt to arrive at peace with Syria and Lebanon also, and only then will Israel be able to arrive at a normal situation in the region in which it is existing.

The Agreed-Upon Borders

I very, very well know that these seven assumptions are not yet acceptable to large sections of the two disputing sides, nor are they advocated by today's government of Israel and by the leadership of the Palestinian nationalist movement of today. But I am convinced that there is no other way to end the conflict (other than by the spilling of additional blood which will not bring about any kind of tipping of the scale and will only draw in its aftermath additional calamities and tragedies).

I must emphasize why the pre-Six Day War boundaries are the base on which it is possible to reach negotiations and peace.

I concede that these are not ideal borders for the State of Israel from a security viewpoint (although they are not as bad as usually delineated); I concede that they are not ideal to the Palestinian Arabs and am certain that both sides would prefer other boundaries entirely.

The decisive reason is that within these borders the grand aims of Zionism are attainable and that for these borders of Israel there is an international consensus of monumental dimensions: this consensus includes both super-powers, U.S. and Soviet Union (who have explicitly expressed this repeatedly), China, all the nations of the European Common Market and the decisive majority of the nations of the Third World.

This consensus after 2,000 years of diaspora and of lack of Jewish independence, and after 100 years of the struggle of Zionism is an exceedingly large asset which can be relinquished only at Israel's peril.

In addition, today, at the start of the eighties, and following the signing of the peace agreement with Egypt, this consensus includes (not by reason of enthusiasm but rather by reason of reality) a significant number also of Arab nations, first of which is Egypt (but not it alone, for also Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Tunis and the Gulf Emirates have expressed their agreement in one form or another).

In contrast to this consensus, there is not a single nation on earth (except for Israel itself) which agrees to the annexation of these areas and which is disregarding the Palestinian national problem. Israel cannot, and need not, stand alone against the world. It can utilize the almost world-wide consensus and achieve a maximum of conditions (including, of course, first and foremost, IDF supervision arrangements) for its security.

If, despite this, Israel by force holds the territories and enlarges and "thickens" the settlements and the annexations, it will continue to bring upon itself unglittering worldwide isolation, but in addition (what is no less horrible) a situation which will become progressively intolerable of dominators and dominees, of extended military rule over the Palestinian Arabs, which will become by the nature of things progressively more cruel. This situation will totally distort and corrupt the image and the substance and the quality of the State of Israel and of Zionism.

ISFALUR Cluster States

In contrast to this gloomy picture existing in the present, in contrast to this destructive scenario which is taking place before our eyes, and in contrast to the horrible vicious circle in which we and the Palestinian Arabs are thrust, and from which there appears to be no escape--in contrast to all of these, I wish to describe what can happen if both sides take steps along the path that has been outlined in the seven basic assumptions.

After a primary period (which is likely to extend over very many years) during which there will exist in a separate and very suspicious existence stemming from the bitter, bloody conflict of about 100 years, three political entities: Israel, Palestine and Jordan. It can be assumed, and hoped, that positive dynamic forces

will begin to operate in these three entities, forces stemming not only from a common fate of about seven million Semites and children of Abraham, whom fate has brought to a stretch of land sacred and precious to all of them on the east of the Mediterranean Sea, but rather which stem no less from mutual political, economic and social interests which can and should be concretized (although slowly) in a situation of peace and after the wounds of the past have begun to form scar tissue.

Without in any way ceding their sovereignty and their full independence, a process will begin (familiar to us from other nations in the world who were in the past no less antagonistic and hostile) of cooperation in many varied areas. The compactness of these political entities and their unique geographical situation will bring about, with the progress of that process, a cluster (call it, if you will, a confederation or a common market, or any other name) of the three, and with the continuation of the process, which again may extend over years, there will be established this tripartite cluster, which for the sake of convenience I shall label ISFALUR, a name comprised, of course, of the letters ISrael FAlestin and URdon (Jordan in the Arabic).

I wish now to describe what will be the centripetal forces which will bring about the existence and the consolidation of ISFALUR and what the three entities which will establish it can "profit" from this cooperation (in addition, of course, to the monumental and magnificent primary profit of the substantive peace); and similarly, what are the regional cooperative projects that can be established and implemented only through the cooperative powers of the components:

1) The Northern Water Project

ISFALUR will be able to harness the sources of water to its north and to control them for the benefit of all its components. On the assumption that peace will reign with Syria and Lebanon as well (but on a smaller scale even without them), ISFALUR will be able to bring about a rational regional allocation of the water of the Jordan River (and with the agreement of Lebanon, of the Litani as well) and the Yarmoukh River, to convert the Galilee to a multi-annual, multi-dimensional reservoir, and to bring about the irrigation of additional hundreds of thousands of dunams on both sides of the Jordan Plain as well as in southern Israel and in the Gaza Strip (which will be part of Palestine).

2) The Jordan Plain Project

On both sides of the Jordan Plain, a large project may arise based upon very intensive agriculture and production of food for export, including the establishment of modern food industries. This project will constitute a foundation for the settling of refugees on a large dimensional scale, while the agricultural producers constitute a stable base for the establishment of villages, municipalities and cities which will absorb many tens of thousands of new settlers who will convert the Jordan Plain (similar to the Jordan Valley and the Be'et She'an Valley in Israel) to a densely populated region, blooming, producing and exporting.

Upon invitation, Israel can contribute from its experience and its know-how to this restoration and development project. Within the framework of this project

there should be examined the possibility of a digging of a canal from the Mediterranean Sea to the Be'it She'an Valley and to its south. This canal can also serve as a source of supply for electricity and particularly as an outlet from the Mediterranean Sea. From it, sea water will come to fill artificial lakes upon whose shores will rise large desalination projects, to add significant quantities of unsalted water for irrigation. Similarly, internal shipping will develop to carry products to the ports of Haifa, and sport, rest and recreation sites, which together with the Sea of Galilee will serve as a magnet for many tourists from within ISRAEL and from the world.

A Mighty Chemical Mine

3) The Dead Sea Project

The Salt Sea--"Dead Sea"--which has already turned into a live sea, is the largest and most natural repository and quarry of ISRAEL, whose three components surround it. This quarry has not yet been tapped except for its very beginning. The Dead Sea Enterprises in the Israeli part of the sea, and smaller potash enterprises in the Jordanian part, are nothing more than the tip of this "salted" chemical and metallurgical iceberg. During the decade of the sixties and seventies, there will be, without a doubt enormous breakthroughs in the technology for exploitation of new energy sources as well as in modern chemistry. The Dead Sea, the deepest point on the globe, can serve as a condit in these breakthroughs. I allude particularly to the exploitation of solar energy and to its utilization for a chemical industry.

The sea, or at the start parts of it, can serve as a giant mirror to focus and deliver large quantities of solar energy for industry, for agriculture, for illumination and for tourism to the shores of the sea and the expenses of ISRAEL. From that period forward, during which energy at economical cost will be found on the shores of the sea, there will be practically no limit to the exploitation of this mighty chemical mine.

The potash as a basis for the cultivation of vegetation will be only one of the minerals of the Dead Sea, and perhaps not the most important among them. Even today men are exploiting the bromine which is found in the sea in very large quantities and the opportunities for mining and for some other important elements for the medical and pharmaceutical industries will arrive very soon. But the most important elements in the Dead Sea will be available in the future the light metals such as magnesium and aluminum and other rare metals required for the aviation industry, for the space industry and for other science oriented industries.

It will be possible to dig out the treasures of the Dead Sea into thousands of chemical and metallurgical products without destroying the environment of the Dead Sea as a tourist, rest and recuperation area (exploitation of its springs and its salt). It will be possible to move the treasures of the Dead Sea to large distant complexes at distant sites in the Negev and over the length of the Jordan-River depression to Elat and Aqaba and there to develop the foundation for a gigantic modern and science industry without disturbing the environment and the beauty of the Dead Sea.

It will be possible to bring materials in solution to the ports of Akaba-Eilat on the one hand, and the ports on the Mediterranean Sea of ISRAEL on the other hand, and to create there, as well, a basis for various chemical industries. Within the framework of the Dead Sea project it will be possible to dig a canal from the Mediterranean Sea to the Dead Sea which will pass from the coast of ISRAEL in the west and will be an additional and large source of hydroelectric power.

4) The 'Arava Project

The project will extend from two sides of the 'Arava from the south of the Dead Sea up to the Gulf of Elat-Akaba. The project will encompass establishment of a modern communications base, including super highways, high-speed trains, and airports. The project will encompass large (agrochemical) industry, which will be based upon modern food production and upon a food industry of international dimensions, whose products will be sent mainly to the markets of Europe by sea and by air. Similarly, there will be set up in these areas chemical and fertilizer industries (exploitation of the rich phosphate minerals!) and metallurgical industries.

For the length of the 'Arava both on the Israeli side and on the Jordanian-Palestinian side, there will be established new cities similar to 'Arad and new villages, which will be able to absorb hundreds of thousands of settlers, including the settlement of refugees. The 'Arava will in the future become a dense and fertile settled region similar to the coast of the Mediterranean Sea from Rosh Hanikrah to Rafiah.

The Largest of the Mideast Project is

Establishment of Multi-City Complexes and the Ports of TIRAK and BECASE

This project will constitute the crowning glory of ISRAEL and will be a turning point in the development of the entire Mideast. It will be common to five charter states: three of the ISRAELI states, Saudi Arabia and Egypt (with whom in the future other states may join).

In order to explain this project, we must first remember the geopolitical and economic situation as it today:

The Saudi petroleum, which is the largest energy reserve in the world and the most important source for the supply of energy to Western Europe and to the United States, is to be found in the northwest of the country, near the Persian Gulf (or the Arabian Sea). From there the Saudi petroleum (as well as, of course, the petroleum of Kuwait, the Gulf Emirates, Iraq and Iran) are moved in giant tankers through the Strait of Hormuz, around the Arabian Peninsula, through the Suez Canal or around the Cape of Good Hope to Europe and America.

The narrow Persian Strait has become one of the most important, yet hazardous, crossroads in the world. The threat of their blocking by political vagaries hangs as a sword of Damocles over the world.

ISRAEL can offer a partially, yet very significant, alternative to Saudi Arabia for the Persian Strait and thereby also attain a great dimensional regional development

of the northwest of Saudi Arabia and the north of the Egyptian Sinai.

The main elements of the alternative are these:

Moving a significant part of the Saudi oil through a network of large diameter pipelines to the region of Haki (a Saudi fishing village several kilometers south of 'Aqaba).

Conversion of Saudi Haki not only to a terminal for the pipeline, but also to a large port city which will integrate with the Jordanian port of 'Aqaba, the Israeli port of Eilat and the Egyptian port of Taba (to be set up by Egypt), for a joint project.

These four cities and ports would constitute a new cluster of cities which we will call, for sake of abbreviation, TEHAK (=Taba - Eilat - 'Aqaba - Haki).

From the port of TEHAK the Saudi petroleum or its refined products (and perhaps also the Egyptian, the Jordanian and the Israeli petroleum which will be discovered in the future) will flow in an additional pipeline toward the Mediterranean Sea to another and new cluster of cities and ports, which will encompass the ports of El Arish (Egyptian) Rafiah and Gaza (Palestinian) and Ashkelon, Ashdod (the Israeli). For sake of abbreviation, we shall call this ERGASH (= El-Arish - Rafia - Gaza - Ashkelon - Ashdod). From ERGASH the oil will flow by tanker to the ports of Europe and North America.

A Meeting Place For Three Continents

This route is the shortest and the most "desirable" for bringing the oil from the Saudi producer to the American-European consumer and will also be a monumental development incentive for the five countries involved. This route will also be the most economical for moving the petroleum (length of the pipelines from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean Sea on the average is about 900 miles, as contrasted with 3600 miles through the Hormuz Strait and around the Arabian Peninsula). And what is perhaps most important: It will leave the Strait of Hormuz as an important, but only partial, passage and will deprive it of its exclusivity, its sting, and its hazards.

Even in the establishment of the cluster cities of TEHAK and ERGASH a regional, and perhaps international, goal and challenge the likes of which there are not many in the world and which may in the future be compared with the digging of the Panama Canal, Suez and like projects which changed the face of regions and continents.

These cluster cities definitely can be constructed in such manner that the large energy and industrial urban activity will not damage their beauty nor destroy the environment. The digging of canals into the 'Arava and southward, with the use of large artificial lakes, or whose shores will be constructed the industrial plant, is mandated by reality in a Gulf so narrow and deep and rare in its beauty as it is the Gulf of 'Aqaba-Eilat. That the Dutch did not succeed in giving the technology of the end of the century,

I believe that these cluster cities will in the future be among the largest and most developed in the Middle East, and will fulfill functions similar to those of Antwerp and Rotterdam on the shores of Western Europe.

Within them, and surrounding them, will be planned basic chemical, petrochemical and metallurgical industries. On their foundation will arise a pharmaceutical industry, a plastics materials industry, a precision chemical and metals industry. And these will be but the ground floor of science-oriented industries in electronics and computers.

This cluster of cities will constitute the large meeting point of the three continents: Africa, Asia and Europe. Among the three large civilizations: the Muslim, the Judaic and the Christian. Between the monumental petrodollar riches and the genius stored in the descendants of Abraham, Isaac and Ishmael.

This economic, industrial, scientific and human focus will be the lodestone for institutes of culture and science, and will in the future be similar to the great cultural cities which arose at the intersections of rivers and seas and put their stamp on humanity. The crossroads will be here: the two seas as well as the rivers of oil energy as well as the reservoir of human energy.

The Blessing And the Curse--Choose Life

You will say that these are pipe dreams and castles in the air. But how beautiful these dreams are--which are attainable by the hand of man!--as against the alternatives which are also dreams, but dreams of terror and nightmares, which also are attainable by the hand of humanity through unending slaughter and murder and the conversion of the entire region, and with it perhaps the entire globe, to a heap of desolation over which hovers a radioactive cloud.

And thus said Moses, the father of prophets, venerated by the descendants of all nations and by the descendants of all religions involved in the dispute, and this is what he said on those very rocks and those very deserts, opposite those very seas of which we speak:

"I take as my witnesses today the heavens and the earth; life and death I have placed before you, blessing and curse; choose ye life."

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MOSCOW SAID SCRUTINIZING COUNTRY'S RELATIONS WITH PEKING

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 23 Dec 80 p 5

[Article by Dev Apeli: "Moscow Interested in China-Israel Relations"]

[Text] The Soviets are following reports spreading in the West about contacts between the People's Republic of China and Israel with great interest. Soviet research institutes (the Institutes for the Study of the Middle East and Far East Problems) are diligently gathering these reports, not only in order to use them in their propaganda against "Peking's two-faced policy towards the Arabs", but also because they believe that materialization of economic and political relations between China and Israel will show the deepening of U. S.-Chinese involvement in the Middle East arena.

In the quarterly publication PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA (MIDDLE EAST PROBLEMS, a model publication by the best Soviet Sinologists) an article appeared this year about Chinese policy in the Middle East after Camp David. In the writer's view, the Chinese leadership is seeking to take advantage of U. S. political expansion in a region close to the USSR's borders in order to encourage the American government to take a stronger and more active position vis-a-vis the USSR and its Arab allies. According to that observer, this is the reason for Peking's support of the Camp David Accords and Chinese propaganda efforts to depict the Carter administration's policy in a positive light, showing that he wants to prevent an armed clash between the Israelis and the Arabs. Soviet policy, on the other hand, is described by the Chinese as the main obstacle to stabilization in the Middle East.

Pro-Chinese Diplomacy

The Soviets have long claimed that a strong "pro-Chinese lobby" among American Zionists and in Israel is actively pursuing talks with China, while taking advantage of American avenues of communication and direct diplomatic contacts where possible. The Zionists' pro-Chinese diplomacy, notes the author of an article which appeared in a Soviet journal, received additional encouragement from Peking's support of the Camp David Accords. Economic cooperation between the two countries has been expanded and Israeli economic experts are aiding in formulating China's plan for modernization. This Soviet author contends that there has been cooperation between Chinese and Israeli intelligence "not for [only] 11 years and not for 10 years". One of the first joint Israeli-Chinese

intelligence missions, he says, was an attempt to assassinate Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasr and bomb the U. S. Embassy in Cairo. The author took this story from a book which appeared in the United States in 1974 about "The Secret Service of China".

He also blames Chinese and Israeli intelligence with acts of terror and sabotage directed against the spiritual leaders of Khomeyni's Iran.

Soviet attention was drawn to reports which appeared recently in the American weekly NEWSWEEK concerning a deal or deals between Israel and China for supply of electronic equipment. On 17 November PRAVDA published a TASS report under the headline: "From Israel to China". The report stated that NEWSWEEK, based upon information from authoritative sources, had reported Israeli supply of large quantities of military equipment to China and that the amounts would be doubled in the current fiscal year. Both countries are on the verge of signing an agreement for supply of U. S. \$2 billion worth of Israeli electronic equipment. These supplies are being sent under the strictest secrecy, the TASS report continues, because Peking is afraid that news of this deal might once and for all expose China to the Arab World as a "partner of the Zionist regime in Israel".

The Zionist State

Analyst [R. Moseev] returns to the "Chinese story" in PRAVDA in a column with the headline: "The Partners of the Aggressors".

This writer deals at length with Israel's large-scale arms exports, noting that Israel exports arms to reactionary countries such as Somalia's Nicaragua, Bolivia, Honduras, Guatemala, South Africa and Taiwan. The Zionist state's military industry, he writes, has been fed by the American military-industrial complex, making Israel one of the most active arms exporters in the capitalist world. In the continuation of this article, PRAVDA's analyst returns to NEWSWEEK information about negotiations nearing conclusion for the supply of U. S. \$2 billion worth of electronic equipment to China. "This will be the biggest export agreement in the history of the Zionist state", concludes this analyst.

"Zionist" is a derogatory and insulting term in the political lexicon of the Soviet media, and the fact that PRAVDA uses the term "Zionist state" twice in one short article clearly reflects the intention to shift from the realm of factual reporting to aggressive propaganda. PRAVDA's analyst continues, stating that it is no coincidence that the Chinese hegemonists appear in the list of Iel Aviv's partners, stating that China has pursued and developed relations with the most reactionary regimes in the world recently.

In closing, the writer explains that the Israeli government is increasing its military production and provides products of its military industry to those countries which the United States, for any reason, is uncomfortable dealing with directly but is interested in arming.

Thus, according to the central organ of the Communist Party, the NEWSWEEK report was authoritative. Moreover, the United States is behind this agreement because

it is interested in supplying electronic equipment to the Chinese military industry.

The Soviet media constantly warns of the danger which arming China poses to world peace, whether by the United States or other countries, whether with electronic or other equipment which may aid China in becoming a nuclear superpower. It thus seems that the appearance of reports about Chinese-Israeli rapprochement and deals are not only intended as anti-Chinese propaganda for Arab consumption. The Soviets apparently believe these reports.

It is likely that if one day an Israeli-USSR dialogue on normalization of relations takes place, the Chinese issue will be brought up. Israel will have to consider the fact that the USSR regards today's China as its most bitter enemy. There is no point ignoring the political aspects of hypothetical Chinese-Israeli rapprochement on the level of civilian or military commerce.

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RELATIONS WITH FAR EAST STATES VIEWED

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 19 Dec 80 p 17

[Article by Yosef Pri'el: "Low Profile Relations"]

[Text] Following an almost 2 month visit in Far Eastern countries, I can say that, even though Israel has high level diplomatic representation in most of the countries in the area, our relations have kept a low profile, frequently even less than that, due largely to Arab oil which serves as a life-supporting drug throughout the region.

Between the two large sea-rivers, Japan and India, sprawls a whole other world whose population is still not ready for western-style government. This is a world which belongs to the category of developing nations and, in large part, to the side of non-aligned youngsters, the Third World living in the shadow of the Chinese giant, with Vietnamese threats and Japanese economic control in the background.

Israel, at present, embassies in Japan, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Nepal and Burma, and a consulate in Bombay, India. While official diplomatic relations still exist between Israel and South Korea, they are practically non-existent, this time entirely due to Israel. Given the small number of Israeli troops in the area, the Israeli oversight in South Korea is both grave and confusing. Former Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan closed the Israeli Embassy in Seoul in 1978 because of budgetary cuts. Now, Israeli efforts to reestablish representation there meet with polite refusal from South Korea, whose dependence upon Persian Gulf oil is increasing.

In most of these Asian countries the role of Israel's representatives is to maintain an Israeli presence. Most of the activities and links between Israel and these countries are economically oriented. There are also economic links with countries with which Israel does not maintain diplomatic relations. One might mention numerous foreign reports which have described deals (in part, for military supplies) between Israel and countries such as Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Taiwan and others.

That is Israeli awareness of what is happening in this part of the world, thought of as "distant" and remote, is limited, as in the Far East very few people know about Israel. This is a broad generalization which varies from country to country.

but the average person has the very foggy notion that Israel is an Arab country which is far away and has problems. In four countries the situation is different. In Singapore, Thailand and Burma, there is an awareness of and popular support for Israel, its strength and successes, in part bolstered by a prevailing hatred for Arabs. In the Philippines, by and large a Christian country, there is identification with the Holy Land and a rather limited awareness of what is happening in our part of the globe. Despite this, during conversations with people in Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan and China it was difficult to determine whether it was the first they had heard about Israel or memory lapse.

In Japan, the great economic power in the East, Israel's situation is most delicate. The Japanese would like Israel to maintain a very low profile in order not to aggravate the Arabs. The director of a Japanese government ministry told the director of the Israeli Office for Commerce and Industry Infrastructure who was visiting him that the Japanese don't love the Arabs as much as they love money. The people with money and, moreover, oil, are unfortunately the Arabs. Israeli exports to Japan have increased fourfold over the past 5 years but are still relatively small scale. According to the first secretary for economic affairs at the Israeli Embassy in Tokyo, Alon Ben Yosef, the problem of the Arab boycott in Japan is not as serious as might be supposed and can be overcome in various ways. He says that we are suffering more because of our failure to send high-ranking officials to Japan than from the Arab boycott. Israel's new ambassador to Japan, Amnon Ben Yochanan, who served until now as head of the Asian desk at the Foreign Ministry, is aware of his difficult position, but believes that Israel must not give in and must preserve every foothold in the region. For, like it or not, we are a part of this Asian world.

The absolute dependence upon Arab oil is also a clear characteristic of the Philippine economy. Today, this country imports U. S. \$11.6 billion worth of oil annually out of which 60 percent comes from Arab countries. In addition, the Philippines benefits from some U. S. \$600 million which its workers earn in Persian Gulf countries. To this economic dependence must be added the problem of large-scale Islamic insurgency in the south of the country. The insurgents are backed by Colonel Qadhafi's regime in Libya, which sends weapons to the jungles of Mindanao via Indonesia and Malaysia, two neighboring Moslem countries. Ferdinand Marcos' regime has attempted to stop the rebellion through negotiations with Libya. Among the conditions set forth by Qadhafi for stopping aid to the insurgents, one stated that the Philippines must stop all acquisition of weapons and other aid from Israel and curb its relations with Israel.

Against the background of these Libyan conditions, Israel ambassador to the Philippines, Moshe Raviv, describes relations between the two countries as correct verging on good, with an understanding for Israeli problems and an openly positive attitude towards the peace treaty with Egypt, despite votes against Israel in international organizations together with the 77 non-aligned nations. Trade between the two countries is modest, but possibilities for expansion are great. According to the ambassador, there is successful activity underway in the Philippines. During the past 20 years, 350 Filipinos received advanced training in agriculture, cooperative systems, medicine, women's organization, and other fields. Israeli exports were aided by aid to Filipinos.

throughout the country. Today there are 15 experts from TAHAL, as well as agricultural and poultry farming advisers.

Israel's small embassy in Rangoon is a mute testimony to the golden age of relations with Burma during the rule of U Nu (1953-1962). The Burmese saw Israel as a good example of a nation freed from British colonialism and wanted to learn from our experience and put it to use. The Israeli ambassador to Burma, Kalman [Inar], is not very busy nowadays. Israel is one of only about 20 countries which have embassies in this socialist country. The Burmese people is very friendly towards Israel to this day. On the diplomatic level, this is expressed in Burmese opposition to decisions unfavorable to Israel. Though one of the founders of the non-aligned bloc, Burma no longer functions in its framework and maintains its own brand of non-alignment. In UN votes it either votes in Israel's favor or abstains. As an almost completely isolated country which does not depend upon imports of raw materials, including oil (Burmese production meets all local needs), the Burmese owe no debt to the Arab World and thus continue to maintain good relations with Israel. These relations may change when Ne Win's rule comes to an end. Most analysts predict this will occur within the next 10 years, bringing drastic changes in Burmese internal, and perhaps external, policy.

Israel's Ambassador to Singapore, Nahum Eshkol, also speaks of good relations and friendship towards Israel. The doors of the local Foreign Ministry are open to him, even though Arab oil and investment strain the prevailing good relations, relations which stem from Singapore's attempts to adopt Israeli know-how in many fields.

Perhaps the strongest and most sincere Israeli connection in Asia is Thailand, much to the credit of the activities of Ambassador Mordechai Lador working in the serene and supportive atmosphere fostered among the Thai people by the royal family. Israel does not keep a low profile in Thailand--on the contrary, Israel is a force in the field of agricultural aid and assistance and is most highly regarded. However, because of an 80 percent dependence upon oil imports from Arab states, and the employment of some 60,000 Thai workers in Persian Gulf countries, as well as a Moslem minority of 3 million in the south, Thailand takes anti-Israeli stands or abstains in votes in international forums. But this is done "apologetically" with repeated emphasis on the sincere friendship with Israel and general dislike for the Arabs.

When Israel is mentioned in Asia, it is primarily in light of its military strength, and as an example of the few against the many. Last summer Israel was also mentioned in terms of its film and entertainment industry. In all Far Eastern countries, Boaz Davidson's film "Eskimo Lemon" enjoyed great success and was screened for many weeks dubbed in Thai, Chinese, Japanese, Filipino and other languages. Thank goodness there are also things like this to be proud of. We may not have oil, but at least we have Eskimo Lemon.

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INCREASED ACTIVISM NOTED AMONG WEST BANK SETTLERS

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 26 Dec 80 p 14

[Article by Yehuda Litani: "The Mass of Judea, Samaria and Gaza"]

[Text] "Look at how they're flattering and kowtowing to him," said the vice-mayor of the town of Bethlehem, George Hazabon, during a dinner tendered on Christmas Eve this week by the municipality of Bethlehem for 300 invited guests, among them many of the Israelis of the Authority. Hazabon, the communist, who was confined this month to his city by the Military Authority for a period of 6 months, is in an aggressive mood. In his comment he meant all of the "bourgeoisie," as he calls them from the three "Beyts" (Beyt Lehem, Beyt Jalla, and Beyt Sahour) who came to honor the commander of the Judea and Samaria region, Brig Gen Ben Eliezer, who sat with the mayor of Bethlehem, Elias Farij, at the head of the invited guests.

"Look at how your bourgeoisie accommodate with our Bourgeoisie," George Hazabon continues, and means one of the patricians of the city who is conversing animatedly with Teddy Kolleck, the mayor of Jerusalem. "From one year to the next, the level of the welcome drops," says someone near our table. "Last year they served meat, this year -- chicken." "This is their inflation," Hazabon answers. "We have no choice." "Why do they need all this confusion," an engineer from Bethlehem says. "During the days of the Jordanian authority, the former mayor invited a couple of Jordanian officers, and that ended the matter. Look what's going on here -- the entire military authority and all the police officers, and we -- essentially the householders, as if invited to our own wedding." George Hazabon relates that exactly 2 years ago the mayor of the municipality, Elias Farij, praised the Camp David Accords. "Everything is kept in my briefcase," Hazabon says.

Out of a corner of my eye I observe at the table adjacent to us Ya'akov Shumley, a teacher of English from Beyt Sahour who had been evicted a couple of months ago to a forsaken refugee camp in the Jordan Valley, after his son Tareq was accused of throwing rocks at the vehicle of the Military Commander. He is seated deep in thought. After some time there passes near him a member of the military authority in Bethlehem who had been accused by the Shumley family of savagely beating and mistreating their son. Both make it appear that they are oblivious of each other. George Hazabon raises a glass of wine and thanks all those sitting around the table. "That on next Christmas, God willing, there will no longer be occupation."

More Security People Touring

I came on Christmas Eve to the Bethlehem region not only to be present at the welcome to the honored personages of the region in the Women's Unity House in Bethlehem and to stroll around the Nativity Plaza, but also in order to participate in the founding convention of the Jewish Settlements Council in JSO (Judea, Samaria and Gaza) which was to convene that evening in the large auditorium of Yael Shapira in Alon Shavit in the center of Gush Etzion.

On my parking permit which I received from an IDF spokesman there was the notation: Rachel's Tomb. I parked my car there and went on foot toward the Nativity Plaza. The hour was noon and bored motorists were rolling down their shutters at the entrances to their stores. Skies were cloudy but the weather was pleasant and there were almost no tourists. "More security people are touring," says one of the souvenir sellers. "Every year the number of security people increases and the number of tourists decreases," he continues, to the sound of the loud whirring of an helicopter circling above and making the merchants nervous. On the surrounding roads there are armed soldiers. Below, on the road, a patrol of recruits feast their eyes on the scenery and on a number of pedestrians who seem to have wandered to the place by chance.

At the entrance to the Nativity Plaza — bodily security inspections. The conveyer of the Latin Patriarch which arrived from Jerusalem accompanied by mounted Israeli policemen, and a horde of boy and girl scouts from Bethlehem, who are making a tin with drums and rifles, finally passes and the crowd begins to disperse. The falafel vender at the back alley near the Plaza benefits from the terrific denseness. The humus, the sesam mix and the falafel of those refugees from Jaffa, has acquired a widespread reputation, and from time to time a border guard or a local resident gets to them to stock up on some physical nourishment. Near the ornate municipal building a boy is selling a variety of sweets and screaming in Hebrew "Orlov a shekel!"

I went up the bannister of the municipal building steps observing the tourists from Scandinavia near the, loaded down with olivina made of olive wood, various crucifixes, metal statues, and wreaths of thorns. Bethlehem, whose significance wanted to assert it to Jerusalem in 1997, had become, 13 years later, an important layer of resistance to the Israeli authority, particularly because of the students in the city's university. Since, during the days of Moshe Dayan, they attempted to separate the Bethlehem zone from the rest of the West Bank -- here the majority are Christians, they sell them, merchants, their interest is mainly commercial. They enjoy a good room, and with a great deal of willingness, fulfilled their wishes. Today, if there are any changes in the relationship, they are becoming blurred. Christians, Muslims, separatists, extremists, the West Bank is turning into a single piece -- the conquerors against the conquered, the conquered against the conquerors.

That's what I thought as I on the birthday of the Christian in his city of birth, when its many bells toll: universally in the exciting year which mixed with other sounds -- the whistles of the youth leaders, the bells of the food vendors and the Christmas music which blared forth from the loudspeakers. George Sabouni appeared in the doorway of the municipal hall and invited me to join the welcome party in the House of Women's Unity.

Shila Gal ascends the stage, the head of the regional Council of Gush Etzion: "... There is but a single goal -- to preserve the land of Israel for the Nation of Israel. Other than us, there is no one to do the work ..." Three women ascend the stage and read segments from the Vision of Redemption of Rabbi Cook "... We shall not abandon the Holy Land in the hands of the Arabs ..." From Iron Wall of Jabotinsky ("... There is no point in reaching a willing agreement between us and the Arabs of Eretz Yisrael... as long as there flutters within the hearts of the Arabs, and there remains the slightest ray of hope that they can dispose of us, they will not be prepared to forego this hope of theirs...") And from A Song of Prayer for the Savior of My Nation of Uri Zvi Greenberg ("... We have blessed the warrior of borders to sing of the borders of the great promise ... in all the heavens of the Hebrew Kingdom...") A reading from Chapter 17 of Ezekiel ("... And they shall dwell upon the land which I have given to my servant Jacob, where your ancestors have lived, and they and their children and their children's children shall dwell upon it forever...") A happy selection and the chair of the Samaria Regional Council, says the master of ceremonies, will favor us with their most lively country, my birthplace/Here is the land of my ancestors' desire/ They wander for us in the night).

The head of the Regional Council of the Gaza Strip, Shimon Zuckerman, says among other things, that "our settlement constitutes a turning point -- we have abandoned the flash pot, we have gone to places dictated by the national need and not by personal need ... sooner or later the whole nation will recognize the justice of our cause -- perhaps, perhaps the thought, after the state of our situation ... we must take the vacuum, the true option is the Jewish Nation over the land of Israel" (with applause). Our organizing, says Zuckerman, is not meant to take the place of party organizing, but rather organization of the settlements of the region as into a clear political entity. We must make it apparent to everyone, continues the head of the Gaza Council, that if we must struggle, we shall struggle against any path which will result in the loss of sovereignty of any of the parts of Eretz Yisrael, we shall have to be the sufferer, and we shall be it. "In order to achieve our goals, there is but one way -- we must move together! We must double and triple within a short time the number of residents in the various parts of Eretz Yisrael." He speaks about the necessity for the settlers to take account of the political situation, that a part of "our" aims will have to exist even without government support.

Abraham Yellertine, head of the Settlers' Council of Ariel Benjamin, says, among other things, that there is no difference between Gush Etzion in Gaza and any other district in the Land of Israel. "When it becomes clear that there is no difference among these districts, we shall be able to lead this nation."

Again, words by the chair, and the playing of the harp, and before the singing of the Hallel, Rabbi Yisrael Ariel from Samaria brings greetings to the settlements of the district. I have brought you a message of life, he says, (repeats) and he holds in a length of rope before the audience. "We walked with this message (repeats) and that we are but a single strand, there is no strength in many, we are all one land, we are all the children of a single father." The other meaning of the rope, continues Rabbi Ariel, is that the banner's aim that the eyes set discuss in the house of an exiled person. We are all, living with the sense that the banner's rope is waving on the threat of the Arab District, he says. Just as settlements

are being evacuated in Yamit, so is there the threat of the evacuation of settlements in Judea and Samaria as well.

He differs with an article in the most recent issue of NEKUDA under the title "To Us This Will Not Happen." This can happen, to you, as Uri Ariel, "slogans can be disseminated, but when the hour of testing arrives, we will be witnesses to this terrible calamity -- don't wait for the exterminator to sneak up on the settlements of Judea and Samaria, perish the thought, don't wait for the moment when the cranes arrive at Kedumim and Elon Moreh, take Yamit as an example and the moment that they come to uproot a planting, to attempt to demolish houses, let every individual abandon a house and do battle in Yamit in order to save Judea and Samaria, in order to save all of the Land of Israel!"

After the singing of Hatikvah, the master of ceremonies thanks the participants, and the delegates of the settlements go down for an evening meal and for the start of the committee deliberations. Outside, the veteran demonstrator and freedom person Yitzhak Shmueli says to me: "Write that only here quotations from Jabotinsky and Uri Tzvi Greenberg are read. In HERUT they have long forgotten to do this."

On the return trip, the rain came down again, and I tried to remember previous meetings of settlers. Then the leaders were Hanan Porat, Katzover, Levinger. There were no choirs, there was no harp playing, and singing parts, but the speeches that were delivered were delivered with more heat and fervor, without planning. It was less institutionalized, more debate. Since then, the settlers organized within the framework of the regional councils, from the time that Gush Emunim ceased in effect to operate, everything has been said in a more restrained tone.

I am told that behind the scenes there are more actions and activism and on the surface there is less rhetoric. The police barricade near the al-Dhaisha refugee camp returns me to another world, the Christian Christmas. The police officer examines the permits and gives permission to proceed. The house of Elias Farij, mayor of Bethlehem, on the main road, is illuminated brightly, and so also the ornaments illuminating the main road to Jerusalem. A long line of automobiles is waiting for inspection near the police barricade at Mar-Elias. The policemen are wearing raincoats and the windshield wipers are working on the cars. They are all waiting patiently, cars of Israelis from Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, of settlers from Gush Etzion and Kiryat Arba, of residents of Hebron and Bethlehem, and of tourists.

The rain is still coming down and I am reminded of the toast of George Hazabon that afternoon, "that next Christmas, God willing, there will no longer be an occupation," and in contrast the remarks of Shila Gal at Gush Etzion, several hours later, "the goal is but a single one -- to preserve the Land of Israel for the People of Israel ..."

8090

CSO: 4805

LAYOFFS FEARED DUE TO EXPORT CREDIT CUTBACKS

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 30 Dec 80 p 6

[Column by Aryeh Lavi: "In the Labor Market"]

[Text] At the Employment Service there are fears of a wave of layoff notices from the manufacturing enterprises, following the decision of the Bank of Israel to reduce credit for exporters. Certain employers have announced that they are cancelling calls for workers, and others have reported that they intend to lay off workers after they have finished examining the implications of the cut in credit as it affects them, following recommendations at the end of last week by the Advisory Commission of the Bank of Israel.

Nevertheless, the view at the Employment Service is that the number of those actually laid off as a result of all of this will be low, but they foresee that the industrial enterprises will exploit the credit cutback -- which did not damage the subsidy component which is built in to the credit -- in order to gain from the workers more cooperation and to forestall possible wage demands.

Tadiran of Petah Tikvah to Lay Off 150 Workers

The Tadiran Enterprise at Petah Tikvah which employs about 1600 workers, is seeking to lay off 150 of its workers. Management of the enterprise attribute this to the reduction in orders from the defense establishment.

About half the workers which Tadiran management intends to lay off will be laid off in January. The other half will be laid off in February. Among those slated for layoff, 80 are involved in the electronic and communications fields, and 70 are unskilled, mainly women.

Discussion of Fate of Keshet Combine in the South Today

This morning, in the office of TAMAT, discussion is scheduled on the application for support by the Keshet Combine, which was absorbed by the Kashiyei Nezilut, to determine the number of workers to be laid off from this combine in the southern region. According to the notice submitted by the Keshet management to the Employment Service, it appears that they intend to lay off the 380 workers of the Ophar enterprise in Ofakim, and the 40 who are employed by the Azata enterprise of the combine in Netivot. In total, Keshet announced the planned layoff of 420 workers in both of these enterprises.

The Barak Apparel factory in Ofakim, which employs 95 people, among them 87 women, will not close. In the Ophar enterprise 380 workers are employed today, among whom are 240 Israelis and 140 from Gaza. In the Azata enterprise 40 workers are employed, among them 30 Israelis, mostly men, and 10 from Gaza.

Tabor Workers Furloughed

Twenty of 90 workers in the Tabor Enterprise were given a two-week furlough, after difficulties in the operation of the enterprise. Sixty-five of those employed at Tabor are residents of Afula, 15 are from the area, and another 10 are employed at the offices of the company in Tel Aviv.

Slight Improvement in Development Towns Situation

A slight improvement was felt during the month of November in the employment situation in the development towns. During that month there were registered at the Employment Office in the development towns, 12,754 applicants for employment, as compared with 13,474 during the month of October. In total, there were registered in November 38,488 work applicants, as against 40,350 work applicants in the month of October. The number of unemployed 6 days or more dropped to 4,943 as compared with 5,145. In total, countrywide, November saw 13,999 registered unemployed, while during the previous month it was 14,038.

The number of offers to workers in the development towns increased to 7,022 as contrasted with 7,519 workers during the month of November. The total number of offers to workers in November came to 20,639 as against 20,018 in October.

More Israelis to Work in Airfield Construction

The two American companies which are constructing the two airfields in the Negev requested some additional 100 workers through the Employment Service, in particular for work in services and construction.

The number of Israelis employed by the two foreign companies increased steadily but at a slow rate and has already reached about 700. The number of foreign workers now totals 5,500.

The General Manager of the Employment Service, Mr Baruch Hakla'i, states that there is a trend of taking over of the positions of the foreign workers, following the replacement of those foreigners employed at the two airfields, some of which now want to return home.

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ORMET TURBINES CREATE TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 2 Jan 81 p 17

[Article by Mikhail Garti: "To Squeeze Out the Last Calorie"]

[Text] Technological revolutions, unlike social or political revolutions, are not characterized by dramatic events and the blaze of color. Their characteristic color is basic gray, and the only lightning bolt that they emit is the shower of steel chips which fly off the lathe. And yet, the workers and the technicians who gave the "final touch" to two of the new turbines that were to be shipped this week from the Ormet plant in Yavneh to the purchaser in the US, were in a somewhat festive mood. The turbines themselves -- a number of boilers connected by a piping system, a humming electric generator, and a current control panel -- had already been placed in steel frames, ready for loading and shipping.

But the seemingly simple piping system has hidden within it an actual technological revolution. "For many years it was said that it is not possible to manufacture small turbines which would operate at low pressure. All the textbooks indicated that in order to operate a turbine, high pressures are needed -- and high temperatures in which the steam remains dry and does not thicken," explains the manager of Ormet Turbines, Yehuda Bronitzky. "But when we persisted in the very manufacture of small turbines, it turned out that the solution in effect exists, that it was buried in the bottom layer of the most basic laws of thermodynamics, laws upon which the engineering books added their interpretation, which related to what they recognized at that time, to a large steam turbine which functions at high pressures and temperatures."

In essence, underlying the argument that it is not possible to manufacture small turbines, was a sort of circular paradox -- since fuel was cheap and its burning created high temperatures, all of the turbines were designed to function through the burning of oil or coal, and in that case were truly efficient only as they grew to significant proportions. Because of the thickening characteristics of the steam emitted from water, the calculations demonstrated that a turbine of diameter of some 15 centimeters, designed to produce 1 kilowatt of electricity would require an electric motor to turn its fan.

The revolution initiated by Bronitzky has its origin in the old physics texts -- and in the discovery of liquids with properties different from the properties of water and in everything connected with boiling, with the production of steam, and with thickening. "The most prevalent error," says Bronitzky, "is that the efficiency of the turbine is associated with high pressure. Physical laws teach that

the efficiency is associated with the heat differences between the steam entering and the steam leaving, and it is possible to manufacture turbines of very high utilization rate in which the impelling gases pass over the blades of the turbine at a speed double and triple the speed of sound -- even at relatively low pressures."

Many Maintenance-Free Years

At his factory in the industrial region of Yavneh, Bronitzky demonstrates his approach in every turbine that he manufactures. His surprising version is the introduction of the know-how of the chemists, who concoct liquids with the properties desirable for the turbines, and the engineers who design the shape of the blade-wheels. The first product by which Ormet made its reputation world-wide, is known today in all the professional literature as the Ormet Turbine." Those were small turbines with an output of one to three kilowatts in which the steam produced by the boiling organic liquid impelled the blade of the turbine. To heat the liquid contained in the boiler, a small burner was devised underneath, which used solar oil. The turbine itself turned a small generator, that also manufactured by the enterprise, which supplied the electrical current.

The principal advantage of the entire system was that it could function for many years without maintenance, with only the need every few weeks to replenish the reservoir of solar oil attached to it. The units were sold to consumers who sought a source of current with little interruption, which could function independently. Within several years one could find Ormet Turbines in the frozen peaks of the Andes, in the US, in Equatorial Africa -- essentially almost over the entire globe. The electricity that they generated operated wireless relays, controlled the valve systems of a giant oil pipeline and operated automatic pumping stations.

Up to 1979, the 2,000 turbines which were sold accumulated more than 18 million operating hours in 40 countries with practically no mishaps. With the experience accumulated, the Ormet enterprise undertook, during the middle seventies, a new project -- in cooperation with the Ministry of Energy, the Sulmet Company was established, whose purpose was to develop the idea of the solar pool. In such a pool, the lower layer of water is heated by the sun's rays up to 90 degrees Celsius. This layer, being salt-laden, and of a higher specific gravity, cannot rise ahead of the pool and dissipate its heat. A temperature of 90 degrees is sufficient to operate an Ormet Turbine, and all that remains to be done is to develop the technology of transferring the heat from the pool to the boiler of the organic liquid so that it boils.

After successful testing in the compound of the enterprise that supplied 5 kilowatts of electricity, the larger pool -- with an output of 300 kilowatts, was set up at the Zohar Estuary on the shore of the Dead Sea. And now a special crew of the enterprise is engaged in the planning and building of a solar pool with an output of 5,000 kilowatts (five megawatts), and if these experiments succeed it will serve as the basic unit for the setting up of solar pools over wide areas to supply significant quantities of electricity to the nationwide network.

But pending completion of the solar pools project, the Ormet enterprise is now developing a new type of turbine -- "lost heat turbines." Here, also, the basic unit is the Ormet Turbine with a capacity of some 300 kilowatts -- except that the

source of the heat for boiling the organic liquid is in this case heat extracted from manufacturing processes. In various manufacturing processes and in refining plants worldwide, the temperature level of less than 300 degrees Celsius is considered "lost temperature" which cannot be utilized. In several cases attempts were made to utilize it for heating of structures or hothouses -- or even for heating water for laundering in industrial laundries, except that the investment in area and in separate piping systems to transmit the heat (in most cases in the form of hot water, or "wet steam") was found to be not worthwhile.

"New Electricity" Credit

Operating an Ormet Turbine by means of this lost heat, provides electricity -- a product which is easily transferred and for which there is always a demand. The technology has been available for several years -- but the cost factor delayed implementation of the idea. The price of a lost heat turbine fluctuated between \$280,000 and \$320,000 in this market, and in order to justify the investment it was necessary to operate the turbine many hours daily (depending upon the operation of the enterprise in which it is installed) -- and the electricity generated was intended to replace relatively expensive electricity. "A year ago, during a visit to the United States, it was explained to me that the turbine would be worthwhile if I could sell it at a lower price which would make possible translation of the investment to an electricity cost 2.5 cents per kilowatt hour," Bronitzky explained. But the calculations showed that the price was slightly beyond that threshold -- and that the value of the output of the heat-loss turbines would be at best doubtful.

But now the new price regulations for electricity consumers in the US came to his aid. These regulations differentiate between "old electricity" -- which is relatively cheap -- and "new electricity" whose price is high and goes to 8 cents per kilowatt hour. By these regulations, if an electricity consumer creates a source of current for himself, he receives from the local electric company (the "utility") a credit according to the price of the "new electricity." The logic behind the regulation says that if he had not created an individual source, the utility would be required sooner or later to set up a new power station -- and that would be more expensive and the price of electricity which it would have provided to the network would be higher. (The power stations providing "old electricity" are older, in which the entire cost of building the station has already been deducted from the cost of operation).

Under these conditions, the lost heat turbine became most desirable. By calculations made at Ormet, an enterprise installing a turbine with an output of 300 kilowatts and operating it for 6,000 hours annually, would get a credit totalling \$150,000. That, in contrast to the \$400,000 price of the turbine, including delivery and installation at the site of the purchaser. The beginning of export this week is relatively modest -- two turbines which were sent to consumers, an additional turbine to be shipped shortly, and four more turbines in the process of manufacture (aside from two similar turbines which have been acquired by enterprises in Israel).

But if the lost heat turbines gain the same reputation which Ormet Turbines have, there will open for Israel a giant export market. According to a survey by the

American Department of Energy, there are in enterprises and in refineries in the US a lost heat potential sufficient to create 2 million kilowatts -- or 6,700 medium sized lost-heat turbines -- or in dollar terms: more than \$2 billion! "Here there is employment not only for the Ormet Enterprise," Bronitzky explains, "to export at a quantity of this magnitude, it will be possible to combine tens of enterprises which can specialize in various components of the turbine and to convert it to a special and desirable export product.

From the appearance of the orderly and efficient work of the Ormet Enterprise -- an enterprise in which each metal worker records at his lathe, the data of his activity on a report screen suspended near his machine, and connected to a central computer, it appears that in the invention and in the export of the lost heat turbine there has been not only an important step in the utilization of energy, and in the extraction of every calorie of the export process, but also a similar utilization of the intellectual resources of the Israeli who thinks that it seems from the past few years as though there had been hung upon him in many places the sign: "Out of Service."

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LEADERS DISCUSS CRISIS, PROSPECTS FOR ACCORD

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 24 Jan 81 pp 32-38

[Interview with Walid Junblat and Amin al-Jumayyil by Antoine 'Abd-al-Massih: "AL-MUSTAQBAL Opens the File on the Lebanese Dialogue: Walid Junblat: 'There is no Accord now; War Will Start Again and May Be More Violent;' Amin al-Jumayyil: 'We Were Tempted and Pressed To Disassociate Ourselves from the Arab Family, but We Will Continue To Be Arab Leaders' "]

[Text] This interview with the two Lebanese leaders, Walid Junblat, the president of the National Movement in Lebanon, and Deputy Amin al-Jumayyil, member of the Political Bureau of the Lebanese Phalangist party was sometimes "confrontational" and other times "calm." In one of its aspects it appears to be a prelude to the dialogue for accord among the Lebanese. This is the first time that the aspects of the dispute are candidly and objectively revealed as these two leaders see them. It is the first time that specific answers are given to conditions, or rather, to the requests each one of them is making to the other party to achieve a minimum of the accord that is required, which is the dialogue. AL-MUSTAQBAL was able to serve as the bridge for the dialogue between the two Lebanese leaders. It conveyed to them all the questions that were on people's minds and all the shortcomings they attributed to them. It may be said that this dialogue between Walid Junblat and Amin al-Jumayyil through AL-MUSTAQBAL has brought the points of view of the feuding parties closer together and explained many problems that were subject to individual interpretations and explanations that were either inaccurate or kept hidden from the people and, therefore, appeared desirable. In this interview Walid Junblat spelled out everything he wanted from the Lebanese Front so he can come to an agreement with it, and Amin al-Jumayyil spelled out everything the front wanted from the other party so it can come to an understanding with it. It remains to be said that this dialogue revealed something that was very positive which had seemed non-existent. This is the fact that neither Amin al-Jumayyil nor Walid Junblat--nor their parties either--harbor any ill will towards each other, despite the numerous shortcomings that each one attributes to the other. This dialogue reminded us of days gone by when Lebanon was an example of democracy where the Lebanese citizen used to declare his opinion without fearing that his

head would be cut off. If we were to add what Walid Junblat said to what Amin al-Jumayyil said, we would find, despite everything else, that the disagreement is not as great as some people think it is, and we would find that what happened was only a storm in a cup. However, the storm was severe and the cup was very wide. This is the height of the tragi-comedy in Lebanon. And here is the text of the interview we began with Mr Walid Junblat.

[Question] The Lebanese crisis or problem has become so complex and involved that many people have not been able to understand it. Most of the questions, therefore, will be simple and direct. Would you first give us a clear and simple definition of this crisis?

[Answer] Do you call this a simple question? The Lebanese crisis or the Lebanese question today is a question of will. It is a struggle between a national will to consolidate Lebanon on democratic foundations that are remote from sectarianism, from fanaticism and from sectarian entities and a second will that is supported by Israel and whose objective is to create a sectarian entity in Lebanon. This is the Lebanese question today. Separatist sectarian proposals are not new in Lebanon. They go back to the 19th century, to Prince Bashir al-Shihabi the Great who laid down, developed and nurtured the foundations of political sectarianism in Lebanon. It was from that that a specific movement developed in Lebanon [whose purpose] is to attain a specific sectarian homeland. Today, this homeland has begun to take root.

[Question] If we were to take the social analysis into consideration, do you think that a movement can grow without there being social, economic and political reasons for its growth?

[Answer] Quite the contrary, a trend different from this one should have developed according to the social analysis.

[Question] I am referring to that movement that you call an isolationist movement. What are its social or economic causes?

[Answer] There are no economic causes because the economic causes are obvious, and they are inconsistent with the sectarian assertions. Lebanon stands on [its] relations with the Arab world, doesn't it? Without these relations I cannot imagine that the rocks of Kasrawan or the sands of Juniyah would give Lebanon prosperity. Regarding the social causes, there is an ethnic crisis in Lebanon. The Maronites, who are of Arab origin--and historians are in agreement about this since they are one of the Lebanese tribes that sought refuge in Lebanon--have not yet been persuaded to accept this. They still want to withdraw from the Arab entity [and] the Arab community.

[Question] Are you referring to the Maronites as a sectarian group or as a social group?

[Answer] I am referring to them as a sectarian group. What is the difference between a sectarian group and a social group?

[Question] There is a big difference between a sectarian group and a social group. Do you then see the Maronites as a sectarian group?

[Answer] I make no distinction between a sectarian group and a social group. The Maronites are one of the Lebanese tribes.

[Question] The document that was issued by the Lebanese Front a few days ago contained a strong and unequivocal rejection of the subject of partition. Those people are constantly stating that they are opposed to partition and the settlement of Palestinians on Lebanese soil. How do you explain this?

[Answer] In practice, however, and on the ground they are using all the means that lead to partition and the settlement of Palestinians in Lebanon.

[Question] [Like what], for example?

[Answer] They are rejecting any plan for a political settlement; they are rejecting any international plan. 'Ayn al-Rummanah is the biggest proof. [Another proof] is allowing this, that is, this major political dispute between numerous factions, to interfere in Lebanese politics.

The Army Is no More

[Question] Don't you believe that there are other parties that strongly reject the presence of the Lebanese state in second areas?

[Answer] For example?

[Question] Let us assume in Beirut. We will not go far. Here in West Beirut.

[Answer] The state basically chose to deploy--deploy the army--in the regions of 'Ayn al-Rummanah and al-Hadath--the regions that are controlled by the Lebanese Front. We would have welcomed and we were hoping that the deployment would be in a bigger terrain. But we found out afterwards that the deployment of the army was formal and superficial. The biggest proof of that is 'Ayn al-Rummanah. It is a shameful example. In the final analysis the state is becoming more biased, and especially today, for the Lebanese Front. Why should we accept it here?

[Question] What if the army were forcefully and effectively deployed in the region of 'Ayn al-Rummanah. . . ?

[Answer] It is over, over. The army will not be deployed. It's been thrown into disarray. The army is no more.

[Question] Let us assume that it was deployed. Would the National Movement that you head accept the deployment of the Lebanese army in West Beirut, for example?

[Answer] It will not be deployed there. It was there, and it was expelled. Now it has returned in a superficial way.

[Question] Then you do not imagine, do you, that the army will ever stand on its feet?

[Answer] Under the present condition, no. It would be difficult, [quite] difficult. The entire makeup of the army must be reconsidered.

[Question] In what way?

[Answer] In every way. Let us first apply the new law that has not yet been put into effect. There are organizational decrees. There are 13 decrees that have not yet been issued, and the commander of the army still has his old powers: he hires and fires people on the basis of his old powers and by memoranda.

[Question] If the organizational decrees for the Lebanese army are issued, will the situation change and will the makeup of the army change?

[Answer] No. The makeup of the army will change after an intermission of 5 to 6 years. If promotions are granted in a logical fashion, we can achieve a balance in 4 or 5 years.

[Question] What is the balance? What do you mean by that?

[Answer] At present there is terrible injustice in some positions in the army in favor of a specific group. This is obvious.

[Question] You are referring then to a sectarian balance?

[Answer] Yes. It is, unfortunately, a sectarian balance. We are still in the stage of having one third [of the army positions] for Muslims and two thirds for Christians.

[Question] Is not this due to historical reasons that go back to the history of the establishment of the army?

[Answer] No, no, not since the establishment of the army. The matter was different during the age of Fu'ad Shihab. But fanatic elements such as Hanna Sa'id and Iskandar Ghanim came to the command of the army, especially during the war. They hurt the army a great deal.

[Question] But the National Movement is calling for a secular order, and yet, on the other hand, it is asking for a sectarian balance in the army. How can the National Movement be a secular democracy on the one hand and advocate a sectarian balance [in the army] on the other hand?

[Answer] The National Movement is very realistic. We practice politics in Lebanon, and we want to attain realistic stages. If we call for secularization and for the abolition of political sectarianism, it is natural that we are calling for this in the entire makeup of the Lebanese state and in the political system in Lebanon. We are ready at any moment, but because the National Movement is realistic, we want to take this one step at a time, no more and no less.

There Is No Dispute Between Me and the Movement

[Question] Are you talking about the realism of the National Movement as a structure, or about the actual situation of Lebanon?

[Answer] The actual situation of Lebanon.

[Question] Many people believe that your presence in the National Movement has become an unnatural presence....

[Answer] Why? How?

[Question] Through the favoritism that has been in existence for over a year. It were as though this presence was forced on you and determined by local and regional considerations.

[Answer] What considerations? I have my freedom to act--a freedom which I do not negotiate about--within the general premises that are agreed to. This is not a problem.

[Question] Are your former personal convictions consistent with those of the parties to the National Movement?

[Answer] We are not concerned with personal convictions; [we are] rather concerned with political convictions.

[Question] Yes, political convictions.

[Answer] We are in agreement. There is no major difference.

The Crisis Is as Old as Bashir al-Shihabi

[Question] As a progressive socialist party, do you deal with the Lebanese crisis only through its Lebanese dimensions?

[Answer] Naturally we deal with it on the basis of its Lebanese dimensions and on the basis of its Arab dimensions. Can the two be separated?

[Question] But there are parties within the National Movement that deal with the Lebanese crisis on the basis of its Arab dimensions first and on the basis of its Lebanese dimensions second. How do you specifically deal with it?

[Answer] The Lebanese dimensions are basically the essential dimensions [of the crisis]. The struggle between us and the separatist brothers in Lebanon is an old one. It antedates the Arab question; it antedates the national question; and it antedates the Palestinian question. It is very old. As I said before, it goes back to the 19th century, before Prince Bashir, and especially in Jabal Lubnan, which is the mainstay of Lebanese politics. Now, however, the Arab, the national and the Palestinian dimensions are giving the Lebanese question broader and much more complicated prospects.

[Question] What do you mean by the security of Jabal [Lubnan]?

[Answer] I mean that security in Jabal [Lubnan] should not be disturbed as was the case in 'Ayn Darah and in other locations. The difference between us and others is that when we make a mistake or when we are responsible for the death of someone, we condemn that thing [or person] and we declare this in newspapers. We also declare our willingness to turn the person who committed the act over to the authorities and the courts and to give them all the details and the information. But others consider [these acts] vengeful operations as was the case in 'Ayn Darah. They forced themselves into homes and forced people to leave. There is a difference in the moral conduct. It is said that there are standards in the world. We will set them. This is not a problem.

[Question] How will you set them?

[Answer] We will respond to them in a logical manner.

[Question] Then, there was a dispute between you and the parties of the National Movement, [is not that right]?

[Answer] There was no dispute. There were differences of opinion.

[Question] For example, you had a different position regarding the army....

[Answer] I had a different position. Now it will remain the different position in principle. However, some of the calculations must be reconsidered.

[Question] [Like what], for example?

[Answer] The subject of the army, the subject of the state, all the subjects that need to be reconsidered in a substantial way.

[Question] Let us go back to the National Movement. What are the aspects of the disagreement between you and the National Movement and between you as Walid Junblat and the National Movement, which includes a group of parties and movements?

[Answer] Who said there was a disagreement?

[Question] Many statements that have been issued indicate that there was a difference that almost amounted to a mutual contradiction between you and some parties of the National Movement.

[Answer] Where [are those statements]? How?

[Question] The recent statements about the events in the town of 'Ayn Darah.

[Answer] I will respond to the brothers. It is simple. This is not a problem.

[Question] Who are the brothers?

[Answer] The Ba'th. From time to time a few persons who are skillful in the art of making things happen will make specific efforts....

[Question] It may then be said that you did take one step forward towards the accord and cooperation with the legal authority, but that you are now taking a step backwards.

[Answer] We are thinking along those lines.

[Question] With regard to the accord government which Prime Minister Taqi al-Din al-Sulh was asked to form....

[Answer] It was not formed.

[Question] You were against the position of the National Movement too, [were you not]?

[Answer] This is not true. The government was not formed.

[Question] But you supported the formation of the government....

[Answer] The idea of forming a government lasted for 1 week and then failed.

[Question] You supported the formation of an accord government.

[Answer] I did support the formation of a government.

[Question] Was the National Movement against it?

[Answer] No, it was not.

[Question] Did it support the formation of a government?

[Answer] It was not against....

[Question] Who then was opposing the formation of a government?

[Answer] There were unsuitable circumstances, and there was a certain rejection. That is enough. (He laughed as he said that).

The Accord with the Front is impossible

[Question] Much has been said and is being said about the accord. It is always being discussed. Your position on that too is different....

[Answer] This is a recording like the story of the oil jug. There is no accord in Lebanon today. There is no accord period.

[Question] Isn't there a plan for an accord?

[Answer] Accord today is impossible because the Lebanese Front is still holding on to its old political positions. From time to time it issues mild and moderate statements, but its basic premise remains divisive and pluralistic, as they call it. We reject this. Besides, there is the haughtiness and the arrogance of the Lebanese Front and the fact that it deals with Israel. This is not easy.

[Question] The Lebanese Front is prepared to meet with you.

[Answer] This is not a question of meeting with me or with others. The question is one of certain political assertions. This is their last statement. (He was referring to the recent document that was issued by the Lebanese Front). What changed in it? We are still at the stage of the proposals of Sayyidah al-Bayr, even though they are considerably milder.

[Question] What direct request would you make to the Lebanese Front to get to the point when it would be possible to begin a dialogue?

[Answer] Condemning dealing with Israel. Accepting a formula for a political settlement or a plan for a political solution. Reconsidering the 1943 National Pact. Affirming and establishing Lebanon's Arab affiliation. Confirming and establishing the developing political democratic system in Lebanon and recognizing the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. If they agree to these matters, this would not be an easy step.

[Question] On previous occasions you had indicated your willingness to talk with the Lebanese Front. You had also announced that a meeting with Bashir al-Jumayyil would be possible.

[Answer] As a matter of principle we do not reject this. But we do note that this would be a waste of time. This was exploited by the Lebanese Front and by some agencies in the state. It is over now.

[Question] Do you mean the state exploited your announcement that a meeting with Bashir al-Jumayyil was possible?

[Answer] Yes, it exploited it in a cheap way. Our friend, the minister (Nishal Iddih) publishes only what he wants. I was watching television yesterday. He only publishes what he wants. We support him and oppose everything that is not lawful, such as unlawful television and unlawful radio broadcasts. But he only publishes what he wants. All right. So we will go ahead with a partition plan; what will happen? Will the world come to an end? No, it won't.

[Question] A partition plan?

[Answer] We will reject every presence for the state in our regions. What will happen? Nothing will happen. If there are more or less gendarmes or army [soldiers], that is not a problem.

[Question] But does the state actually have a presence now in the areas to which you are referring?

[Answer] ...We will abolish them. The state should look out for itself.

[Question] What about the outcome?

[Answer] I don't know. We'll wait and see.

[Question] Walid Bey, do you believe that the citizens approve of this situation?

[Answer] I am not responsible.

[Question] Let us talk about the situation in the "national regions." Do you believe that most of the people accept this situation?

[Answer] Naturally no one accepts this situation. But the situation is much stronger than....

[Question] Can it be said then that the circumstances of the area or your political circumstances do not permit the dialogue to begin?

[Answer] I am not in a hurry for the dialogue. The dialogue is being reconsidered now with the principle of the dialogue and the accord. I am not in a hurry at all.

War Is Coming and Will Be More Violent

[Question] It may then be said that the Lebanese crisis has gone back to square one.

[Answer] It seems so. It seems so. It is evident that the time factor has no value in Lebanon. We too are not in a hurry.

[Question] Can it be said that the war will start all over again?

[Answer] It is possible. It is imminent. Naturally everything is imminent now.

[Question] Will this be just like what happened in 1975 and 1976?

[Answer] It may be bigger and more violent.

[Question] This would be terrible for the Lebanese people who have suffered a great deal.

[Answer] But who is it who is refusing the dialogue and the political settlement? Basically it is not us.

[Question] The other parties are saying that they are not rejecting a political settlement.

[Answer] In the interview Pierre al-Jumayyil had with Sa'ib Salam on television, he said that there were no alliances in the Islamic regions. And [yet] we are still hearing Bashir al-Jumayyil's liberation speeches.

[Question] Let us assume that under the present circumstances you were contacted by Bashir al-Jumayyil.

[Answer] The matter is not one of personal contact.

[Question] Political contact?

[Answer] We are talking about it. We are talking about it.

[Question] If he invites you to a meeting?

[Answer] He is not the one to invite me to a meeting. I am the one who would think of contacting him first.

[Question] Then the initiative to contact him may come from you?

[Answer] This is not imminent. I am not in a hurry over the matter of the dialogue and the accord. Why are you in a hurry?

[Question] Because people are dying and the country is in ruins.

[Answer] I am not responsible for this situation.

[Question] You are not responsible, but you have the capability to help this country get out of this crisis.

[Answer] I had the capability. No more. It is gone.

[Question] How then do you see the future?

[Answer] There is a state of inertia now, as we wait for Arab and Lebanese prospects to become more favorable for a political solution.

[Question] What about President Sarkis's recent message?

[Answer] I have commented on it. It contains generalities and emotions as usual. It is a tear-jerker, very much a tear-jerker. (He laughed at length).

[Question] Is there a plan for a meeting with President Sarkis?

[Answer] I would have no objections if he invites me for dinner since he has good wine....

[Question] Do you drink wine?

[Answer] Sometimes. Wine is beneficial in the winter.

[Question] It's been said that you stay for a long time in your town, al-Mukhtarah, and this is interpreted as some kind of disdain.

[Answer] I am comfortable in al-Mukhtarah.

[Question] But political activity is in Beirut.

[Answer] There is political activity in al-Mukhtarah too, and it includes the entire region of Jabal [Lubnan]. I believe that the region of Jabal [Lubnan] is important. I am also engaged in [some] social activities. At present I am interested in the subject of environmental protection since there is much pollution. We are in the process of writing a study about protecting the environment [from things] such as garbage and fuels. But such a study requires large capabilities that would be allocated by a state. Besides, we are also studying [the situation of] the roads most of which are inoperable, especially after the recent rains, because of the kind of asphalt that the Ministry of Public Works imports.

[Question] You were abroad on a private tour a few days ago. Will you make official visits outside Lebanon soon?

[Answer] I have an invitation to attend the congress of the Soviet Communist party next February. I have a visit to South Yemen, and I will try to tour the Gulf, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

[Question] For what purposes?

[Answer] I have many friends.

[Question] Political friends?

[Answer] Naturally.

[Question] [Like whom], for example?

[Answer] Most of the princes and especially Prince 'Abdallah, who is an old friend.

[Question] Sometimes some of the parties in the National Movement attack the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

[Answer] This is the business of the parties in the National Movement (He laughed).

[Question] But you are the chairman of the Political Council of the National Movement!

[Answer] It is nice to have variety within unity. (He laughed at length).

Sham'un Is a Distinguished Man, but He Was Placed in a Dilemma

[Question] Is this a premise of the Lebanese Front?

[Answer] No. This is different. Their premises are different. Do they have variety? They had Sham'un, but they sent him away.

[Question] How are you and Sham'un?

[Answer] There is nothing between him and me.

[Question] What about his mansion which is under construction in Dayr al-Qamar?

[Answer] I believe that the construction process has been stopped now. (I found out afterwards that the construction process was ongoing).

[Question] Why?

[Answer] I don't know.

[Question] Is this for political reasons?

[Answer] Ask him.

[Question] Does this have anything to do with the question of security of Jabal [Lubnan]?

[Answer] I do not believe so.

[Question] Will Sham'un's mansion in Dayr al-Qamar be anything like Junblat's in al-Mukhtarah?

[Answer] There is no competition here. (He laughed at length).

[Question] What do you think about President Camille Sham'un?

[Answer] Is this the subject of the discussion today? (He laughed). There is of course a major political difference [between us], but there remains a mutual feeling, a kind of common understanding about some of the questions.

[Question] Especially about al-Shuf?

[Answer] Especially about al-Shuf and about other questions. Of course there are major political differences. Regarding national affairs, Arab affairs and Israeli affairs there is a clear difference. However, an evaluation would be difficult now because Camille Sham'un is a major politician, and he is very intelligent. But how did he unfortunately get to that stage, I don't know.

[Question] What stage is that?

[Answer] The present stage. There were two leaders in the Lebanese Front, and there is now one leader. Isn't that right? A political and a military erosion has taken place.

[Question] What would you tell him now if you were to be contacted by him?

[Answer] There is no problem regarding personal contact, but political affairs is another matter. There is a huge political file. Yesterday on [the program], "The File," (a television program) Camille Sham'un said things about my late father that were very factual, very logical and very reserved. At the same time he quoted Kamal Junblat. I thank him a great deal for that. This is something positive.

(His secretary entered [the room] to remind him that the time for his appointment with the Soviet ambassador in Beirut was getting closer).

[Question] Are you going to see the Soviet ambassador after his return to Beirut? The news states that there are political reasons behind his long absence from his post. There is also news that states that the Soviets will play a new role in the region and that it is for this reason that Ambassador Soldatov has returned.

[Answer] A new role? Has their old role come to an end? This has nothing to do with whether the ambassador goes or returns.

[Question] A new role after the Syrian-Soviet treaty.

[Answer] The information I have is that he was sick, that's all, and that he had gone back to his country to recuperate.

[Question] What will you talk about?

[Answer] I don't know. We will see after a while. (He laughed). I will ask him about his health first.

[Question] And about Brezhnev's health?

[Answer] That is possible! (He laughed).

[Question] In what language will you speak?

[Answer] We will speak in English. He speaks a little French. He is one of the distinguished figures.

I Am Syria's Ally and Friend

[Question] Are you Syria's friend or ally?

[Answer] What is the difference? I am both a friend and an ally.

[Question] On what bases is this friendship or this alliance built?

[Answer] On specific, political bases and principles on which we agree, and especially today. It is also built on a personal friendship with President al-Asad and with other Syrian officials.

[Question] Do you have a plan to visit Damascus?

[Answer] Yes, it is now necessary to visit Damascus. It's been a long time since I visited it.

[Answer] Are you expecting an invitation?

[Answer] We are beyond these formalities. I contact them and they set a date.

[Question] Let us go back to the subject of the dialogue. If the Lebanese Front were to condemn dealing with Israel,....

[Answer] Let them go ahead.

[Question] What will your position be then?

[Answer] That would be a first step. What would remain would be the unity of Lebanon; rejecting pluralism; reconsidering the 1943 National Pact, Palestinian presence, the political system and the relationship with the Arabs.

[Question] Can it be said that we are still at square one?

[Answer] That is correct, but what can I do? I have done everything I can to achieve a political solution. The state became engaged in theft, and there was a hint of some understanding with the Lebanese Front which did not have a sincere desire to attain a dialogue.

[Question] What was the state's position?

[Answer] The state took advantage of this matter to alleviate the vehemence of the attacks on it by some countries. The shortcomings that are attributed to the state are quite considerable.

[Question] For example?

[Answer] First and foremost the army. Under the former cabinet it is said that no remonstrations were made at the time to the financial scandals.

[Question] Who was responsible for those scandals?

[Answer] The president and the prime minister overlooked those scandals, even though it would have been possible to have those responsible for them removed.

[Question] What is your relationship with the former prime minister, Dr Salim al-Huss?

[Answer] We have a good relationship.

[Question] How can it be good when you are accusing him of scandals?

[Answer] I am not accusing him of the scandals. But for political circumstances this government continued [to exist], and some of its elements took advantage of their positions in the cabinet to acquire wealth illegally. Hence, we must reconsider and bring back the old principle of asking people, "From where did you get this?"

[Question] So that we can come to some conclusion it seems to me that what you are saying lets us know that the war will start again.

[Answer] I am not predicting peace.

[Question] What then are you predicting?

[Answer] I am not predicting peace. There is inertia, the status quo. (He said [the latter] in English).

[Question] What is the last book you read?

[Answer] Oh! (He sighed). I am at present educating myself by reconsidering my political information. I began with Islamic studies. I am at present reading a history of Islam, "The Islamic Encyclopedia" in English. At the same time I am reading the Koran in Arabic, and I am also reading a book entitled "Islam" by Sayyid Husayn Nasr. He is a distinguished professor.

[Question] He wrote many books about Islam and Sufism, [didn't he]?

[Answer] Do you know where he lives these days?

[Question] No.

[Answer] I would like to see you again. Come up to al-Mukhtarah if you like.

[Question] How? Who will come up with me?

[Answer] You get in a car and you drive up.

With Amin al-Jumayyil

Here is the interview that took place between AL-MUSTAQBAL and al-Shaykh Amin al-Jumayyil.

[Question] What is the Lebanese problem, where is it concentrated and what stage has it reached?

[Answer] The Lebanese problem in many of its basic aspects is an outside problem that is inside the country. It is the problem of others on our turf. It is the problem of Arab and international alliances on our land. Of course there is more than one internal problem in Lebanon and more than one difficulty that has existed since the creation of Lebanon. However, all these internal problems and difficulties do not justify the death of 70,000 persons so far or the losses that are estimated in the billions of pounds. The Lebanese citizen has suffered from the crises and has struggled against them, but he has always won. We defeated the basic schism in the 30's and in the 40's and we attained the collective agreement of 1943. Even in 1958 after more than 5 months of open civil war, the Lebanese people were able to coexist without any problem as soon as the page of the revolution was turned. Pierre al-Jumayyil used to visit al-Bastah without any guards, and Muslim leaders used to visit al-Ashrafiyah as though they were in their own region. [It was the same] even in the region of al-Shuf between the late Kamal Junblat and Camille Sham'un. That was in spite of the political struggle that was going on between them. After 1958 the struggle remained a political struggle. The gist of this is that the Lebanese citizen was always able to overcome the disputes and the crises no matter how dangerous they were. The evidence for this also is that in 1975 there was more than one attempt among the citizens of the same nation to bring the existing crisis to an end, but whenever a solution was close, somebody forced the Lebanese crisis into further convulsions. This means that Lebanese territory was the scene of a struggle between non-Lebanese parties. This also means that there were foreign interventions in Lebanon. If it were up to the Lebanese to come to an understanding with each other, the problem would have ended in 24 hours.

[Question] Are these foreign forces Arab or international or both?

[Answer] The Lebanese problem began between some parties. It could have

been settled quickly, but the state's capitulation and its unwillingness to face dangers and to tell the truth about some of the incidents that occurred opened Lebanese territory to all the capricious tendencies, movements and ambitions. At first these parties were restricted, but in the end and after some people realized that Lebanese territory was suitable for all kinds of interests, there was not a single party in the world that did not utilize Lebanese territory as suitable for its political activity or its combat action.

The Responsibility of the 1943 Regime

[Question] Do you then consider the Arab and world-wide forces to be the basic reason behind the Lebanese problem?

[Answer] They are among the basic reasons. There were grudges and inter-Lebanese difficulties that had not been settled at the time because none of the rulers that came to power in Lebanon since 1943 had conducted themselves in the manner required by national duty. Lebanon was turned into a farm instead of there being an effort to create a homeland. Some Lebanese parties were and still are receiving their orders from abroad and not from inside Lebanon. This vacuum in the administration led to the fact that internal problems and difficulties were not treated, and this opened the doors in Lebanon for various interventions. However, I am so far optimistic that if we were to agree on a minimum of national positions and if we were to launch Lebanon as a participant in a dialogue, it would survive as an entity and as a homeland. Today, Lebanon is quite shaky. Lebanon did not fall at once; it was "torn out" a little at a time. Lebanon was falling in stages: geographical or institutional sectors were torn off Lebanon in stages. Therefore, it is not reasonable for us to strive today to restore the unity of Lebanon's land and institutions at once. Rescue today can take place through a step-by-step logic after a plan is drawn and agreed to by a minimum of the leaders who represent most of the movements of the Lebanese people. Despite everything that happened Lebanon is still necessary for its citizens first, and for the Palestinian people in particular, second. It is necessary for the Arab world, for the whole world and for peace, whether that peace be the Camp David peace, the Geneva peace or any kind of peace. This is because there will be no peace on the basis of Camp David or on the basis of Geneva if peace is not restored to Lebanon. No matter how tempestuous the winds that blow on Lebanon are, Lebanon is still much stronger than many states on the Arab scene. What is reassuring in this regard is the desire of the Lebanese people to save the homeland. [Equally reassuring are] the efforts that are being made by all the parties in that direction despite all the obstacles, despite all the pressures and despite all the attacks. Some of these attacks were barbaric and were trumped up, and this occurred in some regions to affirm that launching the state and the homeland was not possible. Some of the positions express the citizen's desire for a meeting quite well. Among those positions are the positive position on the accord cabinet of Taqi al-Din al-Sulh and the football between the followers and independence.

[Question] You spoke about the vacuum in the administration from independence and until today. We can then consider this to be self-criticism, [can't we]?

[Answer] Self-criticism in our capacity as Lebanese [citizens].

[Question] You were a fundamental team in the administration.

[Answer] We were not a fundamental team in the administration because as the Phalangist party, we participated in the government with one minister out of 20 or more ministers. We were no more than 4 percent of the administration. The capabilities and the powers that a minister has for taking action through the administration are quite limited. We used to consider the basic action to be that which was carried out through the party organization. I still remember that during the 60's when al-Shaykh Pierre was the minister of public works and demands were made by the union of the electricity company, which was subordinate to the ministry of public works, the party was not able to realize some of these rights for the union of the electricity company that was headed by a Phalangist on the strength of the administration. This forced the union led by the Phalangists to declare a strike against the ministry of public works to force the state to make some justifiable reforms. This is an irrefutable example of the fact that the Phalangist party was not able to implement its action programs and its ambitions on the strength of the administration to save the administration and to save the mentality that is in power. Today, this is the ambition of the Phalangists who are fighting to create a state that meets the standards of their ambitions and their aspirations.

We Do not Support Camp David

[Question] You spoke about the Camp David peace, and you presented it as a peace plan. What is the position of the Phalangist party on Camp David?

[Answer] I have delivered more than one lecture and made more than one statement about Camp David. Camp David was satisfied with solving a crisis between Egypt and Israel. It gave nothing to the region, and it did not take a single step towards a just and a permanent solution in the Middle East region. Therefore, Camp David does not concern us at all because it was not able to solve any one of the Lebanese problems. Nor was it able to unravel any one of the difficulties from which we are suffering in Lebanon, especially one of the major and basic problems, which is the Palestinian problem on Lebanese territory. Therefore, Camp David does not concern us at all. We do not support Camp David, nor do we oppose it. We support every just settlement in the region. We would support Camp David if it placed the Lebanese problem on a course towards a solution. We would support Geneva if it did move the Lebanese crisis in that direction. We would support any plan that would contribute to a solution of the Lebanese crisis. But to a large extent all the solutions that are being discussed--

those in Camp David, in Geneva, in Kissinger's plan or in Rogers' plan--regarded the Palestinian in Lebanon as one who became "acclimatized" and who was supposed to have settled there in a normal fashion. Perhaps some Arab countries were subconsciously working towards that end. There are many countries that went along with the Camp David plan despite their violent and absolute opposition to the Camp David accords. What we have seen in fact is that these countries used to add fuel to the fire of every conspiracy that followed the Camp David line.

The Accord of Lebanon Is Part of the Accord of the Syrians and Palestinians

[Question] How do you view the accord? If we were to take into consideration the forces that are fighting each other on the Lebanese scene, would it be possible to achieve an accord among the Lebanese only without achieving an accord between these forces that are fighting each other?

[Answer] The accord requires that the accord [itself] be the first law for the Lebanese people, that is, it should be the first concern of the Lebanese people themselves because there is more than one party that is benefiting from the fact that the accord is not realized. Those parties are taking advantage of this fact and benefiting from the wave of Lebanese disputes to obtain more interests for themselves at Lebanon's expense. No one but the Lebanese themselves has an interest in the achievement of the Lebanese accord. Therefore, the accord should be the duty, the objective and the concern of the Lebanese and not the objective and the concern of the foreigner. Basically, the accord is an inter-Lebanese accord. The foreigner who calls for the Lebanese accord does so on a tactical basis. The accord is now contingent upon some of the forces that are active on the Lebanese scene. Syria is one of them and also especially the Palestinians. Of course, Israel has come into the picture through the border strip. Therefore, we cannot launch the accord without taking the forces that I mentioned into consideration unless the given factors and the conditions of those forces were to change. Accordingly, a minimum of agreement among a minimum of the forces that can be found on the Lebanese scene would give shape to a Lebanese plan for the accord. This plan must be Lebanese from beginning to end and should comprise the given Palestinian and Syrian factors. The plan must also be devised with a Lebanese understanding and with Lebanese assumptions that would make Lebanon a capable participant in the dialogue with Syria and with the Palestinians so it can persuade Syria that the Lebanese accord that we want is not an accord against Syria or against the Palestinians. We want the Lebanese accord so we can establish a formula for cooperation with Syria to preserve Syria's basic interests without hurting the Lebanese entity, Lebanese independence, or the independence of Lebanese sovereignty in Lebanese political action inside the country and abroad. This would preserve the absolute sovereignty of the Lebanese people to determine their own destiny. This then is the minimum accord between some of the Lebanese parties both in the National Movement or in the Lebanese Front. From this premise an understanding can be reached with Syria, and it can be persuaded [about this] without problems.

There Is a Rapprochement Between Us and Them

When we speak about the accord, we consider this accord to be present in the heart of every Lebanese [citizen]. But the heart of every Lebanese is nurturing some complexes that are preventing him from [taking part in] the dialogue.

If we were to go back to the "Interim Political Program" that was drawn up by the National Movement, we would find that we do agree on many of the lines of this program whose broad lines do not contradict our aspirations. The matter is the same regarding numerous statements that were issued by the National Movement. There is no conflict. The situation is the same regarding the statements of the Lebanese Front. If one reads them with calm nerves and without complexes, one finds in them many matters that would ensure reassurance and equality for all. But there are complexes that are being nurtured from abroad, and the barriers that are set up between the regions prevent people from contacting each other and talking with each other. In order for me to talk with Walid Junblat who lives only a few kilometers away, I had to go through Paris, through the (France en Terre) broadcast and from there travel thousands of kilometers. As long as Walid Junblat wants to talk to me and I want to talk to him, why is it necessary for us to go every time by telephone through Paris? We are convinced that the Lebanese people are prepared to come together. I am convinced that Walid Junblat is not far from a dialogue with the Lebanese Front. Sa'ib Salam also wants to talk with Pierre al-Jumayyil who, in turn, wants to talk to Sa'ib Salam. Prime Minister Karami also expressed his wish to debate the Lebanese Front in one form or another, and the opposite is true. There is, however, the notion of fear that is preventing people from talking with each other. All the parties have a desire for the accord or a desire for coexistence, for dialogue and for communications to achieve a formula for the future.

Syria Is Well and We Are Well

Some people may want to cooperate with Syria. We have no objections to cooperation with Syria. This is based on the proverb which states that, "If your neighbor is well, then you are well," or "Your nearby neighbor is better than the far away neighbor." We are not opposed to this logic at all. We are opposed to the logic of control, and [we are opposed to others] imposing their will on us. The matter is the same regarding the Palestinian question. We definitely do not want to point our gun towards any Palestinian. By merely pointing a gun towards the Palestinian, we would be putting an end to the Palestinian question in Lebanon, and this would mean settling the Palestinian people in Lebanon forever. This would not serve the Muslims or the Christians; it would not serve the Lebanese people or the Palestinian people. Therefore, we have mutual interests with the Palestinians. It is this that they do not want to understand; that they are ignoring; or that they are being prevented from understanding. We had begun a dialogue with the Palestinians in the 70's. It was an official dialogue in which I personally took part along with [my] colleague, the

late Joseph Shadir on the one hand and Abu 'Ammar and Abu Iyyad and some Palestinian brothers on the other. But there were some forces that suspended this dialogue before it produced positive results for both parties together.

[Question] We have noticed that the dialogue between the Phalangist party and Syria is sometimes active; then it stops and it is [later] resumed. Does this mean that there is a struggle among the factions within the party, or is this the result of certain circumstances?

[Answer] This is not at all relevant to the factions in the party with regard to the dialogue with Syria because at the present time some of those who are talking with Syria are coordinating [their discussions] with all the agencies of the party. But this dialogue with Syria does not yield results. We do not want to kid ourselves. From the very first day of President Sarkis's term, my position has been clear. That is, that if the Phalangists want to have accord in Lebanon and want to unify Lebanon, they have to make every contact with Damascus and with anyone other than Damascus through the government. The presidential palace should be the springboard for any dialogue between the parties in Lebanon or between Lebanese parties and parties outside Lebanon. What would be the significance of my dialogue with Syria? What can I offer Syria? What can Syria offer me as a Phalangist? Can I require, for example, the withdrawal of the Syrian army from the mountain tops of al-Shawir, and can I have the Lebanese army take its place? What if the state were to refuse the deployment of the army in the mountain tops of al-Shawir? Any Phalangist demand of Syria or any Syrian demand of the Phalangists is invalid if it does not go through the government. Our relationship with Syria can create positive climates, but if the Phalangists' relationship with Syria is not crowned with an official act through the government, such a relationship cannot yield any result. Our proposal is predicated on this, and our tragedy is that the government is not moving in a sound direction. Ever since the Phalangist delegations' first visits to Damascus we have been affirming to Syria and to the Lebanese government that this is a matter between Lebanon and Syria. The government is being asked to be the coordinator between the Phalangists and Syria on the one hand and between the National Movement and Syria on the other. That is, the government is to be the general coordinator or the positive bridge [leading] to the interests of Lebanon. Bikfayya, the town of al-Shaykh Amin al-Jumayyil, cannot be the springboard for the Lebanese dialogue; nor can al-Mukhtarah or al-Musaytibah do that. However, B'abda is still waiting for Santa Claus to bring the solution.

The state also too often relies on imaginary or impossible solutions. It also makes one plan or waits for one solution without having an alternative solution in case that one fails. The logic of modern politics requires that several successive alternatives be devised so that if the first one fails, the second would be ready. Thus the alternatives compete with each other. I also do not understand how Prime Minister Sa'ib Salam, a former prime minister and one of the chief elements of Lebanese politics is not summoned to the presidential palace at least once a month for consultations

on our Lebanese affairs. I also do not understand how Prime Minister Rashid Karami, President Sarkis's old friend and one of the chief elements of the method, is not summoned to the palace. Salam and Karami may not have weapons and armed men, but this does not deny the fact that they experienced the Lebanese situation and that they can offer some solutions or contribute to [the effort] to find the means of rescue. I also do not understand how al-Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil and also [former] president Camille Sham'un are not summoned to the palace. President Sulayman Franjiyyah governed Lebanon for 6 years. He placed the dinner table in the presidential palace at the service of the state. We were always invited for lunch in the palace where leaders from Tripoli, from Sidon and from al-Biqā' met around the table. Everybody talked, exchanged witticisms and made friends. The [dining] table became the point where rapprochement and mutual affection [were established]. Some people saw this as a caricature in the meat pestle and the araq glass. But it was the meat pestle and the araq glass that made people in the presidential palace talk together until 1975.

With the Government and Against Its Methods

[Question] One understands from your statements that you attribute serious flaws to President Sarkis or that you are prodding him to conduct the dialogue.

[Answer] First of all, I personally support President Sarkis all the way. The presence of President Sarkis for Lebanon is a guarantee because of his integrity and patriotism. This is indubitable and indisputable. The Phalangist party supports President Sarkis all the way. But this does not mean that we do not find some faults with the action [he has taken]. The ministry of foreign affairs is idle. I do not understand why the ministry of foreign affairs is taking no action. Why aren't representatives going to the various capitals to explain the Lebanese situation? Our relationships with many of the Arab and foreign countries are on ice. Let me give you an example. The Syrian minister of foreign affairs, 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam does not stay put. He is always traveling abroad, carrying official messages and explaining the Syrian policy. Despite all my affection and my friendship with Minister Fu'ad Rutrus, I am saying that our diplomacy is idle because it is only based on the action of the minister and no one else. The proverb says, "One cannot clap with one hand!"

[Question] But if you do find fault with the lawful government, do these faults justify your pulling the rug from under the feet of the lawful government and placing the government in very embarrassing situations, as was the case in 'Ayn al-Rummanah, for example?

[Answer] In physics there is a principle which states that nature hates a vacuum. When the state is absent on the foreign scene, someone takes it upon himself to act on its behalf. The case is the same in the area of security. If there are some regions where the state cannot be present because some of the forces on the land are stronger than the state and are

in control of these regions, we can understand the absence of the state from peace preservation activities under such circumstances and its satisfaction with declaring its position on that situation. But in the regions where the state has a presence, such as 'Ayn al-Rummanah, in particular, the state has no excuse for not taking action. We clapped for the army when it entered 'Ayn al-Rummanah, and I do not believe that a single incident occurred between us and the army in 'Ayn al-Rummanah. In al-Hadath, for example, there was a certain incident between us and the army. The army came and shelled a Phalangist house in particular; it detained anyone it chose to detain, and we did not create an uproar. But when the army observes unusual behavior in 'Ayn al-Rummanah; when the residents of the region ask that these actions be stopped; and when the army takes no action to stop these activities, then the army would be wrong and would be making it possible for citizens to take matters into their own hands.

We support the army. We want the army. But we want the army to support itself. In the regions where the army has a presence and where [its authority] is not disputed, the army should act like an army. What was preventing the army, for example, from deploying all its commandos in 'Ayn al-Rummanah to check all the Phalangist and non-Phalangist lairs of irregularities? If the army had done that, all the people would have supported it. We were hoping that the army would carry out a purge in 'Ayn al-Rummanah. At any rate we were able to straighten matters out, and the army did go back to 'Ayn al-Rummanah.

[Question] But it did not go into the internal subdivisions?

[Answer] This is the first stage. We are asking that the army be deployed in all of Lebanon. Naturally, the 'Ayn al-Rummanah operation was a major setback, and we regret that, but it was forced on us. As al-Shaykh Pierre said in several statements, "Power is not given, and security is not granted; it is rather imposed."

[Question] Why then did he not impose it?

[Answer] The army command made a mistake. We are not blaming the command because it may have miscalculated or may have had its special circumstances. But it was a grievous error, and it has to shoulder its responsibilities in this regard.

Dealing with Israel Is a Swindle

[Question] The Lebanese National Movement and many Arab agencies are accusing you of dealing with Israel. This hurts Arab national feelings considerably. The National Movement is setting a basic condition for starting a dialogue with you, and that is condemning dealing with Israel. How would you respond to that?

[Answer] Dealing with Israel is a slogan used for exaggeration and for making a cheap gain. It is a slogan used to impede and to add fuel to

the fire of the Lebanese crisis. This matter never stemmed from a conviction. The charge of dealing with Israel began in 1975 with the beginning of the war. Nevertheless, this accusation did not prevent Syria from entering Lebanon as an ally of the Lebanese forces and the Lebanese Front. We must not forget that the Phalangists were basically depending on the Arabs. The Phalangists have been depending on the Arab League and on some Arab countries since 1975. This became evident in the fact that they counted on the principle of sending an Arab peace-keeping force to Lebanon. Our cooperation was sincere. After the idea failed, we counted on the Arab League, on the principle of the Arab deterrent forces. We accepted this, and the Arab deterrent force entered our country and was deployed throughout our areas.

Then the slogan of dealing with Israel is a slogan that is used to exaggerate. It has become commonplace. We've had enough exaggerations and enough warmongering. All those who are accusing us of dealing with Israel agreed to join us in an accord government that Prime Minister Taqiyy al-Din al-Sulh intended to form.

Let me relate to you this incident. In September 1970 when some Palestinians sought refuge in Israel to escape the bloody events that took place in Jordan, the Arab community later embraced them and they returned to the fold despite the statements that they had made in Israel. Let us assume for the sake of argument that two citizens from the town of al-Damur, which has suffered a great deal, and two citizens from the south, which is still suffering, were forced to seek refuge in Israel and were now asking to come back to the fold. We have to treat them just as we treated the Palestinians. Let us turn a new leaf and say, "Forgive the past." However, the policymakers are exploiting these slogans and are using them as an excuse. But it is a feeble excuse to prevent the Lebanese accord.

We in the Phalangist party in all our declared and clear positions affirm the fact that we are counting on the Arabs. I do not want to conceal a secret if I say that we are being pressed to declare that we are abandoning our reliance on the Arabs and that we would be relying on another [agency]. Pierre al-Jumayyil has always rejected that.

[Question] Outside pressures or inside pressures?

[Answer] The Phalangist party in particular has been pressed and pressed again. The purport of these pressures is this: "How can you still hope for something from the Arabs? How can you continue to insist on depending on the Arabs? How can you go on saying that Syria is your neighbor?" There are many pressures on the Phalangist party, and their purport is how can we still believe in coexistence, and how are we still counting on the Arab League? What did the Arab League give you other than waste and destruction? The position of the Phalangists and of Pierre al-Jumayyil is still the same and has not changed because our dependence on the Arabs is obvious.

[Question] This is an exciting piece of news.

[Answer] There were pressures, and if I can go further than that I would say we had offers.

[Question] Can you explain that?

[Answer] Talking about this subject would be premature.

[Answer] Were these pressures and offers eastern or western?

[Question] It is premature to talk about these matters. We do not want to add fuel to the fire. There were temptations and temptations. [If we] agree to withdraw from the Arab family, that would of course lead to the fragmentation of Lebanon and the final settlement of Palestinians in Lebanon.

[Question] Are these [pressures] coming from the Americans?

[Answer] I will not go any further into this subject. No they are not from the Americans because the American government today is still trying to prevent the partition.

[Question] What do you expect from the new U.S. administration? Have you had communications with it?

[Answer] Of course we have had communications, but they have been marginal. These are other than the official positions. The Americans expressed to us their desire to help Lebanon. As we know the U.S. administration is fettered by Israel just as it is fettered by oil.

[Question] Would you please go back to the subject of pressures and offers? Were these temptations for political and material support?

[Answer] Don't ask me for details. This may be premature. The time for us to talk about this subject will come. But the day will come when the Arab world will understand who is selling the Arabs and who is saving the Arabs. The day will come when it will be known who is counting on Israel and who is counting on the unity of the Arab rank to serve the Arab countries. We must not forget that in 1976 when the Syrian troops entered Lebanon there were groups in the National Movement that were counting on Israel to intervene to prevent Syria from spreading throughout the Lebanese scene.

[Question] Let us go back to the subject of the accord. Are you prepared to meet with Mr Walid Junblat?

[Answer] We do not have a complex about meeting with anyone. I personally met more than once with Abu Iyyad and with the late Abu Hasan before he died. We are open to any form of dialogue without any pre-conditions.

We are extending our hand to every party that wants to talk with us from the premise of honor and mutual respect. We do not want to impose our will on anyone, and we do not want anyone to impose his will on us. We used weapons only to defend ourselves and to protect our heritage and our existence. We are prepared to lay down our arms at any moment when we find that there is a desire to lay the foundation of the Lebanese state and preserve the homeland.

8592

CSO: 4802

SWEDISH FIRM CHIEF TELLS OF TRAINING SOLDIERS

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 19 Feb 81 p 6

[Article by Claes von Hofsten]

[Text] It isn't just through the Telub firm that Libyan officers have received Swedish training. Back in 1977 the private Swedish consulting firm, Teleplan, sent two instructors to Libya. Their job was to instruct military personnel in electronics.

The instruction went on for 2 months in the fall of 1977 in Tripoli. Between 10 and 15 Libyan officers received intensive instruction in computers, optronics (advanced optics) and radar.

The contract for this instruction was signed in 1975. At that time Teleplan, Inc. was negotiating on two separate but similar contracts. That was the only thing that led to the courses being held in the fall of 1977.

Nothing Sensitive

"It was nothing very sensitive as far as we were concerned. It was quite in line with our daily activities," said director Ove Hammarstrom, executive director of Teleplan, Inc.

But Ove Hammarstrom stressed that Teleplan did not sign the contract until it had consulted with the war materiel inspector at that time, General Lage Thunberg and received his approval. The contract was signed with Libyan Air Defense.

General Lage Thunberg told SVENSKA DAGBLADET on Wednesday that he did not remember the matter very clearly but he thought it involved training Libyan radiotelegraph operators.

Lage Thunberg denied that the contract was regarded as a problem at the time or that it caused any special discussions.

Lage Thunberg would not comment on the propriety of the Swedish educational assistance.

Director Ove Hammarstrom said that the Libyans had expressed interest in more Swedish courses in Libya but that no more contracts were signed.

"As far as that goes they can still purchase more services from us, but new legislation seems to be under way," said Ove Hammarstrom. "But there are no plans in the works now. We are not doing any marketing in this direction either."

Only Land

According to Ove Hammarstrom Libya is the only land Teleplan helped with this kind of instruction. But Teleplan has worked closely with the Swedish armed forces for many years. Teleplan works on a consultant basis within the areas of telecommunications, electronics and computer technology.

6578

CSO: 3109

REVOLUTIONARY COURT SENTENCES ANTISOCIAL ELEMENTS

LD281114 Tripoli JANA in Arabic 0700 GMT 28 Feb 81

[Excerpts] Tripoli, 28 Feb (JANA)--The revolutionary court set up by the revolutionary committees during its third session at Qar Unis University 2-3 February 1980, yesterday handed down sentences in the cases submitted by the revolutionary committees against civilians, military, fascist, dictatorial, negative parasitical, nonproductive, cowardly, influence-manipulating, intemperant, receivers of favors, bureaucratic and bourgeois elements which patronise the power of the revolution and the authority of the people.

At the start of its session, the court stressed that the revolutionary court, which will deliver its sentences today [as heard] at an open session, differs in its composition, sentences to restrict the freedom of man but seeks to liberate him from the material and moral bonds and to rescue him from his own greed and domination which conflict with the peoples' aims for freedom, happiness and building of a socialist society.

The revolutionary court sentenced 59 defendants who tried to corrupt the popular administration through bribery and seeking favoritism to removal from their public positions and banning them from taking up in the future any public office. The court also deprived a number of defendants, who used to work in contracting, commerce and brokerage, of all their economic weapons and decided to refer them to the people's court to pass judgment on them according to the indictment and the laws of the people.

The court sentenced another group of defendants to transfer to productive work centers in order to rehabilitate them for return to the new socialist society. The court sentenced other defendants to return items in excess of their need to the people and for them to continue in their work. The court found 40 people not guilty as charged.

CSO: 4802

LIBYA

BRIEFS

GAS PLANT--The Secretary of Light Industries has signed a contract with an international company for the creation of gas plant in Benghazi. This industrial complex will daily produce 100 cubic metres oxygen, 60 cubic metres of liquid oxygen, 30 cubic metres of acetylene and 20 kilos of nitrous oxide, all of which will be used for industrial and medical purposes. [Valletta THE JAMAHIRIYA MAIL in English 31 Jan 81 p 5]

GRAIN PRODUCTION--Sources at the General People's Committee Secretariat for Agrarian Reform and Land Reclamation said more than 67,000 hectares of land were cultivated with wheat, barley and alfalfa during the current season. The cultivation of seeds was performed through the use of aircrafts. The sources said most of the cultivated areas depended on irrigation, not rainfall. [Valletta THE JAMAHIRIYA MAIL in English 21 Feb 81 p 3]

IRAQI ASSASSINATION PLANS--Iraqi intelligence bodies in Britain are making abortive attempts to create problems between Libya and Britain. Under the supervision of the military attache at the Iraqi Embassy in London, these bodies are carrying out other attempts aimed at the assassination of members of the Libyan Popular Bureau in Britain. [Text] [LD021338 Tripoli Domestic Service in Arabic 1230 GMT 2 Mar 81]

CSO: 4802

ARTICLE REPORTS SITUATION SAID TO BE GETTING WORSE

Brussels REMARQUES ARABO-AFRICAINES in French No 527, 1980 pp 20-23

[Article by Jean Wolf: "The Revolving Colonels"]

[Text] Things are getting worse and worse in Mauritania. To be convinced of this, you only have to read the news from all sources coming from there or listen to the tragic or disillusioned stories of those returning from Mauritania.

Let us take a look at the situation. After Lieutenant Colonels Mahmoud Ould Louly, president of the republic, and Ahmed Salem Ould Sidi, deputy chairman of the Military Committee for National Salvation, were kicked out last January, people were hopeful that the "revolving colonels" were finally going to stop revolving, that the situation had become clearer, and that Mauritania was going to enjoy a certain amount of political stability. Alas, that was far from being the case.

For the dissatisfaction which was brewing has been constantly in evidence since that time. One would be aware of this if one had witnessed the brutal act of repression at the beginning of March in Nouakchott carried out against a demonstration of helpless women. They were protesting after the armed forces had destroyed the miserable shantytowns where their families had found accommodation. The women were beaten, thrown into trucks, and carted off to the places they came from (Akjoujt, Atar, Moudjeria and Aleg) where they are barely surviving in lamentable fashion.

Several cadres in politics and business who had not shown enough enthusiasm for the peace treaty signed with the POLISARIO in Algiers have been stripped of their jobs, arrested, or sentenced to exile. Among them are Tijani Ould Karim, president of the Youth Union, Mustapha Saleck, director of the budget; Mohamed Ould Ichidou, former leftist opposition leader; not to mention some of the cadres in large state enterprises such as SMAR [Mauritanian Insurance and Reinsurance Company], SONIMEX [National Importing and Exporting Company], SOCOGIM [expansion unknown] and SNIM-SEM [National Industrial and Mining Company/Semipublic Company]. It is known that the director general of the latter company, former Foreign Affairs Minister Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, has been put under strict house arrest.

There were new developments last 5 April: Maj Moulay Ould Boukhreiss, minister of interior, was removed from the government. And is it not being said that Ould Boukhreiss was trying to have the dubious Ahmed Baba Miske¹ made prime minister or at least minister of foreign affairs? The chief of staff, Col Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, was removed from the Military Committee for National Salvation at the same time as Ould Boukhreiss. "And to avert any new coup attempt, the president accompanied these dismissals with high-level changes among officials in charge of the gendarmerie, the national guard, the surete, the secret police, and the military command of the town of Nouakchott and of certain military regions," a well-informed observer wrote.

To tell the truth, such attempts have not been lacking, and Lt Col Khouna Ould Haidalla at the very last minute had to put off several official trips indefinitely in order not to be overthrown, in particular his departure for Lagos at the end of April and for Nice on 10 May where the Franco-African summit was being held.

Although in the end he took the risk of going to Peking (12-18 May), Iraq (19 and 20 May) and finally Kuwait (21-23 May), it was because his country's financial situation was almost desperate and he hoped to bring back aid, which had become indispensable. But he did not do this travelling without having played on rivalries among the military forces in order to neutralize those forces, without having relieved several other "suspect" officers, and without having had security measures around important persons under house arrest strengthened such as Hamdi Ould Mouknass, the former minister of foreign affairs; and Ahmed Ould Daddah, the former president's brother, former governor of the central bank and former minister of finance; and, finally, without having had three former ministers arrested: Ould Abdullaye Baro (Planning), Abdallah Ould Ismail (Fishing) and Mohamed Ould Baba (Defense), all of them accused of "schemes which might further a coup encouraged by France."

For during this period relations with Paris were worsening at a rapid rate.

At the end of April, the Mauritanian Government curtly demanded the recall of the French paratroopers it had asked to have stationed in Mauritania 6 months earlier "in order to defend the country's territorial integrity." France complied immediately, while in Nouakchott it was unofficially being accused of having tried to further a new coup.

"The truth is that France refused to comply with a surprising Mauritanian request presented on 14 April at the time of a visit by Minister of Foreign Affairs Moktar Ould Zamel to the Elysee: 'Send us back former President Moktar Ould Daddah.' Valery Giscard d'Estaing was both surprised and irritated to hear it being said that the French Government had made such a commitment. 'That is false. France is not an extension of the Mauritanian prison system,' the Elysee and France's embassy in Mauritania replied at the same time."

What had happened in reality? Although the first president of the Mauritanian Republic had in fact been set free at the beginning of October 1979, it was only following a veritable flurry of urgent steps taken in the utmost secrecy (so as

not to needlessly offend people which might have caused a refusal), either directly with the Mauritanian authorities or indirectly with the president of the French Republic who was being asked to use his influence with then Prime Minister Rhouma Ould Haidalla with a view to obtaining the release. The respect, esteem and prestige surrounding the father of the country of Mauritania is so extensive that some 20 chiefs of state--not counting a very great number of other important Arab and African figures--had intervened in this way with one side or the other.

Finally, Giscard d'Estaing found a favorable opportunity along these lines when Lt Col Ould Haidalla came to visit him in Paris accompanied by his minister of foreign affairs, Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, who was to be arrested by Haidalla a few weeks later. Since the head of the Nouakchott government was asking for French troops for protection on his northern border, the French president agreed on the condition that Prof Moktar Ould Daddah be brought to France in his own Mystere 20. Out of the entire Military Committee for National Salvation [CMSN], only Lt Col Ahmedou Ould Abdallah had been told about this "transaction," which Ould Haidalla justified by claiming that it was only a temporary release when his government and the CMSN asked for some explanation. To give substance to his argument, and to save face, he sent Ould Zamel to Paris to demand Ould Daddah's "return," something which had never been envisaged by Giscard d'Estaing, much less by Moktar Ould Daddah, whom nobody had asked for the slightest commitment that he would return some time to Nouakchott to give himself up.

The political atmosphere became increasingly oppressive and in this worsening situation the unrest caused by the Haratines took place. They are freed black slaves assimilated by the Moors, whose language they speak and land they farm. But they are rebelling and calling for justice. That demand is not going to be satisfied very soon² in spite of the official abolition of slavery, which resolves absolutely nothing.

The financial situation is disastrous, and if the government is calling for a struggle against fraud and corruption that is because they are prevalent everywhere. This includes government enterprises, starting with the National Pharmaceutical Office [PHARMARIM], which deprives the population of the medicines it needs. This was acknowledged a few weeks ago by Zein Ould Malloum, managing director of PHARMARIM, being interviewed by AL-CHAAB, the daily newspaper, who also said that "prices of scarce pharmaceutical products still available on the market have just been marked up 30 percent."

He added: "We have received reports on several occasions of the existence of gangs trafficking in our medicines in other neighboring countries where these products are sold at very high prices compared with ours. In any case, despite our repeated investigations, we have never laid hands on these traffickers [sic]."

This factor is only a sample of the chaos prevailing in Mauritania, a country which continues to struggle with incredibly complicated problems and is literally on the edge of economic collapse, not to mention the political breakup which threatens it more and more.

It appears that the most difficult thing is to stabilize the country's neutrality. However, for 2 years Mauritania has been learning, to its cost..., that each of

its neighbors and friends, either near or far, would like to turn that neutrality to its own advantage. This led to three successive chiefs of state and two prime ministers as well as bringing about seven more or less extensive reshufflings. So there has also been a succession of five ministers of the interior, five ministers of information, four chiefs of staff, and even six people in charge of running the staff of the Military Committee for National Salvation (CMSN), which was formerly called the Military Committee for National Recovery (CMRN).

A good friend of mine who loves Mauritania, where he has stayed for many years, but who is thinking about leaving for good because of the "air of catastrophe" which holds sway there, has written me these disillusioned lines:

"In the financial area there is total bankruptcy. There is more than a billion dollars of external debt and a budget deficit which greatly exceeds 150 million dollars. That is the truth; you must not for a moment believe the happily reassuring announcements improvised by a chief of state who knows absolutely nothing about economic problems, is trying to impress the people he deals with and the whole nation at the same time, or else is deluding himself. Who would dare tell him--this military man who already thinks he is one of Africa's oracles--that he is in the process of leading his country to the brink and that his colleagues (who are very full of themselves but are pitifully incapable) and he himself are engaged in breaking up the country built with such love and wisdom by 'Old Moktar' whom the people talk of with sighs of deep nostalgia.

"Economically there is almost total stagnation. The bulk of the most interesting projects are halted, businessmen have a gun at their heads, the rise in the cost of living is reaching dizzying proportions, foreign investors are turning their backs on us, corruption continues to be evident at every level, and anxiety about the future is spreading among government workers who are never paid on time, who are in any case underpaid, and whose number is excessive, according to what is constantly being declared, although that number has increased further since 10 July 1978.

"Politically, hatred has been building up in the North toward the South and the South toward the North. The government claims to be carrying out a policy with authority, when that policy is mostly made up of harassment and humiliation of everyone showing the slightest sign of not agreeing with it. It is a far cry from the free system of government about which so much has been proclaimed. In particular there is the realization that it was /before/ that such a system existed. And our braggarts whose pictures are being published every morning on the front page of AL-CHAAB--undoubtedly they imagine that they are working just because they talk a lot and they have constant meetings--give the impression that they are pussyfooting around and not going anywhere. Poor Mauritania, where order and stability once held sway. Now you are afraid when you think about the future."

When you read this letter--from which I am deliberately omitting certain words and accusations which the current leaders could consider offensive--you see that it only corroborates information along the same lines which reaches us from all sides.

Lt Col Khouna Ould Haidalla appears to be a man alone from here on out. But did he not deliberately create the void around him? He is now the only one among the officers who carried out the 10 July 1978 putsch still in the saddle. He has removed innumerable colonels, captains, lieutenants, ministers, cadres and high-level officials, accusing them of being pro-something (French, Senegalese, Saudi, Ba'athist, Chinese, Soviet) and at the same time he has dismissed all his old companions, ending up by dismissing the man who had helped him to eliminate them, Lt Col Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, former chief of staff. As a Tunisian colleague writes, these eliminations on the quiet (the last one to date is the military commander of the city of Nouakchott) have ended up keeping the great majority of "pro-Mauritanians" uneasy and silent.

But aside from those who have been dismissed, there are those who are leaving because they are disgusted with the chaos and are fed up with a present without hope and no future. From among this group we must point out the revealing flight of the highest ranking religious figure of Nouakchott, the great Imam Mohammedou Ould Bousseiri, who took advantage of a pilgrimage to Mecca to sensationally announce that he refused to return to his country.

Another defector of note is Mauritania's ambassador in Kuwait, Mohamed Abderrahman Ould Amine, joining in Paris the former "number two" of the rebels' regime, Col Ahmed Salem Ould Sidi, son of the famous emir of Trarza and one of the highest ranking members of the Mauritanian Army. He escaped by secretly crossing the Senegal River and revealed the "staggering conditions" in which he was driven in the name of Mauritania to sign the agreement on 5 August 1979 with the POLISARIO. He despondently explained: "I did not have the slightest room to maneuver and in particular I was not authorized to demand that the POLISARIO free our prisoners, who numbered in the hundreds." Decidedly an agreement which strongly resembled a capitulation.

He went on to add: "Mauritania has become an object which is sold to the highest bidder and is taken back before the auction is over to try to exchange it for others. It has become something to be wagered. It is fought over in embassies and chanceries. But the 'buyers' are no longer understanding. They have become hesitant because of the 'devaluation of the merchandise' which is being offered to them."

Ould Haidalla, who signed that appalling peace treaty giving up any claim to territory but not managing to get the Mauritanian prisoners of war freed⁴, undoubtedly imagined that he had in that way averted any danger to his country. For in theory he was allowing the so-called Saharan Democratic Arab Republic to set itself up in a territory suitable for the genuine establishment of a homeland, which up to then was a fantasy. What he imagined is obviously an illusion, for by assuming that the SDAR could manage the impossibility of conquering a territory in which the Moroccans are firmly entrenched, its first concern would be to try and add on the whole northern and central part of Mauritania, which is populated by Beidane 'Reguibat, just as is the former Rio de Oro.

This destabilization would of course be carried out under the aegis of Colonel al-Qadhdhafi, whose imperialist dreams were accurately denounced by President

Leopold Sedar Senghor at the time of the latest OAU summit conference in Freetown, and whose influence in Nouakchott as well as on the borders of the Mauritanian desert is becoming more and more disquieting. Then the South would secede, and Dakar would not be unconcerned about its fate.

Ould Haidalla's very questionable "independence policy" still runs a definite risk of jeopardizing the unity of the country which President Moktar Ould Daddah put together with such difficulty, a unity which is both bi-ethnic and bi-racial.

The present Mauritanian chief of state is threatened from inside the country as well as from without. Internal opposition, which is severely repressed, is becoming increasingly active. Constantly growing segments of the population are giving their support to the Alliance for a Democratic Mauritania (AMD), which was actually founded more than a year ago in Mauritania itself but was introduced to the press last June in Paris by former Ambassador Mohamed Ould Jiddou.

What the AMD wants is well-known: a civilian and democratic government to be re-established, the military to return to the barracks, and the traditional role of Mauritania to be honored, the role of Mauritania as a transitional area between North Africa and the southern Sahara, between the Arab and black African civilizations.

Attilio Gaudio writes that the picture of the current situation painted by the AMD's leadership committee cannot help but "lead our thoughts back with deep nostalgia to the years when the country was governed by the former chief of state. In spite of some of his misjudgments, the country experienced a unity with freedom and a peace with honor unusual for an African country.... [Now there are] brutal changes, a climate of defiance, disorganization in the central administration's institutions, a central administration ravaged by nepotism.... The AMD's accusations result in particular from the permanent instability, the general anarchy, the corruption, unprecedented economic collapse, and continual repression which have characterized these last 2 years of fragmented military power."

One of the AMD's spokesmen, Mustapha Ould Abderrahman, even goes further when he asserts that the country is now "in the hands of a pro-Soviet dictator."

"His reasoning is simple," a French journalist explains. "Haidalla is a Saharan (because he comes from Western Sahara). He is completely pro-POLISARIO Front, which is itself at the moment controlled by pro-Libyans, and Libya is dominated by the Soviet Union."³ This reasoning is perhaps a little simplistic, but it is clear--and a number of observers have already stressed--that the troubling links between Nouakchott and Tripoli involve great dangers for the future, for the existence of Mauritania, but also for the entire region.

Of what is the AMD composed? It is a movement which brings together men and women of all ages, traditionalists and modernists, from the left and the right, cadres who are civilian and military, workers and students. Among other well-known figures it includes the famous Colonel Ould Abdelkader, former air force commander-in-chief, Haba Ould Mohamed Fall, owner of hotels and import-export companies, and Moussa Fadiga, secretary general of the Federal Front of the Mauritanian South, where the ethnic blacks live.

If LIBERATION is to be believed, the AMD's "main component is still the 'Kadihine' (proletarians) or rather those among them who supported Ould Daddah until his fall. The Kadihine have Maoist origins, are deeply nationalist, and have a clandestine organization at their disposal which has a presence in all strata of Mauritanian society. They had deeply infiltrated the power structure with the aim of safeguarding the country's independence while supporting its alinement on Moktar Ould Daddah's pro-Moroccan stands."

How is Mauritania to redeem itself in the eyes of world public opinion, which is increasingly suspicious about a country which seems to be within a hair's breadth of political decomposition?

President Ould Haidalla thought he had a brilliant idea. He called Paul Balta to the rescue.

This is the LE MONDE journalist whom a Moroccan delegate at the United Nations announced one day in 1978, from the speakers platform at the General Assembly, was "in Algeria's pay." He is in any case an unquestioning supporter of the POLISARIO. For Balta, a tireless herald of Colonel Boumedienne and a fierce defender of anything being concocted in Algiers or Tripoli, no arrow aimed at President Ould Daddah's Mauritania was too sharp after the memorable Bechar interview had taken place in which the founder of the country of Mauritania was literally insulted by the Algerian chief of state. Balta's belligerent vengefulness miraculously stopped after the "peace agreement" of 5 August 1979.

It is true that for some time Balta changed his setting, moving over to support the cause of the good Ayatollah Khomeyni and to spit on the shah who had already had kidney failure at the time, Balta writing in his affected style abounding with categorical assertions and generally accompanied by very little evidence.

And now, as soon as he appears in Nouakchott, the situation of the country, however much of a shambles it actually is, thanks to the magic of his pen becomes radiant, clear, ordered, almost exemplary. Readers of LE MONDE must not have believed their own eyes. However, God only knows what Paul Balta was able to cook up to create such tall stories of his own invention for them: "The policy of recovery and austerity is beginning to bear fruit"; "The CMSN's courage in facing political problems"; "Slavery abolished in Mauritania"; "the two dismissed former presidents attended the military parade at the side of the chief of state" (And so what? What does that prove? The worthy Balta forgot to mention that they had been a wee bit compelled to be there)--and all this was crowned by a magnificent supplement of several pages in his newspaper (everything has its just reward), which must have cost the Mauritanian treasury half of a ministry's budget.

And, of course, there was the grand finale--everything comes to him who waits--in the form of a magnificent interview with Lieutenant Colonel Ould Haidalla. In that interview the president gave advice to Morocco which he had just come up with. He piled up cliches. He claimed that he controls Mauritania's territory "which does not exclude that some of its (editor's note: the POLISARIO's militants can come to see their relatives."⁶ He asserted without joking that "foreign investors, in particular French ones, will be coming in soon." He declared that while Ould Saleck and Ould Louly were "busted" one after the other, that was

because they were "spinning their wheels"--without getting more specific--and that it might happen that he too might end up "spinning his wheels." He bragged about the new regime's achievements, forgetting to mention that /all/ of them had been conceived of, worked out, and started up by the previous government. Finally he announced that he had made "discoveries of wild extravagance" and that the "legacy of the previous regime" had been "particularly difficult." He said all this without giving the slightest piece of evidence in any area.

Meanwhile, Paul Balta was engaged in a maneuver very much like a little con job. He announced, in a headline covering three columns, dated Friday, 20 June, that "Mauritania Is Favorable to the OAU Recognizing the Saharan Republic." But however you read the article you will find /nothing/ to support that sensational headline. This is the way history is written and a gullible public is influenced.

I do not know if the brilliant literary services of our Parisian colleague did much for the cause of the Nouakchott colonels, but it does not seem that their situation has enormously improved since that time. Except on paper.

And what about President Moktar Ould Daddah in all this? He has recovered his precarious health and is finally finding time after 25 years of fanatical work to experience normal family life. No one could ever say enough about his innate honesty (he left his country without a penny and had not taken any "precautions" for bad times), his wonderful objectivity, and his deep love for his homeland, which he pieced together again. Nothing has been able to break down his Olympian calm, his clarity, his sharp sense of international politics and of his country's needs. His modesty remains the same and so does his piety. Since he was exiled, his personality shines forth and seems to be asserting itself more, if that is possible.

Could his country one day have need of him again? If you mention this possibility in front of him he smiles and does not answer or else he answers by asking another question himself: "Why could others not continue what I tried to start? May God come to their aid."

But perhaps sometimes, secretly, deep down, he thinks about those prophetic words of the great Lebanese poet, Khalil Gibran: "However strong injustice may be and whatever the apparent security in which it makes merry, the hour of justice will finally, inexorably sound on the clock of universal destiny."

But until that time, under the repeated battering of which Mauritania is the pitiable victim, may that country not lose its soul.

FOOTNOTES

1. Mauritania's former chief of mission at the United Nations, dismissed by President Moktar Ould Daddah for, it is said, having mixed up government money with his own personal financial assets a little too much. He was arrested, then freed and made it to Algiers, where he plays a rather shady role between Algeria, Libya and the various POLISARIO factions. In the end everyone, starting with his former countrymen, has lost confidence in him.

2. The 1960 constitution, abolished by the military in 1968, was already proclaiming total equality among all citizens. As of 1970 the case of the Haratine slaves no longer comes under traditional courts but under a modern system of justice. On several occasions President Ould Daddah had vigorously denounced the exploitation of man by man. Slavery, which had practically disappeared, only picked up again after 10 July 1978.
3. JEUNE AFRIQUE, issue 1021, 30 July 1980. Abdelaziz Dahmani: "From Ould Daddah to Haidalla."
4. Everything leads one to believe that in spite of its earlier promises the POLISARIO does not dare set the Mauritanian prisoners free because that would reveal that while the POLISARIO was still holding Moorish soldiers captive, hundreds of black Africans had been massacred. Let us listen to what President Senghor has to say: "I really think that the information is reliable. The black prisoners are not being handed over because nearly all the black prisoners, if not all of them, have been massacred because they were black. The POLISARIO is morally racist."
5. Elie Comarin, LIBERATION, Paris, 12 July 1980. Finally, during August, the POLISARIO decided to free 45 prisoners. But how many hundreds of others have disappeared forever?
6. However, everyone knows that the POLISARIO wanders at will over the whole northern part of Mauritanian territory and that it was from there that they recently attacked the Moroccan troops at Guelta-Zemmour.

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CSO: 4400

DEVELOPMENTS IN GULF JOURNALISM DISCUSSED

Doha AL-RAYAH in Arabic 18 Jan 81 p 3

[Article: "Gulf Journalism; Interview With Sheykh Hashar al-Maktum; Between Local and National Requirements For Defense of Our Causes"]

[Text] At this time during the past year two new newspapers were ready for publication in the United Arab Emirates--AL-BAYYAN in Dubai and AL-KHALIJ in Sharja--raising the number of newspapers in existence in the Emirates from three to five newspapers.

With the increase in the number of gulf newspapers many questions come to mind: Does the area actually have room for this many newspapers? What is the role of gulf journalism in assuming basic domestic and national tasks in this sensitive area? What is the role of gulf journalism in advancing the positions of Arab news information in general?

These are two of the many questions which vary in form only to flow in the same direction. When the two new newspapers were issued in the Emirates, comments were made that this number of newspapers was more than necessary.

In this context we can follow the experiment, and conduct an interview with Shaykh Hashar al-Maktum, director of the news information office and editor-in-chief of the newspaper AL-BAYYAN, which is nearing the end of its first year in publication.

Towards a Leap Forward in News Information Accompanying Emirates Development

Shaykah Hashar: "There was a need for the publication of the newspapers AL-BAYYAN and AL-KHALIJ. As you know, the Dubai Emirate is considered one of the more important emirates within the country and there was no daily newspaper published there. So there was a need to publish AL-BAYYAN, not just to cover current social and economic activity in that part of the Emirates, but also to take part along with the other daily newspapers in the development of news information and journalism in the gulf as a whole and in the Emirates in particular.

"Only in Kuwait was journalism and other information activities advanced, and we see today that the Emirates has seen great economic growth especially after the production of petroleum, and has participated as well politically with her sister Arab nations. It was natural that accompanying this progress in the political and economic fields would be a suitable leap forward in news information to express and reflect their contributions and dimensions."

Emirates Journalism Participates in Advancing Way of Life in the Union

Shaykh Hashar adds: "The Emirates are different than Kuwait, for instance, the Emirates occupy a larger area reaching about 1,000 kilometers spanning long and vast coastlines. This was one of the reasons for the increase in the number of newspapers. Additionally we see that Kuwait has had the same number of newspapers for a long time in spite of the fact that it has a smaller area than the Emirates. We see here that the current progress calls for the existence of this number of daily newspapers quickly.

"Additionally, the Emirates is a country made up of several emirates with its newspapers participating today in voicing opinion on how to develop the Emirates to be a good example and an advanced country for the Arab in every location to be proud of."

Particulars and Responsibilities of Gulf Journalism

When our discussion turned to the more prominent responsibilities of gulf journalism in regards to the area's political, economic, and social conditions, Shaykh Hashar said: "The responsibilities that emerge in front of gulf news information in the present stage are responsibilities peculiar to some parts of the gulf collectively. Thirty years ago the gulf was not exporting petroleum and its countries income was very weak, with its people at that time depending on fishing, pearls, and tending of livestock for their living. Today God has blessed this land with natural wealth accompanied by material benefits for the area's inhabitants, as well as new advances in all cultural fields. One of the most prominent responsibilities of news information in this stage is bringing to light the problems of the community which vary with time and changing conditions, and informing the reader, listener, or observer, of these problems. Then, the awareness and criticism of these problems without defamation of those involved so that the criticism is constructive and commendable. We also have to acquaint the people of the region with political problems and what is happening around us in the world's nations so that they will be informed about them and their shortcomings, and to benefit more from the experience of others and prevent the occurrence of mistakes."

Arab News Information and Addressing the Outside World

In answer to a question about his view concerning the positions of Arabs news information Shaykh Hashar answered: "I think that Arab news information is successful to the extent of dealing with Arabs individually and collectively, but that it is still lacking, unfortunately, in dealing with the outside world in a successful way. I think that Arab governments will not be remiss in supporting any new projects in this field. It is my belief that quality is better than

quantity at times in news information and that it is the responsibility of the Arab countries themselves to participate with the league to bring forward suggestions in this field. I do not wish to ill-treat officers of the league and I can see that any Arab Ministry of Information has capabilities and funds which far exceed those designated for the opinions of Arab news information in the community."

Western Mentality and Treatment of Our Causes

Shaykh Hashar finished his discussion saying: "One of the reasons for the success of Zionist news information in the West, especially in the United States is their ownership and shareholding at times in the information media there. Briefly, the Arabs, if they want to arrive at an awareness of the people of the West, must acquire or have a share in Western information media and to have those in charge of or responsible for liaison with these media be well-experienced in the Western mentality and how to deal with our causes. As the number of specialists in Western affairs grows in the Arab world, the abilities to bring about this good deed will increase. There is no doubt that this would not require a large amount of funds measured against Arab potentials."

Shaykh Hashar pointed out after this that he attended the Arab information ministerial conference in 1979, during which the state of the offices of the League of Arab Nations in the Western nations was discussed. Unfortunately, the problems which the offices suffered from at that time remain today.

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CSO: 4802

SAUDI ARABIA

BRIEFS

SWEDISH MINISTER REFUSES ARMS--Jeddah, 20 Jan--Sweden is not and will not be selling any arms to Saudi Arabia said Foreign Minister Ola Ullsten before boarding his plane Tuesday and flying back to Stockholm on the "Royal Plane" at the conclusion of the Swedish state visit. Reports that Sweden has sold weapons to Saudi Arabia appeared in Saudi mass media on Tuesday in reports of Ullsten's talk with crown prince Fahd and Swedish press interviews with the crown prince. They must be based on misunderstandings, said the foreign minister. It is true that crown prince Fahd, who is the "strong man" in the Saudi regime, asked Sweden to deliver weapons to Saudi Arabia. But this request was turned down by Ullsten who outlined the Swedish position on such matters. Sweden does not sell arms to countries involved in conflicts. Saudi Arabia is in a formal state of war with Israel. [Text] [Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 25 Jan 81 p 9] 6578

CSO: 3109

SADIQ AL-MAHDI GIVES VIEWS ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES

Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 4 Feb 81 p 5

[Interview with al-Sadiq al-Mahdi by Ahmad Shaker: "There Are Gaps in Contemporary Thought; I Hope the Al al-Bayt Institute Will Fill Them. Most Intellectuals Are Ignorant About Islam; This Makes Our Area a Breeding Ground For Foreign Intellectual Attack"]

[Text] Sadiq al-Mahid, well-known Sudanese politician and intellectual, participated in the meetings of the committee of the Royal Academy for Islamic Civilization Studies (Al al-Bayt Institute), which ended in Amman day before yesterday, for the purpose of expressing his views regarding the academy's work.

AL-DUSTUR met with Mr al-Mahdi; he commented on several contemporary Arab and Islamic issues.

Founding the Academy

[Question] By way of a reply to a question about the concept of forming the Royal Academy for Islamic Civilization Studies, he said:

[Answer] I want to say, first, that we have always complained that no room could be found in our Islamic countries to study these basic issues. We are forced to meet in Western capitals to study these matters. Therefore, we consider it a very large step, as a Jordanian initiative, that room is being made available for free, objective research into issues that touch the core of problems existing now in our Islamic world, from the political, social and economic aspects.

This is an excellent step, and its occurrence is laudable. Secondly, there are gaps in our contemporary Islamic thought. As examples, preparation of authoritative encyclopedia of the Hadith, jurisprudence, and the entire Islamic civilization, the assembling and preservation of documents pertaining to our civilization, as well as ancient manuscripts, and the creation of an objective, scholarly forum, neither political, nor sectarian, nor national, in which intellectuals and scholarly specialists can meet to attempt to find solutions to contemporary problems, based on Islamic premises, and try to study Islam on a contemporary, scientific basis. These are important questions, and it is hoped that the academy will result in filling these gaps, in accordance with its disciplines.

The preparatory work, which the Jordanian team carried out, was excellent, or rather, the practical participation in thought and deed, which His Majesty the King and the Crown Prince undertook, not in a honorary capacity, but in a real sense, was another of this initiative's dimensions. In other countries, those in their positions frequently are content with a formal relationship in activities such as this.

If this academy has these characteristics, true striving for objectivity and freedom, then that undoubtedly will lead to good results for Jordan and the Islamic world, as well as incomparable zeal for Islam.

[Question] Regarding the possibility of implementing Arab unity, Professor al-Mahdi says:

[Answer] There are two ways to achieve unity, not a third. Two things must be assumed, that Arab unity is a strategic goal of the community, and that the basic elements of Arab unity can be fulfilled more than for British or French unity. The question remains, how do we stop the distortion?

There are two well-known, historical ways to achieve unity: The historical way, by which unity itself materialized in history. For example, we can say that Germany became unified in light of Russia's endeavors, or that the Arabian Peninsula became unified under the leadership of King 'Abd al-'Aziz. The second way is by means of gradual progress and integration; we might call this gradualism.

As for the first method, it does not now have objective elements, since the current leaderships have created national interests for themselves.

Secondly, the international powers, in one form or another, would prevent it.

However, in any event, this method is not open for discussion; therefore, if it fulfilled spontaneous and objective circumstances, it would impose itself. In its absence, we have only the interim method of gradualism to build Arab unity. This requires, first, an Arab charter, wiser and more profound than the present Arab League charter, and a program of gradual, Arab integration which will weave together the present fragments into cultural, commercial, economic units.

I believe that one of the positive things of modern Arab history is that Arab unity has become a part of the people's emotional life. This is a very important achievement, which will be one of the most important factors assisting this gradualism program.

Solution of Arab Crises

[Question] What is the possibility of solving the present Arab crises?

[Answer] We are in an extremely critical stage. Personally, I believe that the crises existing now among the Arab nations--if we exclude those disputes arising because of the Gulf war--are all crises capable of being resolved. Naturally, this does not take into account the crisis with Egypt, by virtue of the fact that Sadat's policy has removed him from the tribe.

However, aside from that crisis, they exist between Jordan and Iraq, on the one hand, and Syria on the other, between Algeria and Morocco, and around Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Libya. In my view, all these crises and problems are susceptible to rational and easy solution, if they are dealt with earnestly and with perseverance, striving for correct priorities, because our present circumstances require specific priorities. The first priority is the struggle with Israel, the second is to keep the major powers out of the area, the third is to achieve development of our resources, and the fourth is to apply a program of integration toward Arab unity. All of this is in light of a new discovery of ourselves, which connects our present with a true and contemporary relationship with Islam.

New American Administration

[Question] What about the new American administration and the possibility of reaching solutions to the Palestinian case?

[Answer] The new American president is very ignorant about our area. His policy toward the area are reactions to unholy feelings, which Presidents Carter and Sadat exchanged. There is some confirmation that his actual policy for America will be worked out by advisors and specialists.

However, so far the prevailing characteristic of the advisors is closer to sympathy for Israel than toward justice and evenhandedness. But we can say that it is well-known from American history that the Republicans, as a party, are always more independent than the Zionist lobby, the Democrats, since the majority of Jews voted for Carter, despite the fact that Reagan said more to Israel's benefit, during the election campaign, than Carter did.

I believe that the Republicans are more independent than the Zionist lobby, if they are pushed toward this independence, but they will only get this push from the steadfastness of the Arab position.

We have heard that Reagan is considering putting "Camp David" aside, and is thinking about another Camp David, which they call the Jordanian option. King Husayn reacted to this option, unequivocally and suitably. If the Arab position remains steadfast, it can influence the new American administration's position.

The Israeli Labor Party

[Question] Concerning the Labor Party's return to power in Israel:

[Answer] If the Labor party is elected to power in Israel, that will have no connection with the Likud's political dispute with the Arabs. The reasons are, first, the breakup of the Likud, and second, the massive economic deterioration in Israel, which has caused it to suffer from an inflation rate estimated at 300 per cent a year. This is a record.

In my view, these are the reasons that will result in the Labor party's victory. In my opinion, the two parties are not in disagreement over the Arab issues, but the Labor party is more influenced by political factors than the Likud, whose

leader can be considered immersed in historical talismen. He drove them, and they drove him.

If there is American pressure, the Labor party will be more influenced by it than the Likud.

[Question] What is your view regarding self-determination in the occupied areas?

[Answer] The phrase self-determination is, in my opinion, the same as a fig leaf, by which the deficiency of the bilateral pact between Egypt and Israel has been concealed. Israeli actions have confirmed the truth of that, because the Arab inhabitants, in this rule, have no land, no water, and no Israeli forces will be removed from there. In any case, it is a question that the inhabitants of the occupied territory must decide, through their opposition to and overthrow of self-determination.

Results of the Islamic Conference

[Question] What do you think of the results of the recent Islamic conference?

[Answer] In order that the conference be outstanding, there are three measurements: that the wounds which drain the area be healed, or that a new page be opened in relations among the Islamic nations, and that its resolutions be a summit of accomplishment.

However, at a lower level, it has led to handshakes between adversaries, and the exchange of good intentions, to promises of economic assistance. This is a good question in its scope; therefore, I can say that it was a kind of oasis in the absence of water.

Contemporary Islamic Issues

[Question] With regard to contemporary Islamic issues and the search for ways to deal with the spirit of the age, what are your views?

[Answer] Moslems suffer from the problem that the majority of secular intellectuals are ignorant of Islam, and most Moslem scholars are ignorant of contemporary issues. We suffer from an absence of independent judgement (al-Ijtihad) and a striving for rigidity, which causes our countries to be open to foreign intellectual attack. Therefore, the correct solution to get out of this situation is to overthrow the rigidity and tradition, and to resolve the balance between heritage and the contemporary period, so that we will be bound to our Islamic and our modern age.

I believe that there are efforts currently being made in this area. I believe that banks can be established on an Islamic basis, eliminating usurious practises, which can carry out modern banking transactions. This is possible. I should mention that that should be done gradually, and that they should deal with international banks on a similar basis.

NO RECONCILIATION UNTIL REGIME REMOVED FROM POWER

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 26 Oct 80 pp 4-5

[Interview with Sudanese Opposition Leader al-Sharif Husayn al-Hindi]

[Text] The Sudanese opposition leader, al-Sharif Husayn al-Hindi, made certain statements on the political and military situation in Sudan. He emphasized that in countries that have lost their economic values, as is the case in Sudan, the economic situation itself declines until it becomes a way of life which the common people realize, as it becomes the subject of discussion in every home, and the suffering from daily life becomes the reality of the economic situation.

Al-Sharif Husayn al-Hindi said: "We hear these days about the scarcity of circulating cash among people and about the crises of shortages in energy, fuel, sugar and the rest of consumer goods products. This shows that there is no economy, because the economy is run by government and the fact is that, in Sudan, there is authority but no government. Authority, in the real sense, subdues people, while government manages their affairs. When there is no government to manage people's affairs, they begin to manage as much as they can their daily, living, economic, medical, educational and other affairs. Since it is not possible for individual citizens to manage their own affairs, and as long as there is no public or civil service nor an administration, there can be no economy. This chaos which is happening now and is suffered by every family is the reality of the economic situation. In fact, there is no dividing line between the economic and political situations because economics is the basis and center of politics. As a result, the political situation is greatly influenced by the economic situation. As long as the economic situation has deteriorated to this level, the political situation must also have deteriorated. For a long time, our motto has been to oust the regime. But, in fact, there is currently no government to oust. There is only economic, political, actual and legal failure. All that people fear is the results of this failure and its effects. People are afraid that this failure will develop into civil strife, then into civil war, and finally, to overall chaos.

There are problems that are clashing the people's minds. It is not a matter of the regime, since this regime is now faltering. That much is clear to all and does not require political analysis to prove to the people this reality which they all live and know. What the people are thinking about is what will happen next; how this country can be saved and how they can avoid all the abovementioned perils. The

facts of the economic situation in Sudan are revealed in every problem every individual citizen faces. The government is hiding, and its newspapers are overflowing with all kinds of news of problems which the people are suffering. Anyone who reads these newspapers would think that they were opposed to the regime and were not its own papers. All I am saying is: The Sudanese opposition, and most of all the Unionist Democratic Party which has been the nation's conscience in the strong bloody struggle against this system for 11 years, and which was its conscience in continuing battles against imperialism and military rule, has an appointment with history and national salvation. All its members and leaders must be totally awake and responsible in order to first shoulder their responsibilities by cutting off the weak thread tying them to this regime. They must also be totally prepared to undertake the historic responsibility of protecting the independence and unity of their country."

Asked about the crises which the Sudanese people are living, al-Sharif al-Hindi replied: "Restrictions have even become its motto. You must have heard Gaafar Numayri in his last interview which he called an "embrace" of the happy people. It is no more than a snake embracing its victim and giving it several bites. Seasonal, monthly and annual constrictions, one after another, have become such a distinctive feature of this regime that no other country in the world has them in such a continuous manner. Most of these constructions are blamed on nature, such as what is currently happening in the turbines of the al-Rusayris reservoir and the small amount of electricity it generates. It is known that al-Rusayris turbines have netting that should be replaced every season to protect the reservoir from the accumulation of trees and other materials in its basin. These trees, transported by the Nile's strong currents during this season, are covering these turbines. What is said to be a natural cause is actually gross negligence, because the netting of these turbines wore out 3 years ago. Sudanese and Egyptian engineers who manage this reservoir have brought this matter to the attention [of the authorities] several times, but the netting was not replaced and has become torn out letting through whole trees that get trapped in the reservoir's turbines. What the Minister of Energy & Mining calls a spare parts shortage is, in fact, these nettings. These nettings cannot be renewed overnight. This constriction occurs in water as well as electricity, in goods, fuel and all supplies. This only illustrates what I told you previously, that there is no government, no administration, nothing being accomplished, no civil service and, above all, no economy whatsoever. All that this regime cares about is to rule. Its duty is not to manage the country's affairs, but to rule by force. As long as it is in power, this regime continues to use force. It does not care whether there is water, electricity, services, goods, or constrictions. In fact, if we begin to count all the existing constrictions, we will be unable to keep track of all of them. We could say that our people are oppressed now, and have continuous and repeated constructions every day, so that when they get out of one they fall into another.

This constriction is, in fact, the regime's fault because it is an ignorant and weak regime, drowned in other problems that do not concern the citizens. The only basic or major solution to these constrictions is the uprooting of this regime. The people could then choose a regime that cares about and solves their problems and removes these constrictions. This is the only solution to this tragedy which the Sudanese people live and which is called a regime and its newspapers call constrictions."

Asked about his rumored contacts with the Sudanese government, he clarified this saying: "This is not true at all. Rumors, what newspapers write and what people talk about and what we discuss in our party meetings are different things. Such rumors will not stop now or in the future. The important thing is that we have no desire whatsoever to be reconciled with the present regime in Sudan. Even if we fail to oust this regime, we still will not have let the historic honor of opposing it pass us by. We are satisfied with our stand. Some day, history will record that we did not extend our hand to be reconciled with this regime and that would be our stand. This stand is enough to emphasize the nationalism and honor of the Unionist Democratic Party at this stage. It says that I did not accept reconciliation with this government nor participation in it. If I fail to oust it, God [alone] has the power to do so.

We will not be reconciled with this government. We will only be reconciled with it if it gives up power; if it gets rid of all its existing organizations and constitution; if it keeps from exhausting the Sudanese people. We then will be satisfied with that. If it does not do that, we will use all the means available to us [to oust it]. Time does not matter, because a people's struggle is not measured by hours, days, unrest, weariness and disturbance. We do not know when we will win: This year? Next year? In 10 or 15 years? or whether our children or grandchildren will achieve that. It does not matter when, as long as we keep on fighting and trying to oust this regime. Even if we do not have the honor of ousting it, we will not have missed the honor of taking the patriotic stand national situation, which is to oppose this regime and be committed to opposing it.

I did not meet with Nimeiri in London or anywhere else, and I do not have the slightest interest in meeting Nimeiri or his delegates or friends.

All that is going on is whispers. This is a result of the long opposition, which affected the people's minds, hearts and nerves and resulted in a long discussion of rumors, hearts and nerves and resulted in a long discussion of rumors. Every time a person disappears for one reason or another, it is said that he is meeting with Nimeiri or 'Umar Tayyib or other such personalities. This did not take place and there is no reason for it to take place. Nimeiri likes power and will not be reconciled on the basis of a principle. He may be reconciled on the basis of power and we will not accept such reconciliation. We are interested in the principles and basis of the regime. Therefore, there is no chance for reconciliation with Nimeiri. All the rumors that have been circulating for some time and are still circulating now, and will certainly circulate in the future, have not truth to them whatsoever."

Al-Sharif al-Hindi then talked about the London agreement saying: "The London agreement has become old with time; using it now is like using a word of truth that is intended for deception.

The London agreement took place under certain circumstances and it cannot be useful for every time and place, because it is not the Koran, Torah, Bible or the Book of Psalms. It is only an agreement which Numayri did not honor. We were sure that he was not going to honor this agreement, but we showed the world and our Arab and African brothers our good intentions of not wanting to fight. We only set down democratic principles; we were sure that Numayri's downfall would be in allowing

democratic principles and abolishing emergency laws. He, like any other man who is covetous of power, realized this and did not carry out the agreement. And we abandoned the agreement. More incidents occurred after the agreement that forced us to abandon the agreement. Incidents also occurred in the Arab region, such as the Camp David agreement, and other incidents occurred inside Sudan, such as this suffering the Sudanese people live through. All these incidents proved to everyone that there can be no reconciliation with this regime. Thus, there is not the slightest talk or thought about the London agreement."

Al-Sharif Husayn al-Hindi explained that the alliance between the Unionist Democratic Party and the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party in Sudan is basic and fundamental. He said: "We, in Sudan, use the system of fronts in all our great national battles. This was the case during imperialism, the first military regime and Numayri's second regime. The front system is that of alliance; only the expression is different. The front is an alliance and an alliance between two parties is a joint coalition. The alliance between us and the Ba'th Party is, as I said, a basic alliance. There was a lot of talk about this alliance and we must see why, in the first place, this alliance took place so that we can see what brings us and the Ba'th Party together, and what makes us different from one another. We cannot be a carbon copy of the Ba'th Party and nor can they be a carbon copy of us. We are two parties with a lot of similarities in thinking and politics. The Ba'th Party opposes the existing regime in Sudan. Part of our alliance agreement is our agreement to oust the existing puppet regime. The first step in the central alliance is giving attention to the [ousting of the] regime. We and the Arab Ba'th Party in Sudan first agree on the necessity of ousting the existing regime in Sudan. This was the cornerstone and basis for our coalition with the Ba'th Party. The Ba'th Party also believes in Arab nationalism, as is clearly revealed by their literature and books. We, too, are committed nationally and as Arabs. We believe that this Arab nation is one and that Arab people are one. The third thing that we and the Ba'th Party agree on is the Palestine problem, based on the resolutions of the Summit Conference in Khartoum: No treaty, no negotiations, no recognition, no involvement in the Palestine problem. On this basis, our alliance with the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party in Sudan is a national alliance and is also related to the central [Palestine] problem. We believe in socialism as they do, so we agree. Therefore, our alliance with them is strategic. During the first phase, it is based on ousting the existing regime in Sudan, which we both agree on. During the second phase, we stand together in support of the Arab cause. During the third phase, we cooperate, after ousting this regime, to bring democracy and unity back to Sudan and to build Sudan. These are the bases of the agreement."

9455

CSO: 4802

DEVELOPMENT OFFICIAL DISCUSSES ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF SOUTH

Khartoum AL-SAHAFAH in Arabic 19 Jan 81 p 3

[Interview with Lawrence Lawal, Secretary of the Office of Development and Services, by 'Abd al-Rahman Ibrahim: "Balance Still Difficult Between Income and Expenditure in the Region"]

[Text] The speaker this time is that calm young man, brown-skinned, dignified. Despite his young age, Mr Lawrence Lawal is secretary of the Office of Development and Services, in the Secretariat of Southern Affairs, under the Sudanese Socialist Union. This is the latest position to which he has been appointed, since he graduated from the university directly to the political arena, moving among the various ministries and legislative organizations. Our conversation centered around three main points:

1. Development concerns in the southern region
2. Food supply concerns and problems of daily life
3. The political movement through the organs of the Socialist Union, to meet the situation and offer solutions.

[Question] I began the conversation by asking about the big developmental concern in our southern region.

[Answer] There are three important matters, and perhaps my views are different from others. These three things are the great obstacles confronting the region's growth and expansion.

1. The southern region is losing the qualified, capable and trained cadres that make the wheels turn. The reasons are well-known.
2. Since the end of the civil war, up to this moment, the region has been trying to lay sound bases for the difficult balance between income and expenditures, to improve services, and then to provide surpluses for growth. The region's budget, since 1972, has had insufficient revenues to balance expenditure.
3. The lack of an infrastructure for the region's economy. In order that there may be growth and improvement of services, we must see to the preparation of a network of land, river, wire and wireless communications, and make available the energy required to operate. This way, it would be possible to tie growth balance

to the budget required for development. However, the absence of infrastructure represents the third important obstacle to expansion of growth services.

[Question] We asked about quick short-term solutions, and deliberate, long-term solutions for this intricate problem.

[Answer] Regarding short-term solutions, we must concentrate on improving the infrastructure, i.e., we must forget everything else, at the present time, if we want to make services available whose growth returns are high. On the other hand, we must be concerned about training and qualifying the working cadres, along with creating a sense of responsibility in every individual, in whom we can instill this good trait. This must be done through the organs of the Socialist Union, side by side with the efforts of the regional government.

For example, we are attempting to urge the local farmers to increase production. Increasing total production in the general economy is encircled by all the negative economic factors from inflation and other things, even in regard to food supply, because increasing production is the only way to bring down the prices, which are oppressing the southern region's citizenry everywhere.

1. Encourage increased production
2. Encourage the regional government to invest in the agricultural sector.
3. Qualify and train the human workforce, while proceeding toward a balance between these urgent solutions for the issue of economic development. I must raise the point of planning and setting priorities, so that benefit can be had from the little money we have, through the best investment possible, to meet the difficulties which stand in our way.

One of these priorities is to tie educational planning to the region's developmental needs. In my view, the commitment of education in accordance with graduated steps has ended, i.e., elementary, then secondary, higher, and then university. The region urgently needs trained, capable hands now. This means that in education we should head in the direction of various technical forms, such as agriculture and industry.

Educational planning must not only be purely vocational, but also tied to the environment, that is, that we create a qualified educated person, bound to the environment and climate in which he lives, which makes him psychologically prepared to improve production.

As for long-term solutions, there is the return to the educational ladder, with its various degrees, in order to create the cadres qualified in the various humanistic specialities, required for mankind's progress and development in every time and place.

This is first.

Second, despite my emphasis on the absolute importance of agriculture, with regard to Sudan in general, and the southern region in particular, I think that our economic planning is directed to meet the future, with its reliance on methods to

diversify sources of income, or what is scientifically known in economics as heterogeneous, that is agriculture tied to industry, and industry tied to the availability of raw materials or consumer needs. Our reliance on a planned, heterogeneous economy and diversified sources of income enables us to avoid collapsing under a few natural vicissitudes. If, for example, the rainy season fails in al-Fenk, we can supply financing and other consumer needs from industry and mining. For example, there is:

1. Iron in the area of Bahr al-Ghazzal
2. Gold in Kubwayta
3. Copper between Raja and Niyala
4. and finally, oil.

The most important means of our reliance on diversifying sources of income, even in agriculture, must be working to improve means of irrigation, and use of river water in agricultural projects, for continuous irrigation.

All this can be achieved, after the region is tied together by networks of roads, passable all year long, by which we can avoid the autumn's bottlenecks. Then we can work to tie the region to the rest of the country. This means that life can work to tie the region to the rest of the country. This means that life can take its course with regard to transportation, without bottlenecks, which means in its role as supplier of all food supplies, connected directly with all parts of the country.

One of the solutions, which I might bring up also, is complete concentration on the cooperative sector, and tie it to the public sector, while not just concentrating on the public sector alone. Concentration on the public sector causes lowered productivity, due to a lack of production incentive. Accordingly, we must work to provide the cooperative sector with the funds required for its growth, and to facilitate its movement, which will make it more capable of meeting all possibilities of the food supply situation.

[Question] Upon mentioning the food supply situation, we asked Mr Lurnis about the truth of the food situation in the southern region, represented in a city like Juba.

[Answer] The food situation is poor, for two reasons. The first is concentrating the food effort in two agencies, the developmental agency and the trade organization. Together we have failed to achieve the desired abundance. This is aside from the obligation of the qualified cadre, perhaps because it is not capable now, or does not know this operation.

The second reason is misfortune in distribution, which is done through individuals. The distribution process is done all wrong. It is assumed, for instance, that Juba's share of flour would be delivered to a person from Juba, but it might be turned over to someone from al-'Ubaydh or Kassala, because as I mentioned, distribution is done through individuals. Therefore, the black market has gotten out of control, and has become worse to the point that the price of a small sack of sugar has climbed to 100 pounds. This is apart from the lack of control system, which results in smuggling of a great many commodities across the borders.

[Question] Does this mean that the border trade, after its legalization, has failed to satisfy the food deficit?

[Answer] It has assisted the spread of the black market and has increased smuggling. This stems from weak controls by regional organizations of the Ministry of Trade and Supply and the Governor of East Equatoria province.

[Question] What is the secretariat's role in confronting situations like this?

[Answer] Unfortunately, Socialist Union decisions are not being implemented. Liaison is very poor between the southern affairs secretariat and the Socialist Union secretariat in the provinces. Or rather, there is conflict concerning jurisdictions, which has resulted in the Socialist Union secretariats in the provinces making direct contact with the Sudanese Socialist Union's secretariat general. Then, we here in the southern affairs secretariat do not have communications to enable us to do field work, which is the natural place for an official such as myself, in the Socialist Union.

(It is a confirmed fact that the official responsible for vehicles in the secretariat, who was Mr Lawrence, had complained that his car did not have a drop of gas.)

So that we are able to overcome this situation, which has made the secretariat general of southern affairs in the regional capital into an organization requiring more support, and if we bear in mind the president's decree number 181, pertaining to the secretariat, referring to paragraph seven which spells out the distribution of these jurisdictions, then I believe that some changes should be made in the fundamentals that tie us to the six provinces and the secretariats of the Socialist Union therein. This is because we feel, at this point, that the president's decree has not been fully implemented.

[Question] Mr Lawrence, I want to go back again to the food situation, which also has an effect on the work of the southern affairs secretariat. What are the solutions that you see, through the Socialist Union's agencies?

[Answer] First, I want to point out that control over the market is possible, and I suggest the following:

1. Give an opportunity to the private sector and the cooperatives, along with full scope for free and just competition in the market place. The public sector would also be able to enter into the competition. Consequently, the desired abundance would be achieved, and, so that prices would be suitable for the masses, raise the subsidy for each family.
2. The Ministry of Trade and Supply in the region must exercise control over distribution, through determining shares and ownership, along with strict accounting for every shortfall.
3. There must be full cooperation in the transportation and communications sector, between the river transport board, the railroad commission and SUDANAIR, in order

to transport strategic materials to the region at appointed times, so that no gap occurs between supply and demand in the market, due to transportation making the situation worse.

4. Increase the cooperatives' effectiveness, expand their present size and increase their number, and urge the councils and basic units first, to guarantee fair distribution, and second, to guarantee controls. This is the only way, by which the simple folk can receive what they need.

5. Strengthen the committee for distribution of food supplies, and support it by members of the people's organizations, since either they are not on it or they carry membership in name only.

6. Work for the coordination of border trade among the agencies concerned, so that there will be priorities for food supplies, and thereby, achieve the means of border trade as well.

7005

CSO: 4802

SALINITY DAMAGES AGRICULTURE IN KHARTOUM PROVINCE

Khartoum AL-SAHAFAH in Arabic 20 Jan 81 p 5

[Article by Dr Muhammad Hamed Sulayman: "Deteriorating Agricultural Land in Khartoum Province; Most Agricultural Projects Ceasing Production Because of Injurious Salinity"]

[Text] In my previous article in AL-SAHAFAH, I raised the issue of deficiencies in agricultural projects in Khartoum province. I made it clear that most agricultural projects were ceasing to yield and produce, because of certain injurious saline conditions on the surface of the soil.

I also mentioned previously that much of the land of Khartoum province contains differing amounts of salt in the soil. Examples are, South Khartoum (al-Kalakalah), Suba, West Omdurman, and north of North Khartoum.

Saline land means the accumulation of quantities of dissolved salts on the soil's surface, or at various depths within the ground. Salinity in the soil is the result of the nature of the soil itself. Its chemical composition does not permit rapid permeation, which leads to evaporation and increased salt, as a result of flooding, either from saline water sources or carrying that salt from saline areas, i.e., lands on which salty water is used for irrigation.

This can result from bad irrigation and inadequate drainage. The presence of salts in underground water, which rise perceptibly when dried, is due to misusing the soil when preparing it for cultivation. The saline land was left fallow, without breaking up the surface by tilling, and permitting the salts, which have been washed down to lower levels of the soil, to return to the surface.

This is not following a suitable cultivation cycle. Furthermore, overuse of water, during irrigation of agricultural land, carries salt from lower strata of soil to the areas around the roots. Salinity problems appear, many times, in the first year after the beginning of cultivation. Consequently, productivity declines. When land was abundant in the province, farmers would move from this piece of land to a new one. However, as a result of population overcrowding, we must take care of this land, develop its diversity, improve its natural and chemical properties and raise its productivity. I also mentioned that bad irrigation, inadequate drainage and [not] following a suitable agricultural cycle are some of the major reasons for salinity to form, which has been called secondary salinity.

To avoid this type of salinity, sound methods must be followed with respect to preparing the soil, the nature of the irrigation water, and following modern methods during the agricultural processes. The nature of the irrigation water is extremely important in avoiding salinity, especially underground water. Usually, project managers do not analyze that water to learn its suitability for use of man, animals and plants. Usually, the water contains a high percentage of salt which accumulates, after irrigation, on the surface of the soil. In order to avoid that, the water's properties must be ascertained before the well has begun to be used for various purposes. The authorities concerned with these analyses, including the Walkah laboratory in the Ministry of Health, and the laboratories of the office of soil maintenance, also ascertain the physical and chemical properties of the soil. Through these factors, one can study the economics of agricultural exploitation. It is considered one of the most important factors which must be studied before implementing projects dependent on irrigation, in order to achieve a return, which has a share in raising the income level. The amount of profitability, with respect to a unit of water used in irrigation, is considered one of the determining factors for the type of crop planted. First, the land is tilled to different depths, to turn up the layers and permit the soil to be exposed to the sun and wind. Tilling should be done whenever that is possible before preparing to plant.

The addition of organic fertilizers and such green fertilization follows suitable agricultural practise which, by experimenting with plants, can yield suitable productivity in specific types of soil. Since plants differ in degree of concentration of various salts they can bear, we usually advise planting fodder vegetation, during the first years of land use.

After that, the means and system of irrigation must be determined. This means that there are methods of irrigation by flooding, by a system of basins or by pipes (sewers) or a modern system, such as sprinklers and [word illegible] to water each plant without effecting the composition of the soil.

Usually, the farmer lets water flood over the whole area he wants irrigated. This is more water than the plants need, and causes many diseases. Consequently, the soil is exposed to deterioration.

Irrigation times are most important; water should be given at set times and in specific amounts. I don't want to go into the scientific ways of ascertaining these times, but the simplest way is to observe the outward signs that happen to a plant before its growth is affected. Its leaves wither, or change color and direction. This way lessens severe waste in the use of water. Usually, there is an attempt by the owner of the farm or its tenant to obtain the maximum benefit from the available water, in order to produce the best crops.

Generally speaking, it is best to irrigate at night or early to lessen the degree of evaporation.

After the irrigation process, the soil should be tilled, to break up the hard crust and cracks, which usually occur in sun-baked ground. This is to lessen the amount of evaporation and to facilitate the irrigation water's seepage, making the soil suitable for the growth of roots and facilitate their penetration of and spreading out in the soil.

After that, some salt patches might be seen on the soil's surface. Usually these patches occur in the event water has not reached the entire surface, and are seen usually on higher areas. When these patches increase, and become interconnected, that means saline areas in the project.

One should plant certain fodder crops, which can bear this degree of salinity, or flood this ground with water, wash it, in order to eliminate this salinity from the higher patches of soil. However sometimes, there is no way except to leave this ground completely alone, after the salt has accumulated on it, since it has become uneconomical for productive use.

By passing water over the earth, the salts dissolve, especially if it is on the surface. Then the water is drained off the farm through open drainage ditches. The washing process should be done without tilling the soil, so that quantities of soil are not carried off with the water, and also, so that the lower spots do not retain it. The washing water would fill them with concentrated salt, which after awhile would return to the surface. The earth must also be completely dry, so that the higher salt-covered stratum is on the surface. It is best to allow 14 days to pass after its irrigation.

It should also be noted that the washing process cannot be effective without complete drainage.

One way to wash the soil and lessen the costs is to encircle the area one wants to wash with a high percentage of soil, higher than the level of the ground. Then immerse the area with water. This is usually done in the autumn, because of the possibilities of using rain water. This process is successful in areas that are irrigated by underground wells, because the water from these wells could contain varying degrees of salt. I don't want to go into the specifics of this process and cite calculations, in accordance with which amounts of additional water are determined to dissolve specific amounts of salt. This is sufficient for the average farmer.

After awhile, this remaining water, carrying the dissolved salt, is drained off the farm using drainage canals. After the washing process, deep tillage is necessary. Chemical and organic fertilizers should be added. It is best to plant fodder crops after the washing process.

7005

CSO: 4802

AGRICULTURAL PROJECTS FOR FOOD, FISH, WHEAT

Muscat 'UMAN in Arabic 2 Feb 81 p 3

[Article: "Providing Food Stuffs and Fish at Reasonable Prices; Cultivating Wheat on 900 Hectares in Various Areas; Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries Speaks With 'UMAN"]

[Text] The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries' new five-year plan indicates that the ministry has numerous large projects for increasing agricultural and fishing wealth during the coming five years. The ministry's budget for this plan came to 110,170,000 Riyals--an increase of about 70,000,000 Riyals over the past five-year plan in which The Ministry of Petroleum and Minerals also participated.

This budget reflects the role which the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries will play in the upcoming period of growth in agriculture, providing water resources for the farmers and erecting underground reservoirs to supply these resources.

A representative of 'UMAN had this interview with His Excellency the minister of Agriculture and Fisheries, 'Abd al-Hafiz Salim Rajab, to find out from him the features of this ambitious plan.

At the beginning of the interview His Excellency the minister explained that the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries plans for the second five-year plan to include ambitious plans aimed at achieving long-range and some short-range goals. He said: "We are striving to make many special qualities for agriculture in the near future which are represented by the following:

"First: Creating a government support system with effective capabilities in the fields of guidance, research and credit, in proportion to the size of the agricultural sector with respect to the number of farmers and the value of products.

"Second: That agriculture be financially independent by producing all products locally and making foreign currencies available to meet various expenses.

"Third: Creating a production and marketing system controlled by the private sector.

"Fourth: Having a balanced agriculture without excessive dependence on one basic produce.

"Fifth: Providing food stuffs at reasonable prices for the consumer.

"As for the fishing sector, the ministry's plans are represented as follows:

"First, Guiding the exploitation of fishing wealth.

"Second: Raising the economic and social level of traditional fishermen by providing the requisites of production for them.

"Third: Encouraging the private sector to enter into fishing industries.

"Fourth: Establishing a marketing network to ensure the continuing availability of fish at reasonable prices.

"Fifth: Training and teaching fishermen at all levels.

"In summary it can be said that our step-by-step projects in the second five-year plan for the agricultural sector and water and fishing resources have been drafted in consideration of the Omani situation, aimed at continuing and strengthening the public support system, especially for agriculture, and to positively influence and develop the traditional private sector in agriculture as much and as quickly as possible in the regions of national importance. The plan also works on raising the fishing production level, raising the standard of living of local fishermen, and strengthening the basic framework of that sector.

"As for the projects whose establishment is planned for within the five-year plan in the field of agriculture and livestock wealth, they are to support existing research stations in both Ramsis and Salalah, and to establish other research stations in Tunuf and al-Rustaq to study date palms, and others in Shinas, Ibra, and 'Ibri. In the field of livestock research support is planned for existing research stations and setting up a research program for chickens in Ramsis and al-Khaburah, as well as setting up other research stations in Salalah. In the field of quarantine and veterinary centers the plan will support and establish new quarantine centers in several locations in the sultanate. In the field of agricultural regions and agricultural services centers the plan will develop and establish 40 centers for agricultural services and guidance in various regions of the sultanate. In the field of reclamation and cultivation of land the plan will undertake a farming study and analysis of about 100,000 hectares and will also cultivate 900 hectares with wheat in the Quryat valley, cultivate 200 hectares in the al-Kamil and al-Wafi areas, 200 hectares in al-Buraymi, and 300 more hectares in miscellaneous areas. In the field of agricultural industries we will undertake studies in producing and processing tobacco in Oman.

"In the field of irrigation and water resources we plan to restore and maintain wells and springs in numerous regions of the sultanate, as well as implementing irrigations of 11 regions, carrying out studies to provide water for new ground made fertile from agricultural studies, establishing projects to set up dams to protect from floods, and establishing dams to collect water various regions of the sultanate.

"As for the field of fishing:

"We plan to establish a marine sciences center, a refrigeration center in the interior, wharves and marine workshops."

Concerning the coordination between the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries and the Ministry of Land and Municipality Affairs in the interest of land distribution among the citizens His Excellency the minister said: "Sultanate regulation number 1972/4 stipulates that in the distribution of agricultural land there will be cooperation between the Ministry of Land and Municipality Affairs and the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. This cooperation between the two ministries exists. The sultanate regulation stipulates that agricultural land distribution is within the authority of the Ministry of Land Affairs, as sultanate regulation number 80/5 pertaining to land law stipulates that the two ministries cooperate in determining a minimum area of land for agriculture.

"On our part in the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries we take two important factors into consideration. The first factor is the suitability of the soil for agriculture. We perform a soil analysis to determine the extent of its suitability for agriculture and the soil type in view of the produce that will be raised. The second factor is the availability of water in the area. We undertake a study to determine the extent of the availability of water which will help in agricultural irrigation operations, which is an important aspect of the piece of land which is granted to the citizen. There are some regions of the sultanate in which the digging of wells for drinking water or irrigation is prohibited due to the presence of salt in the water. These areas lie between al-Ghibrah and near Barka'."

In answer to question about the shortage of water resources from springs during the past period and the role of the ministry in restoring water resources from springs to what they were previously, His Excellency the minister of Agriculture and Fisheries said: "As is well-known, Oman and the rest of the other countries, especially those which share the same geographical latitude in this phase, that there is a weather and climatic wave that differs from previous conditions. This affects springs especially because they obtain their water from the first layer, that is the surface layer, which is subject to the changes in climate. For this reason the ministry has extended efforts to dig some wells to feed the underground springs which were harmed by this natural phenomenon. The goal from this is to help with the springs. The ministry has other projects under study with the aim of setting up underground reservoirs to feed the springs, and dikes to prevent floods.

"The ministry has hired three citizens with experience in maintaining springs on a recommendation from the council on agriculture, fishing and industry. The ministry is also studying the employment of other with experience in this field, in accordance with the capabilities given the ministry."

9785

CSO: 4802

PROPOSED 1981 GENERAL STATE BUDGET OUTLINED

Damascus AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 31 Dec 80 p 3

[Government Statement Delivered to People's Council on the General State Budget for 1981]

[Text] The 1981 budget totals 30.48 billion Syrian pounds. Of this amount, 13.78 billion is for investment expenditures and 16.7 billion is for current expenditures. The contents of the budget can be explained through a review of the following points:

1. Revenues allocated to finance both the investment and the current expenditure parts of the budget.
2. Appropriations for both investment projects and current expenditures, including a comparison with the 1980 budget and an explanation of the reasons for changes incorporated in the 1981 budget.

There is an increase in the estimates of disposable surpluses in the financial and banking sector, commercial sector and [other] economic institutions. The same is true of most firms of the public industrial sector which are expected to expand their activities and put some new projects into operation in 1981.

Estimates of Current Revenues

Current budget revenues for 1981 are estimated at 6 billion Syrian pounds as compared to 4.67 billion for 1980. This represents an increase of 1.46 [as published] billion and a percentage increase of approximately 32 percent. The reasons for the increase are as follows:

Taxes On Income Production

A. Revenues from the tax on income from real estate are estimated at 150 million Syrian pounds as compared to 115 million pounds for 1980. This represents an increase of 35 million attributable to the annual percentage increase in the number of pieces of real estate available for occupation as residences and to the effect of Law No 83 of 1979 which modifies taxation of real estate [occupied by owners of the property] on the basis of value of the property.

B. Income taxes from those engaged in industrial, commercial, and non-commercial trades and professions are estimated at 1.3 billion as compared to 1.2 billion in 1980, representing an increase of 100 million. This increase is due to the following reasons:

1. Completion of work on the general classification of fixed income and the probability of an increase in revenues from its taxation.
2. An increase in the taxes paid by the public sector.
3. Continued work on the collection of back taxes during 1981. It should be mentioned that the Ministry of Finance has prepared an amendment to the income tax law which provides for the following:
 - a. Narrowing the base of fixed income taxpayers.
 - b. Elimination of taxation on the basis of estimated profits.
 - c. Increase of taxation on actual profits.

The necessary steps are being taken to secure ratification of the above-mentioned amendment, but its effect will not be felt until 1982 since it will apply to 1981 income.

d. The estimates of agricultural production and cotton export taxes remain the same as for 1980. However, it is hoped that cotton prices on the world market will improve and production will increase.

Taxes on Consumption

Revenues from dues on consumption of goods and services in 1981 are estimated at 2.758 billion Syrian pounds, as compared to 1.59 billion in 1980. This represents an increase of 68 percent. This is in light of the tax reforms which will be adopted starting in 1981.

Estimates of Surpluses of Economic Segment of Public Sector

Revenues resulting from surpluses of public companies, enterprises and establishments of an economic type are classified according to source as follows:

1. Surpluses resulting from the net profits of some public companies and enterprises such as the companies and establishments of the industrial, agricultural, and commercial sectors.
2. Surpluses which represent an increase in the revenues of some enterprises in relation to their expenditures, such as the surpluses of the Insurance and Pension Organization, the Social Insurance Organization and other institutions in the financial sector.
3. Mining enterprise surpluses which result from sale of the production of some natural resources such as crude oil, phosphates, and asphalt.

4. Liquidity surpluses, which include the depreciation of fixed assets which are expected to be retired for obsolescence, in addition to some accounting reserves set up for contingent losses.

Estimates of the surpluses of the economic segment of the sector were approximately 10 billion [Syrian pounds] for 1981, as compared to 8.603 billion for 1980. This represents an increase of 1.4 billion.

The Agricultural Sector

Estimates for this sector for 1981 increased by 32 percent over 1980. The reason for this is the increase in the estimated surpluses of some of this sector's enterprises.

It should be mentioned that surpluses in some of the enterprises of this sector depend on the effect of seasonal factors. However, efforts will be made to increase productivity to an acceptable level.

The Sector of Public Construction Companies

Estimates of the disposable surplus in this sector increased by 533,917,000 Syrian pounds. This is due to the anticipated increase in surpluses of the companies of this sector, based on their projected rate of activity in 1981.

Estimates of Appropriations for Current Operations

Estimates of appropriations for current operations for 1981 were 16.7 billion as compared to 14.59 billion for 1980. This represents an increase of about 2 billion Syrian pounds.

It should be mentioned that this increase is largely attributable to:

1. Obligations arising from Legislative Decree No 3 of 1980, which includes a salary increase for state employees.
2. The increase in improvements in the various levels of the educational system.
3. The increase in the state's efforts to stabilize the prices of subsidized goods.

Investment Expenditures

In view of the fact that preparation of the current 1981 budget occurs during the end of the fourth five-year-plan and the beginning of the fifty five-year-plan, it is appropriate to take a quick look at the present state of development of the national economy in order to discover some of the principles of this budget.

1. Steadily increasing economic and social growth was achieved during the time period 1975-1980. The Syrian national economy experienced considerable development. Growth in its various sectors continued. Most of the growth and development was positive in terms of direction and results, although a small part of it was undesirable in some aspects.

Great accomplishments were achieved in terms of growth in the gross and net domestic product, steadily increasing employment opportunities for the work force, expansion and diversification of investment in net industrial capital formation. This covers the establishment of numerous processing industries, and the extraction of underground resources such as crude oil, phosphates, rock salt, calcareous asphalt, etc. There was also expansion in the scope of power production and setting up of irrigation and drainage systems for purposes of expanding agriculture and the basic infrastructure for transportation and communications.

Also, government and social services were expanded in the realms of education, public health, culture, and sports, and these services were made available to both rural and urban areas.

Likewise, the economic segment of the public sector assumed a fundamental role in the sectors of agriculture, industry, retail trade, wholesale trade, financial services, and insurance services, as well as in the realms of building, construction, exporting, and importing.

All of this has had a positive effect both morally and materially. The material living standard has gone up and there has been an increase in the use of government services such as public health, education, and other services which have been more extensively funded in order to serve the interests of the entire nation.

2. There has been a steady average increase in production and in the gross domestic product. In terms of 1975 prices, the average increase was 5.8 percent for the period 1975-80. It should be noted that the percentage contribution of the service sectors to the gross domestic product, in terms of (1975) prices rose from 57.6 percent in 1975 to 59 percent in 1980.

3. There has been a steady increase in the net domestic produce in terms of 1975 prices. The average increase has been 5.4 percent per year. This has been reflected in the increase in the individual's average share of it--an average annual increase of 1.5 percent.

If we want to know the rate of increase in the contribution of the most important economic sectors to the net domestic product, in terms of 1975 prices, we have the following figures:

1. The contribution of the agricultural sector increased from 3.628 billion [Syrian pounds] in 1975 to 4.665 billion in 1980.

2. The contribution of the industrial sector increased from 3.959 billion in 1975 to 4.07 billion in 1980.

3. The contribution of the commercial sector increased from 4.533 billion in 1975 to 6.917 billion in 1980.

4. The ratio of ultimate consumption to the gross domestic product rose from 83.9 percent in 1975 to 90 percent in 1979. However, it is expected that this ratio will decrease to 85 percent in 1980. This will take place within the framework

of a policy of guidance and control followed by the state. It will guarantee the channeling of a part of the increase in production and the gross domestic product into more savings, and will consolidate the local financing of investments.

5. Thus, the ratio of savings to the gross domestic product, which decreased from 16.1 percent in 1975 to 9.9 percent in 1979, rose to 14.6 percent in 1980. This was reflected in a positive way in investment. The ratio of investment to the gross domestic product was 28.6 percent in 1975. It stayed more or less the same in 1979, but is expected to rise to about 33 percent in 1981.

6. In the field of foreign trade, our exports of goods and services, in terms of [1975] prices, rose from 4.409 billion Syrian pounds in 1975 to 5.3 billion Syrian pounds in 1980, following a decrease in 1979. It is expected that our exports will increase, especially exports of manufactured goods. This will take place after putting certain production projects into operation starting in 1981.

Imports are still steadily increasing because of the need of development projects for machinery and equipment, on one hand, and for some basic raw materials, on the other.

7. There has been an increase in total expenditures--both for investment and consumption. Investment expenditures for fixed capital formation increased at an annual average of 6.8 percent [from 1975 to 1979]. Consumption increased at an annual average rate of 6.2 percent during the period 1975-79.

Investment expenditures will increase productive capacity and consequently increase both production and the gross domestic product. The increase in expenditures for consumption is attributable to successive increases and expansion in expenditures on government services such as education, public health, transportation, culture, national defense, and other services for the benefit of the entire nation. Bearing this in mind, we realize that it is necessary to begin establishing a proportional relationship between our national resources, as represented by the gross domestic product on one hand, and expenditures--both for investment and consumption--on the other. It is also necessary to seek to decrease the deficit in our balance of trade and balance of payments with foreign countries.

8. There was a disparity between the rates of increase in investments and the rates of increase in the gross domestic product. Part of this disparity can be attributed to the diffusion and lack of integration of investments, in terms of mix or potential, with existing development capabilities. [The investment programs] did not keep pace with the basic structural composition of our available labor force and with the investments and efforts expended to develop it, either in terms of professional skills and specialties or in terms of providing the qualifications needed for operating [industries] with high efficiency. To remedy the situation, the labor force plan should be made one of the basic elements of the development plan so as to bring about essential changes in the structure of the national economy.

Thus, the estimates of appropriations for investment projects for 1981 were arrived at in light of the following principles:

1. Ideal operation of our existing economic projects and serious efforts to productively operate as soon as possible those projects which are about to be completed or started.
2. Achievement of large-scale, rapid development in the agricultural sector, both in the realm of cultivation and animal husbandry, and adoption of the view that the growth and development of our rural areas is the foremost task of our economic and social planning.
3. Application of the concept of comprehensive planning so that our planning will take into account both local and national variables and will be relevant to all of sectors and units of our national economy.

Estimates of Appropriations for Investment Projects

Estimates of proposed appropriations for investment projects for 1981 were 13.494 billion [Syrian pounds]. These estimates were arrived at according to the following principles:

1. Principal emphasis was put on earmarking funds for the completion of projects which have been started, and for better operation of existing projects in order to increase production and productivity. Production is the objective and investment programs are the tool by means of which to achieve this objective.
2. Emphasis was placed on earmarking appropriate funds to achieve the objective of developing agriculture and the rural areas, as well as for central and local services, industrial investments, and mining.

Summary

The aforementioned shows that the budget plan submitted for 1981 is based on a number of basic principles, the most important of which are the following:

1. Pursuing application of the concept of comprehensive planning. In its first stage, this involves striving to achieve a balance between current and investment expenditures [and between expenditures] and local revenues. It also involves pursuing the development of financial planning, which constitutes an integral part of economic planning, and using the budget as one of the tools for implementing the [development] plan.
2. Striving to increase the production of goods by means of better methods, and providing the necessary funds for this, bearing in mind the need to continue investing in the service sectors due to the benefits which they provide for the entire nation.
3. Basing investment expenditures on optimum national economic objectives, such as productivity, production requirements, and marketing channels.

Guided by these principles, the government will--in addition to adopting this budget--continue to pursue other ways and means, including:

1. Taking scientific and objective measures to raise the productivity and returns of both existing public sector enterprises and public sector enterprises which will be established.
2. Taking successive steps to implement tax reform.
3. Taking successive steps to guide and control consumption, [the production and use of] energy, the prices of food supply commodities, frugality and the elimination of waste.

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